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ABSTRACT 
 
Fiscal Autonomy: 
Urban Democracy and the Politics of Public Finance in Dakar, Senegal 
 
by 
 
James Christopher Mizes 
 
Doctor of Philosophy in City and Regional Planning 
 
with a Designated Emphasis in Global Metropolitan Studies  
 
University of California, Berkeley  
 
Professor Teresa P.R. Caldeira, Chair  
	
This dissertation is an ethnographic investigation into how democratic municipalities in 
Dakar, Senegal are formed and reformed. The municipal scale of government has long 
been both a modern norm and a central object of governmental reform throughout the 
Francophone world. Established in the late 19th century as a colony of France, Dakar is 
one of the oldest local democracies in Africa and remains today a model of democratic 
reform for municipal governments across the continent. In 2013, the Senegalese legis-
lature passed what is known colloquially as Act III of decentralization. This national re-
form legally delegated political and fiscal authority to Senegal’s lowest level of territorial 
administration—the commune—inaugurating what the law itself referred to as the “com-
plete communalization of the national territory”. Yet far from resolving the problem of 
communal form, the Act III incited a novel set of experiments in communal authority.  
 
This dissertation reveals a broader terrain of democratic politics and reform that 
is beyond the more familiar domains of law and public debate. I examine the novel set 
of experimental techniques that have emerged out of critical reflections on the problem 
of communal form in Dakar. Posing the communal form as contested problem-space, I 
follow a range of experiments through which diverse actors make sense of how public 
authority should be distributed across Dakar’s urban terrain. To analyze the politics of 
this distribution, I develop the concept of municipal state formation: the set of techniques 
through which sub-national governments take on functions of the sovereign nation and 
exercise legitimate authority over citizens, populations, publics, and territory.  
 
Yet this dissertation does not demonstrate how communes have arrived, once 
and for all, fully formed—or, as the Senegalese laws describe it, “fully empowered”. Mu-
nicipal state formation is never complete; it is an ongoing process of experimentation, 
disagreement, and piecemeal reform. In the wake of Act III, most communal officials 
articulated a commonly held critique: the laws had devolved new responsibilities, but 
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without the necessary revenues to match. There was, in other words, a persistent mis-
match between political and fiscal decentralization. For this reason, I examine fiscal ad-
ministration as a particularly consequential political terrain in which the problem of com-
munal form took shape in Dakar. 
 
This dissertation is organized into five substantive chapters and a conclusion. Af-
ter introducing the concept of municipal state formation, the second chapter reveals how 
a French colonial policy of assimilation provided the political conditions for the legal 
constitution communes in Senegal. But these laws were also formed in relation to a 
longstanding dispute over the fiscal administration of the communes. The third chapter 
turns to one such dispute over Dakar’s municipal bond program. Although the program 
was ultimately sabotaged by the central state, it introduced a novel political terrain into 
this long-standing dispute over fiscal administration: public financial evaluation. I argue 
that such evaluations made an appeal to an audience beyond the courts—what I term, 
a financial public—to assert the City’s claim to municipal authority.  
 
The fourth chapter examines a similarly unsuccessful experiment to re-distribute 
public authority in Dakar. In partnership with a private firm, municipal authorities con-
structed a commercial center in which to relocate thousands of Dakar’s walking street 
vendors. The program introduced a familiar form of a neoliberal fiscal contract: the user-
fee. However, vendors disagreed with the poor location and high cost of the building, 
and unequivocally refused to relocate. In this chapter, I argue that this failed neoliberal 
program provided the conditions under which vendors’ refusal became a possible and 
effective political act, successfully delimiting when and where municipal authority was 
legitimately exercised in Dakar. 
 
The final chapter returns to a more traditional aspect of public authority: the right 
to tax. Although Act III supposedly delegated several new local taxes, bureaucrats and 
officials nevertheless had to experiment with novel techniques of rule to exercise com-
munal authority on the ground. One local commune pushed the limits of communal rights 
to enforce tax collection by drawing on the mayor’s public reputation for violence. The 
Mayor’s reputation as an armed murderer with a “flare for the aggressive” shaped how 
and where street-level bureaucrats collected taxes. Tax collection thus became more 
than an accounting of the physical landscape: it was a technique of territorial control 
grounded in a reputation for unlawful violence. 
 
This dissertation concludes with a reflection on how the concept of municipal 
state formation may be extended to cities far from Dakar. To make this comparative 
case, I briefly analyze the problem of metropolitan fragmentation in St. Louis, Missouri. 
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PREFACE 
 
In 2013, a new narrative about the continent of Africa began to grace the covers of prom-
inent American periodicals. Time Magazine (Perry, 2012) and The Economist (2013) had 
both declared Africa the new global investment frontier, dubbing the continent’s moment 
of fast-paced economic and consumer growth “Africa Rising”. There was, in other 
words, a new narrative of Africa afoot in print forums that had historically painted a rather 
pessimistic vision of the continent’s future. Just one decade prior, for example, The 
Economist (2000) lamented Africa as a “hopeless continent”, arguing that the ongoing 
war in the West African city of Freetown (Sierra Leone) symbolized nothing short of “fail-
ure and despair” for American and European intervention on the continent writ large. 
Fast forward to 2013 and The Economist offered a radical reversal of this image of Africa: 
in place of war-torn Freetown, the bustling and lively Onitsha market in southern Nigeria 
had become the exemplar of Africa’s new time.  
 
I began formulating this research project in the same year that The Economist 
declared Africa was rising, and I set out to make sense of this potentially radical reversal 
of Africa’s position in the global economy. But also, I began this research as a complete 
newcomer to Africa and African studies: I had just finished a master’s project on the 
Campaign to Take Back Vacant Land in North Philadelphia, I had never previously taken 
any classes or read any significant work about Africa or by African authors—except for 
Things Fall Apart (Achebe, 2010) and The Heart of Darkness (Conrad, 1996)—and I had 
never been anywhere near the continent. I spoke only English, and I didn’t have enough 
resources to travel abroad. For these reasons, one of my professors had sufficiently dis-
couraged me from conducting research in or about the Global South. I did, however, live 
in a neighborhood of West African immigrants, I had access to Temple University's li-
brary (I was an adjunct lecturer in geography at the time), and I had recently been ac-
cepted to the PhD program in City & Regional Planning at the University of California, 
Berkeley. I was offered a generous scholarship, and my future advisor, Ananya Roy, en-
couraged me to think beyond—but still with—Philadelphia.  
 
 With this newfound support, I turned my scholarly attention to Africa. I was in-
vested in and inspired by Black social movements in the U.S., and African studies 
seemed like an obvious global fit. I was still a relatively ignorant newcomer, but I never-
theless intended to challenge—and critique—Americans’ commonly held assumptions 
about the continent. Especially my own. What little I knew about Africa was overwhelm-
ingly negative: the conventional wisdom seemed to be one of developmental failure, 
widespread war and ethnic conflict, and the persistence of a rather parochial and pas-
toral way of life. And even the critiques of this conventional understanding were grim. 
Not only were famine and genocide the norm, but it was European colonists and, later, 
American development experts, that had explicitly underdeveloped the continent and 
held it to this overwhelmingly abysmal state of affairs. Yes, there were cities, but they 
appeared as massive slums about which even scholars understood close to nothing 
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(Watts, 2005: 189). Even Africa’s modern cities were exemplars of a dystopian global 
future (Davis, 2006).  
 
 Imagine my surprise upon reading The Economist in 2013! What I saw in the pop-
ular media had almost nothing to do with what I was reading in the conventional and 
critical scholarship on Africa. And in urban studies, the students and professors inter-
ested in the Global South were almost universally also interested in poverty, slums, co-
lonial violence, suffering, and abjection. But as a close reader of the scholarship of J.K. 
Gibson-Graham (1996, 2006), I had little interest in confirming a general belief that Africa 
was marginal—even, or perhaps especially, as a form of critique. It seemed absurd that 
a relatively conservative American publication would be leading a progressive charge to 
challenge our assumptions about what Africa is or should be today. Were they just naïve 
apologists for the capitalist status quo? Was this new triumphalism nothing more than 
making new markets for American capital after the last financial crisis? As it turns out: 
No. The Economist wasn’t alone in making positive declarations about the future of the 
African continent and, as I would later find out, was incredibly late to the game.  
 
 Before The Economist turned its attention to Africa’s growing middle-class con-
sumerism, there had already emerged a literary movement that was quickly changing 
how and who narrated Africa’s present and future in the world. In 2005, Taiye Selasi 
published a short article in Australian pop culture magazine, The Lip, titled “Bye-Bye 
Babar” (Selasi, 2005). In it, Selasi introduced the idea of Afropolitanism to a popular 
audience: it is a new demographic of young, talented children of African migrants from 
the 1960s and 70s who reject the negative portrayals of the continent; who reject any 
singular identity based on nationality, or ethnicity, or city; and who advance a creative 
and more cosmopolitan understanding of the African experience. Selasi and the Afropol-
itan authors popular at this time—Chimamanda Ngozi Adichi, NoViolet Bulawayo, Teju 
Cole, and perhaps the late Binyavanga Wainaina, among others—embodied an argu-
ment about how Africa and its diaspora could and should be narrated differently. It was 
a direct challenge to literary convention and to common understandings of the continent 
outside it. 
 
But more than a celebration of new, chic generation of global elites, Afropolitan-
ism introduced a shift in thinking about Africa’s engagement with the world. As Achille 
Mbembe (Mbembe & Balakrishnan, 2016) argues, “Afropolitanism refers to the ways—
the many ways—in which Africans, or people of African origin, understand themselves 
as being part of the world rather than being apart” (29). Afropolitanism is critical reflection 
on Africa in the world. But it is only a new form of a very old, dynamic, and diverse 
constellation of what Mbembe terms Black reason (2017). For Mbembe, Black reason 
denotes how the concept of Blackness—the racial subject—was brought into and trans-
formed modern rationalities. It is “a collection of voices, pronouncements, discourses, 
forms of knowledge, commentary, and non-sense, whose object is things or people of 
African origin” (2017: 27). Indeed, Mbembe’s terrain of Black reason is as expansive as 
world history: from the ethnological and philosophical understandings of Africa as a 
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place of un-reason, to the conscription and liberation of the Atlantic slave, to the con-
temporary generalization of Black identities. But I want to highlight briefly here one gen-
eral feature of Black reason: it is the panoply of critical reflections on the role of the 
racialized subject—and object—in modern forms.  
 
In this dissertation, I take one such site of critical reflection as my starting point: 
the Senegalese municipality. I do not celebrate or denounce the new narrative of eco-
nomic ascendancy in Africa, nor do I follow the cultural production of young elites in the 
African diaspora. Instead, I examine some rather mundane technical experiments in mu-
nicipal government. I begin with a story of how, in 2013, one city—Dakar, Senegal—
made a claim to Africa’s changing place in the global economy. Yet in investigating this 
contemporary claim, I discovered that it wasn’t necessarily anything new: the City of 
Dakar has long offered a style of critical reflection on—and practical interventions to-
wards—transforming Africa’s relation to the world. This dissertation is an investigation 
into one such form of reason that has long framed anti- and post-colonial politics in 
Dakar. And as I will demonstrate throughout this text, the “city”—in particular, the mun-
dane mechanics of municipal government—began as and remains a privileged site 
through which Dakar’s more practical intellectuals have advanced claims to a global 
modernity.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
Introduction 
Experiments in Municipal State Formation 
 
In 2013, the pan-African publication Jeune Afrique reported that the City of Dakar had 
received the first credit rating for a municipal government in West Africa (Dakar évaluée, 
2013). What is more, Dakar had received a positive, investment-grade rating: BBB+ in 
the long term and an A3 in the short term, both with a positive prospect for future im-
provement. The credit rating agency, however, was not without its reservations, noting 
the City’s strong dependence on local taxes which it neither controlled nor managed—
it was the central state, not the City, that set and collected such revenues. According to 
the credit rating firm, this rendered the City incapable of budgetary planning beyond one 
fiscal year. Unable to anticipate its own budget, the agency noted, the City would be 
unable to plan for its own urban growth. But the positive rating reflected the agency’s 
confidence that the City of Dakar was willing to undertake reforms to improve its capacity 
to plan for its future.  
 
 The rating was also a groundbreaking event for Bloomfield Investments, the 
young credit rating agency based in Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) which had issued Dakar’s 
positive rating. The agency had recently carved out a space for itself as the pre-eminent 
ratings agency on the West African Stock Exchange, and the rating of Dakar marked its 
first foray into sub-national government. Bloomfield had rated sovereign governments, 
project bonds, and private firms, but it had not yet rated a municipality. In his interview 
with Jeune Afrique, Youssouf Carius, chief economist at Bloomfield, underlined the im-
portance of this new approach. He argued that the City’s inability to plan was out of step 
with the strategic actions recommended by international organizations: The African De-
velopment Bank, The International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank were all turning 
towards local government as the right scale at which to plan for economic growth and 
development (Dakar évaluée, 2013). And the positive rating reflected the City’s positive 
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record of debt repayment and its willingness to improve its financial management prac-
tices. 
 
 This focus on local development is not new. In the 1990s, the “local” emerged as 
a central site of intervention for international development organizations (Mohan and 
Stokke, 2000). Local development promised more democracy and more inclusion for the 
very people expected to benefit from development’s public goods (roads, electricity, 
sanitation, etc). But by 2013, international development experts had transformed the 
justification and even the scale for sub-national intervention. Rather than focus on a 
community and its neighborhood, experts turned instead to the city and its region. For 
example, a prominent World Bank report titled Africa’s Cities: Opening Doors to the 
World (Lall et al., 2017) argued that cities like Dakar deterred entrepreneurs and investors 
because they are “crowded, disconnected, and costly”. To reap the benefits of urban 
agglomerations, the report argued, governments must harness the value in land markets 
for public ends, invest in functional and connective infrastructure, and reduce the nega-
tive externalities of urban growth and development. 
 
  Such policy prescriptions are hardly new to urban planning. There is a long tradi-
tion of scholarship that argues in favor of coordinating land use and infrastructure at the 
scale of the city-region1. According to this line of thinking, facilitating agglomeration re-
duces transaction costs and increases access to a diverse labor force. Alan Scott and 
Michael Storper (2007) have even gone so far as to argue that such agglomeration is the 
universal, natural, and most valuable feature of cities. But it was only since the turn of 
the new millennium that development experts were beginning to take up and apply this 
conventional wisdom to the Global South. Indeed, the World Bank’s report on Africa was 
only one report in a slew of new “Urbanization Reviews” which were tasked with evalu-
ating the strategic investment priorities for cities. And some of development’s most 
prominent thinkers had similarly established an urban economic development agenda2. 
These reports are exemplary of a contemporary shift in development expertise towards 
a global urban agenda. What remained to be seen, however, was how cities would ex-
periment with such an agenda on the ground.  
 
The City of Dakar’s credit rating was at the forefront of this renewed and relocated 
focus on urban development. The City undertook the rating in preparation to issue the 
widely celebrated first sub-national bond in West Africa without the financial guarantee 
of the sovereign nation-state. The issuance was supported by a host of international 
organizations—from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, the United States Agency 
for International Development (USAID), The World Bank, and The French Development 
																																																						
1 Agglomeration theory focuses on the positive relationship between national rates of urbanization and 
GDP per capita, and argues that cities are therefore an important foundation of future growth. For the 
most prominent scholarly articulations of this concept, see Behrens & Robert-Nicoud (2015), Duranton & 
Puga (2004), Henderson (2010), or Glaeser (2010).  
2 For example, Paul Collier is leading the International Growth Center’s Cities That Work Initiative, which 
aims to bring together researchers and policymakers around urban development issues. For an exem-
plary synthesis of this work on cities and finance, see Haas & Collier (2015). 
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Agency. But the financing itself would come from investors on the West African Stock 
Exchange, and not from the conditional loans of a development bank. However, the 
Gates Foundation required its funding to support pro-poor interventions, and the bond 
money was therefore slated to fund the construction of a commercial center in which to 
relocate thousands of Dakar’s walking street vendors. The rationale for this focus on 
relocation was in line with the conventional wisdom on urban agglomeration: liberating 
the streets from vendors would decrease the negative externalities of agglomeration—
in this case, street congestion—and increase economic productivity for the entire coun-
try. 
 
Few municipalities on the continent had issued debt on a regional stock ex-
change, and nearly all of them were in South Africa. In West Africa, only Douala (Came-
roon) had previously attempted such a debt issuance, but the debt repayments had fallen 
apart due to the mismanagement of funds by the elected officials responsible for pro-
gram. Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) received a poor credit rating and was far from issuing mar-
ketable debt on the stock exchange and Kampala (Uganda) was constitutionally limited 
on how much debt it could legally take on. Cities across Latin America, South Asia, 
Eastern Europe, and Southeast Asia were also experimenting with municipal bond issu-
ances many with notable successes. The Mayor of Dakar had himself taken inspiration 
from his visit to Bogotá (Colombia), a municipality with an investment grade credit rating 
which had successfully made several major debt issuances for funding public works.  
 
It is in this sense that the City of Dakar became one of Africa’s flagship experi-
ments in a contemporary shift in the global economy and its development. There was 
something new and different about the City’s experiment that marked a stark contrast 
from the kinds of interventions that came before it: First, and most obviously, it con-
cerned a city-region and its municipality. Development lending had hereto largely taken 
place at the scale of the nation-state, and later at the scale of individual or community 
microfinance loans. But experiments like Dakar’s introduced and popularized this novel 
scale of developmental intervention. Second, the diversity of institutions involved had 
significantly reconfigured roles. In place of a development bank, for example, there was 
a regional stock exchange and a regional credit risk rating agency. The City of Dakar 
intended to leverage West African wealth from West African investors to address West 
Africa’s own urban needs. Importantly, European and American capital was not on the 
table. This new configuration is exemplary of the emerging vision for Africa’s new time 
in which continental capital and continental planning would drive Africa’s rising econo-
mies (Mizes, 2016).  
 
The City had never previously exercised any authority to issue municipal bonds, 
but the positive credit rating catapulted it into this uncertain political terrain. Although 
the City had taken out loans from development banks, there was no national or regional 
precedent for bond debt. Even the regulatory authority for the regional stock exchange 
had to create new rules for this issuance alone. But, if successful, Dakar’s bonds would 
pave the way for future municipalities in the monetary region to issue their own debt on 
the exchange. Indeed, the City’s experimental approach to finance was exemplary of the 
4 
	
changing narrative about Africa that was afoot in 2013. In this narrative, Dakar and its 
municipality had emerged as a privileged site through which an African locale was mak-
ing claims to a changing global modernity: no longer subjected to the constraints of 
Euro-American capital, African cities could become authors of their own future. In a 
flashy and experimental way, Dakar was reconfiguring its relationship to the world.  
 
But at the time of the rating, it was unclear how—or if—the bond would make any 
meaningful advances in the City’s authority or capacity to govern. In fact, it would later 
become painfully obvious that Dakar’s experiment was a spectacular kind of develop-
mental failure. In a shocking turn of events, the central government withdrew its legal 
support for the issuance, sabotaged the entire program, and imprisoned the Mayor with-
out trial. Dakar’s bonds would never see the light of day, and in the international devel-
opment arena, the City of Dakar’s experimental program had transformed from a best 
practice to a lesson-learned with the stroke of the sovereign’s pen.  
 
Experiments in Communal Form 
 
In this dissertation, I take Dakar’s failed municipal bond program as a point of departure 
from which to outline some contemporary transformations in Senegalese government, 
sovereignty, and city form. The municipality has long been a central site through which 
Senegal has reconfigured its relationship to the world: the Senegalese municipality be-
gan as the prototypical form of democratic citizenship for colonial subjects in French 
West Africa, and remains in an independent and sovereign Senegal as the most central 
object of democratic reform. Indeed, it is not possible to overstate the importance of the 
municipality for Senegal’s history of democracy. And up to the present, credit ratings 
like Dakar’s are similarly celebrated in terms of transparency, good governance, and 
local democratic accountability3.  
 
However, the political encounters I explore here depart from more conventional 
understandings of where democratic practice takes place. I do not focus on municipal 
elections, participatory workshops, or the deliberative meetings of municipal councils, 
and I do not trace similar kinds of debates over urban politics in Dakar’s vibrant public 
spheres. Instead, I examine the more mundane, bureaucratic, and technical practices 
which play a particularly important role in the formation of municipal democracies. Fur-
ther, I explore here a specific subset of such techniques: experimental ones. I use the 
term experiment to describe governmental techniques that are relatively novel, unfamiliar 
to most actors involved in their administration, and whose future remains uncertain. 
These experiments do not necessarily entail structured spaces of deliberation and de-
bate. But they do incite disagreements over when and where municipal authority may 
legitimately be exercised.  
  
																																																						
3 For the most influential statement on the role of structured finance in urban development and democ-
racy in Africa, see Paulais (2012). 
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To analyze experiments like Dakar’s credit rating, I engage the concept of the 
“city”4. By “city”, I mean a sub-national, governmental form which exercises legitimate 
authority across a physical terrain of dense human settlements. For the purposes of my 
arguments here, this “city” appears in reality as a municipality, but also in its more spe-
cific usage in the Francophone world as a commune. The commune is the smallest level 
of government In France’s territorial administration, and throughout the 18th and 19th 
centuries French colonial authorities reluctantly generalized the communal form across 
select corners of their imperial territories. They are a revolutionary, democratic, and po-
litical form. These communes do not necessarily cover the entire terrain of an urban area, 
but instead more closely approximate a neighborhood or a small community. I take prob-
lem of the “city”—in this case, the commune—in this political sense as my central object 
of analysis. 
 
I begin with a relatively simple question about the “city”: how do small local gov-
ernments come to exercise legitimate authority over an urban terrain? This question is, 
at first glance, an ontological one: how is it that a commune comes into being? Yet an-
alyzing what a commune is and how it has transformed, brings into view a much broader 
constellation of techniques, audiences, and styles of reasoning that have shifted—and 
will continue to shift—over time. In other words, I link an ontological question—What is 
a commune?—to an epistemological one: How does a commune know? How is it 
known? Or, how has the commune been posed as a kind of problem for governmental 
intervention? In the pages that follow, I trace how communes in Dakar are formed and 
reformed. And I locate these transformations in the experimental techniques of municipal 
government. Dakar’s credit rating is one example of such an experimental technique that 
is at the forefront of municipal reform. But the field of experimentation extends far be-
yond—and before—the failed issuance of Dakar’s bonds.  
 
Sub-national governments and imperial territories—of which Dakar is an early ex-
emplar in Africa—have long posed problems for two linked concepts. (1) Sovereignty: 
How is municipal authority exercised and maintained in a context where such authority 
is plural, legally subordinate to the nation, and open to experimentation and dispute? 
And (2) citizenship: Who and what should be included in the municipal jurisdiction? It 
was not always evident that a municipal government in Africa should have any political 
authority to represent the common will of its inhabitants or to regulate an urban terrain. 
And even after independence, a resistance to municipal authority has persisted. But in 
Senegal today, this municipal scale of governmental action is increasingly becoming 
both a norm and a central object of governmental reform.  
 
Yet my intent is not to demonstrate how communes have arrived, once and for 
all, fully formed—or, as the Senegalese laws describe it, “fully empowered” (en plein 
exercise). Instead, I examine the novel set of experimental techniques that have emerged 
																																																						
4	Following Max Weber (1958), I put the term “city” in quotes when I refer to the concept with which I en-
gage in this dissertation. I use the capitalized City when referring to the City of Dakar, and I use the 
lower-case city or cities as a general referent for an urban area. 
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out of critical reflections on the problem of communal form. I understand communal gov-
ernment not only as a source of interventions, but as itself an object of reform. In this 
dissertation, I follow a range of experiments that demonstrate how public authority is 
understood to be distributed and re-distributed across an urban and postcolonial terrain. 
The politics of this distribution is what I term municipal state formation.  
 
By municipal state formation, I refer to the set of techniques through which sub-
national governments take on the central functions of the sovereign nation-state and 
exercise legitimate authority over populations, publics, and territory. For many of the 
development experts, officials, and bureaucrats invested in Senegal’s urban and demo-
cratic future, such municipal state formation is both a normative goal and a historical 
narrative of progress: the fully empowered and democratic local government figures as 
a potent alternative to the despotic, corrupt, and heavily centralized image of the African 
state today5. But in taking a closer look at municipal state formation in Dakar, it becomes 
clear that there is no obvious trend towards a decentralized state. And in a deeply dem-
ocratic city like Dakar, this is always up for debate. It is for this reason that I do not 
understand municipal state formation to be a secular trend or an empirical fact. Instead, 
I investigate the local state as a problem that many of my interlocutors in Dakar were—
often with great difficulty—attempting to resolve. It was not at all clear to them what kind 
of problem the commune was or should be. As a result, these various groups of inter-
ested actors were making sense of—and disagreeing over—the problem of communal 
form.   
 
Senegal falls into line with democratic societies across the world that have legally 
delegated certain aspects of state sovereignty to the municipal level. In this sense, such 
a reorganization of sovereignty is not exceptional. But this notion of a legal delegation 
does not quite capture how municipal governments exercise such authority on the 
ground. Beyond the law, where and when does a redistribution of sovereignty take 
place? In which fora is it contested? And what are the styles of reasoning and techniques 
of power through which such a distribution is justified, exercised, and contested?  
 
Before I turn to the empirical field and conceptual contribution of municipal state 
formation, I want to make a brief methodological note on public money: in this disserta-
tion, I foreground the fiscal relations of municipal government. This is not the only nor by 
any means the most essential entry point from which to investigate the problem of com-
munal form. But scholars and officials alike have long recognized fiscal relations as a 
particularly consequential set of governmental techniques in the formation of modern 
states. For many officials, government means little without the independence and sub-
stantive means to pay for public services. And for scholars, the fisc appears as the foun-
dation of public interest and a shared sense of belonging in—and to—a sovereign state 
																																																						
5 For an exemplary and influential summary of this position see Wunsch & Olowu (1990) and Olowu & 
Wunsch (2004). 
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(i.e. citizenship)6. And more importantly, during my fieldwork in Dakar, the fiscal aspects 
of municipal government emerged as a regular ground for dispute among municipal of-
ficials, bureaucrats, urban publics, and development experts alike. Put more plainly, the 
fisc was just what most my interlocutors were talking about in the years following 2013.  
 
In the rest of this introduction, I will make more explicit the methodological case 
for the fisc as a central site from which to understand how sovereignty is re-distributed, 
and what this redistribution means for the future of the communal form. First, I lay out 
the empirical terrain of this redistribution. In particular, I call attention to the history of 
governmental reflection on the Senegalese commune and its consequences for the kinds 
of experiments I encountered during my ethnographic research. Second, I return to some 
of the urban and political thought that warrants revisiting in light of the concerns brought 
up by such experimentation in Dakar. Finally, I end with the general plan of the argument 
contained in the chapters that follow.  
 
Senegal, Laboratory of Communal Reform 
 
Dakar’s failed municipal bond program brought to the fore a political question of the 
municipal right, authority, and capacity to govern. But in Senegal this problem of com-
munal form has been at the forefront of governmental reflection, intervention, and polit-
ical disputation for over a century. In this section, I introduce the empirical terrain from 
which I draw the central arguments of this dissertation. I situate Dakar’s contemporary 
experiments within a broader set of reflections on—and practical interventions to-
wards—the formation of municipal governments in Senegal.  
 
For several reasons, I view Dakar as a laboratory for the communal form. During 
much of the colonial era, Dakar was the political capital of French West Africa. And, as 
such, the City served as a model for other localities across the region who sought to 
make similar claims to civic status and democratic representation. After independence, 
many newly sovereign states generalized Dakar’s communal form across West Africa. 
Senegal, once again, was the model for such reforms, and remains so today. It is in this 
sense that the commune could be understood as a “form-in-circulation” (Nuttall and 
Mbembe, 2005: 200) for which Dakar is and has been a central reference point. European 
governments have long treated African colonies as laboratories of rule and control, as 
exceptional spaces in which African subjects were deprived of the protections afforded 
many metropolitan citizens7. But Senegal’s communes are exemplary of something dif-
ferent. And rather than denounce or foreclose the practice of colonial experimentation, I 
seek to understand how it has opened as a terrain of political struggle and dispute.  
 
																																																						
6 Further discussion below, but Tilly (1990) Elias (2000), Webber & Wildavsky (1986) and Levi (1989) are 
exemplary, yet contrasting, approaches.  
7 For an exemplary case in urban planning and architecture in Morocco, see Rabinow (1995). Colonial 
health interventions have similarly sought to control African populations (Echenberg, 2002), but 
Mavhunga (2018) demonstrates how African laboratories formed the basis for colonial control policies.  
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Senegalese communes were formed in and through political encounters with met-
ropolitan France. In the 18th and 19th centuries, French cities underwent significant polit-
ical transformation.8 The revolutions across France produced a new form of govern-
ment—the commune—which embodied the liberal values of bourgeois self-government 
and, for a brief moment, the communist values of worker controlled society (Ross, 2015). 
In Senegal, the creation of its communes was a colonial project, but it was also a liberal 
one. The inhabitants of French colonial territories were themselves making increasing 
claims to freedom, autonomy, and independence. And the commune was the first site 
of such civic claims to inclusion in the liberalism of the metropole.  
 
These communes were similarly justified by the ideals and values of the French 
revolutions. Colonial authorities modeled these local governments after their metropoli-
tan counterparts, and conferred upon them the legal status of “commune”. The original 
Four Communes in French West Africa were in Senegal, and their inhabitants had many 
of the same civic rights and responsibilities as French citizens. Although Senegal’s early 
communes were born out of the same revolutionary values as the metropolitan com-
munes, they nevertheless did not share rights identical to those of communes in France. 
Much of the communal struggle during colonialism was to achieve parity of rights for this 
legal status (Goerg, 2006).  
 
Across the continent, colonial governments ruled their subjects in a manner dis-
tinct from how they ruled their own citizens. In such a bi-furcated state, the colonial 
subject did not have the same set of rights and responsibilities as a citizen (Mamdani, 
1996). Senegal, however, was different. In Senegal, civic rights were upheld by the prin-
ciple of assimilation. Spanish imperialism in the Americas set the global precedent for 
the conversion of subjects to European culture and religion (Pagden, 1986). France, in 
turn, secularized this trend and transformed it into a policy of assimilation which aimed 
to cultivate liberal and democratic subjects across its colonial territories. Although 
French colonial rule at the end of the 19th century turned away from assimilation and 
towards indirect rule, official values nevertheless promoted the inclusion of colonial sub-
jects into the political life and culture of metropolitan France (Betts, 2005).  
 
The persistence of assimilation as an official value and aim of French colonial rule 
provided an important condition of possibility for colonial subjects to make increasing 
claims for civic rights from within the structures of colonial rule (Diouf, 1998). Senegal’s 
urban communes were the central site of such claims. Although rural Senegal was gov-
erned through indirect rule, inhabitants of the urban communes were not colonial sub-
jects, but colonial citizens: they were exempt from the French civil code, their municipal 
governments were locally elected, and their representatives held a seat in the French 
National Assembly (Diouf, 1998). French colonial subjects across the region made claims 
to self-rule by establishing their own communes in the image of the Four Communes 
(Légier, 1968). The commune, in other words, began as an assimilative form. In this 
																																																						
8 There is a vast literature on the French Revolutions. For a perspective on the role of Paris and its com-
munes, see Garrioch (2002) and Ferguson (1997).  
9 
	
sense, Senegal’s communes are the prototypical form of democratic citizenship that 
persists across Francophone Africa to this day.  
 
 After national independence in 1960, the urban origins of citizenship in Senegal 
fell out of frame, and national development and democracy took center stage (Chafer, 
2002).The nation-state, however, was not the political form of independence that many 
anti-colonial elites had previously envisioned (Wilder, 2014). Rather than creating a sep-
arate nation of Senegal, these intellectuals and politicians imagined a global federation 
of former French colonies united with metropolitan France (Cooper, 2014). But this po-
litical imaginary never came to fruition, and independence ultimately took the form of a 
national democracy. Post-independence, however, Senegalese officials quickly re-intro-
duced communal reforms as a continuation of the local democratic politics that began 
under French rule. These reforms took the form of national-scale decentralization laws.  
 
 Since 1960, Senegalese leaders have implemented three rounds of such local 
democratic reforms. In 1972, President Senghor passed the ‘Rural Community Laws” 
which sought to extend municipal government to the interior of the country. And twenty 
years later, in 1996, the second President of Senegal Abdou Diouf implemented what 
came to be known as “Act II of Decentralization”. These laws continued the precedent 
inaugurated by Senghor, but re-focused attention on empowering the local governments 
in urban areas and re-drawing the nation’s sub-national map. This law created many of 
the communes that are the focus of my arguments here. And in 2013, Macky Sall passed 
what is perhaps unsurprisingly known as “Act III of Decentralization. These new laws 
once again transformed the legal status of local governments by enacting what its au-
thors termed “the complete communalization of the national territory” (Loi no 2013-
10 :1). It is these most recent laws that incited a host of new experiments and their dis-
putes; a technical politics of the complete communalization of the national territory. 
 
Disputes in Dakar After the Reforms 
 
I began my fieldwork in 2013 just after the passage of Act III of Decentralization, and the 
problem of communal authority was therefore fresh in the minds of the officials and bu-
reaucrats with whom I was conducting my research. But I did not know at the time that 
the commune would come to frame the central focus of this work. I was interested in a 
different question: how was the City of Dakar emerging as a novel link between the for-
malities of the regional stock market and the so-called “informal” urban street markets? 
The economic practices of the street market and the stock market seemed at odds with 
one another, but the Dakar’s municipal bond project was bringing them together in a 
new, unorthodox—and in the eyes of many vendors, at least—nonsensical way. There 
was obviously a large economic transition at stake in 2013, and I wanted to make sense 
of how one rather outlandish bond issuance had come to stand in as a kind of test case 
in this potentially historical shift in Africa’s relationship to the world.  
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 The sabotage of the program, however, brought up a very different set of com-
munal concerns. And as it turned out, this was not the first time that the central govern-
ment had curtailed the authority of a local government. This kind of intervention was, as 
I would soon discover, an emerging kind of governmental norm. And alongside its ap-
parent novelty, there had long been a set of critical reflections and governmental inter-
ventions on the problem of communal government. The 2013 reforms, however, incited 
a new set of experiments in—and disputes over—this governmental form.  
 
 The Ministry of Finance and Budget is the central state institution responsible for 
managing municipal-level public finance. In the weeks following the sabotage of the 
bond program, the Ministry put forth a financial explanation for its withdrawal of support. 
In an initial letter to the City, the Ministry argued that there were two technical problems 
with the bond (Dakar’s Municipal Bond, 2015). First, they argued that the bond was ap-
proved by the municipal council prior to the recent decentralization reforms and needed 
to be re-evaluated considering these reforms. Second, they argued that the City itself 
was already heavily indebted and would be receiving less revenues because of the re-
cent reforms, which together posed a problem for the City’s ability to pay back its bond 
debt. In other words, the Ministry anticipated that a municipal default could require the 
central state to cover these losses, potentially affecting the Senegalese state’s own 
credit rating (Dakar’s Municipal Bond, 2015). The Ministry drew a comparison to the re-
cent fiscal crisis in the American city of Detroit. The regulatory agency of the West African 
Stock Market decided that these concerns “seemed pertinent” and would not proceed 
without central government support (Diatta, 2015).  
 
From the Ministry’s perspective, the technical problems with the bond were finan-
cial and legal: the central state could be required to repay the City’s debt in the case of 
default. But the structure of Dakar’s debt obligation was more than clear. Dakar’s mu-
nicipal bond came with a fifty percent credit guarantee from USAID and was lauded quite 
publicly as the first sub-national issuance in the region without the guarantee of the sov-
ereign nation-state9. Thus, it was clear that the central government was not legally obli-
gated to guarantee or repay any of Dakar’s debt. The Ministry, however, questioned the 
ability of Dakar to meet even these significantly reduced debt obligations. The recent 
decentralization reforms of 2013 created a large reduction in the City’s revenues. The 
credit rating agency agreed, noting that the reforms introduced a degree of uncertainty 
into the municipality’s ability to pay back its debt (Bloomfield Investments, 2013). But 
even with this qualification, the positive rating demonstrated that a bond guaranteed by 
the U.S. government still made financial sense.  
 
For the City of Dakar, Act III posed a fiscal problem. Although the City is the larg-
est local government in the Dakar peninsula, this terrain is also the jurisdiction of 19 
individual  communes.  The City and  the communes  are both  by  law  considered local   
																																																						
9 See, for example, the UK’s Department for International Development memo evaluating Dakar’s munic-
ipal bond program (Neureiter and Jordan, 2017). 
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Figure 1.1 Municipal Territories of Greater Dakar. White lines indicate the borders of three municipali-
ties—Dakar, Guediawaye, Pikine—in the Dakar city-region. The shaded areas in color represent the terri-
tories of the thirty-eight communes which cover the same peninsular terrain.  
Map by Author. Data from Hijmans, 2015. 
 
governments (collectivities locales), but under the new laws the communes became re-
sponsible for most public services and therefore had the rights to most public revenues 
formerly collected by the City of Dakar. The City, in other words, no longer made legal 
sense: there was no legal category for a “city” that clarified how its rights and responsi-
bilities should be distributed among other, overlapping levels of government. The com-
munes, on the other hand, now made more legal sense than ever before: their empow-
erment was at the core of the vision put forth by the 2013 reforms—and, as many mu-
nicipal officials argued, the vision originally put forth in the 1872 empowerment of Sen-
egal’s original Four Communes. In light of this surprising turn of events, I turned my 
attention to a related question that suddenly “seemed pertinent” to my research: how 
were these local governments making sense of the confusion and uncertainty introduced 
by the reforms?  
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 Many blamed politics. The specter of the Mayor’s potential presidential candidacy 
loomed large over the sabotage of the bond. Mayor Sall was a leader in the Socialist 
Party and there was a widespread rumor that he would advance an opposition to Macky 
Sall, the incumbent president and leader of the Alliance for the Republic (APR). So, for 
municipal officials and public commentators, this rivalry appeared as an easy and obvi-
ous explanation for why the central state would sabotage Sall’s flagship fiscal interven-
tion and, later, throw him in jail without a trial on the suspicion that he had embezzled 
public funds. But beyond—and before—an outright debate over electoral ambitions, the 
governmental authorities had long advanced different kinds of arguments about the re-
distribution of municipal authority on the peninsula. Electoral political rivalries, in other 
words, are not enough to make sense of the kinds of disputes engendered by the mu-
nicipal experiments taking place in Dakar. And in this extended field of disputes, it was 
not only the central state that was posing problems for the exercise of municipal author-
ity on the peninsula.  
 
 Take for example, the case of street vending. The bond program failed as a form 
of finance, but it was only one part of an ongoing effort to relocate street vendors. One 
of these efforts used a different kind of experimental funding technique. The City of Da-
kar had partnered with a private firm and another commune to form a public-private 
partnership that successfully constructed a commercial center in which to house thou-
sands of Dakar’s walking street vendors. One of the confusing and absurd aspects of 
the bond program was that it proposed to fund exactly the same kind of building, located 
directly next door to this already constructed building. And this building was already its 
own kind of developmental failure: although the City included vendors’ associations in 
planning the relocation, most vendors ultimately and unequivocally refused to relocate. 
The building remained mostly empty during the entirety of my fieldwork in Dakar, and it 
remains vacant to this day. How is it that such a sustained disagreement came about? 
And what might this mean for the future of the communal form in Dakar?  
 
 The new commercial center was its own kind of experimental intervention. Public-
private partnerships were still a relatively unfamiliar form to most municipal governments, 
even though the central state had executed a massive toll-road investment in partnership 
with a private French firm. Many residents in Dakar, however, critiqued the high cost of 
the toll road and most continued to use the adjacent national highway instead. The pro-
posed commercial center introduced the same unpopular element: user-fees. Vendors’ 
were expected to pay for their own relocation to the commercial center, making a small 
down payment followed by several years of monthly payments until they could claim 
ownership over their market stalls. Most vendors with whom I spoke argued that such 
payments would obviously cut into their earnings, not to mention their dislike of the small 
size and poor location of the stalls themselves. The building, in almost every respect, 
made no sense to most vendors expected to participate in it.  
  
 Communes across Dakar had long been at a loss for how to address the problem 
of vending. Many of the municipal officials with whom I spoke framed the problem as 
follows: although residents were increasingly demanding something to be done about 
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vending in the streets, these markets were also a central source of communal revenue. 
And the little revenue the communes had was not nearly enough to effectively relocate 
the markets, even if they wanted to (and many did not). The user-fees introduced by the 
relocation program were an experimental fix to this problem, as they would leverage the 
wealth of the market to pay for public improvements in the urban built environment. But 
most communes were not experimenting with such novel styles of business investment 
to address urban needs. Instead, they turned to tax collection.  
 
 In my conversations with the municipal secretaries10 of nearly all the communes 
in Dakar, there emerged almost a universal critique of the recent reforms: Act III had 
given the communes more responsibilities, but without the resources to match. As one 
communal Mayor put it, “Act III killed us!” In response, many of these communes hired 
new staff to increase their efforts on the ground to collect the local taxes for which they 
were now legally entitled. Central state transfers and other large revenue streams from 
state agencies were, as one administrator described it, “too political” and “too random”: 
many communes did not know when to expect such transfers or even how much they 
would be. And, at times, some state agencies simply and categorically refused to pay. 
For these reasons, nearly all communes claimed to focus their efforts on local taxes. As 
one municipal secretary put it, “we focus on the taxes we control.”  
 
 Increasing tax revenues, however, is not a simple matter of collection. The com-
munes had never collected many of the taxes to which they were now legally entitled; 
they had little experience or infrastructure in enrollment, billing, and enforcement; and 
they were faced with the difficult prospect of taking money from cash-poor, skeptical 
residents and business owners. In many respects, the communes were tasked with cre-
ating this fiscal bureaucracy from scratch. And I became curious about how such bu-
reaucracies were introducing this new and experimental forms of fiscal authority in the 
wake of the reforms. Although the law had entitled these communes to taxes, how was 
it that they went about exercising the authority to transform private into public wealth? 
And with what effects? 
 
 By 2016, one commune had emerged in the media and in the gossip across town 
as an exemplary case of such authority. One Mayor had literally razed the communal 
landscape of those who contested his imposition of new taxes on advertising in public 
space. Several advertising firms had refused to pay a new rate the Municipal Council 
had recently approved after the reforms, and the Mayor responded by tearing down and 
dismantling their billboards and selling the metal for scrap. Although this act would be 
later deemed illegal, the Mayor was nevertheless within his right to set and collect a new 
tax. The dispute between the commune and the advertising firms set a precedent for 
																																																						
10 Municipal secretaries are the heads of communal administration. They answer only to the Mayor and 
are otherwise at the top of the bureaucratic hierarchy established by the commune itself. Although the 
secretaries began as local representatives of the Socialist Party, the post today retain no political affilia-
tions. Many secretaries make note of the fact that they are not of the same political party as their 
Mayor’s and serve only the public interest.   
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communal right in the courts, but it also revealed a kind of limit case of communal au-
thority: the Mayor and his administration were both within and outside their legal rights. 
How was it, then, that a commune came to exercise a legal authority upheld by excep-
tional means? And what effect did such exceptional violence have on the commune’s 
fiscal bureaucracy? 
 
In 2017, I spent 10 months conducting participant observation with the local tax 
collection team for this commune in Dakar. Over the course of my time at the commune, 
I discovered that the Mayor’s reputation for violence extended far beyond the destruc-
tion of billboards: he and his administration were well-known for having killed a member 
of an opposing political party in front of their City Hall. Gun violence would reappear over 
the course of my fieldwork, but never again resulted in a death. Many in Dakar held up 
this Mayor as exemplary of—and at times, leading—a violent turn in Senegal’s normally 
peaceful political scene. In fact, it is not possible to overstate how unusual and excep-
tional such political violence is in Dakar: killing and gun violence are not the norm, and 
scholars have even taken Senegal’s absence of violence—and the presence of peace—
to be a kind of West African paradox worthy of investigation11. I was surprised and re-
luctant to include this as part of my research, as it did not reflect my experience of the 
city, nor of the very commune which many others in Dakar understood as a source of 
such political violence. Nevertheless, this reputation for violence would come to influ-
ence much of the bureaucratic practice involved in experimenting with tax collection at 
the commune.  
  
 In the chapters that follow, I expand upon this investigation into these three ex-
emplary—yet exceptional—experiments in municipal state formation. I demonstrate how 
municipal financial evaluations for the bond program, the street market relocation and 
its user-fees, and novel practices of communal tax collection all reveal broader trends in 
how communal government was being problematized at the time of my field research in 
Dakar. But to address the specific concerns brought up by the case of Dakar, some of 
the relevant trends in political and urban thought will need revisiting. 
 
Municipal State Formation 
 
The emergence of the municipality as a site and source of governmental intervention and 
civic belonging is particularly noteworthy in postcolonial Africa. Scholars in African stud-
ies have noted the extreme centralization of political authority in the hands of colonial 
administration and, later, the independent nation-state12. As such, scholars have also 
																																																						
11 There have been a number of scholarly inquiries into the role of Islamic religious practices in the 
peaceful regulation colonial economies (Robinson, 2000), civil conflicts (Stepan, 2012), and national de-
mocracy (Diouf, 2012). For a broader review, see O’Brien (1996).  
12 For a summary of this policy position see Wunsch & Olowu (1990). Bayart (1993) and Cooper (2019) 
have also made arguments about the centralization of power in the hands of political elites. And for a 
scholarly critique of centralization from a prominent African scholar and politician, see Sawyer (1992) 
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documented—and critiqued—the limited delegation of authority to lower levels of gov-
ernment in African countries in comparison to elsewhere in the Global South (Olowu and 
Wunsch, 2004). But there has also emerged a trend that runs counter to this story of the 
centralization of regulatory authority: since the 1990s increasing numbers of African 
states have devolved political and fiscal authority to sub-national governments in the 
form of decentralization laws. Dakar is, once again, exemplary in this respect. But how 
might the case of Dakar change how scholars have come to think about such transfor-
mations in the African state? And what other concepts might also warrant revisiting? 
 
Decentralization has been most famously characterized as an old form of local-
ized despotism. In Mahmood Mamdani’s (1996) account, local government across the 
continent is a kind of “decentralized despotism” in which customary authorities were 
appointed by colonial officials to carry out the administrative functions of the state. It is 
in this sense that the local government was not a site from which a properly political 
subject could emerge: there was, in other words, no arena of contestation within the 
state, which led Mamdani to search for political subjects far outside it. This, however, 
does not make sense in Dakar. Although there was a legal distinction between citizen 
and subject—the hallmark of the “bi-furcated state”—such distinctions were always 
open to contestation and debate. And rather than deploying a politics of association and 
indirect rule, the communes in Senegal were in principle structured in terms of a politics 
of assimilation and, as such, offered up citizenship to the former subjects of the state.   
 
Fred Cooper (2013) has offered a history of the African state that runs counter to 
Mamdani’s narrative of decentralized despotism. Cooper’s contrast from the concept of 
“decentralized despotism” lies in his assertion that such forms of rule were only briefly 
important in the 1920s and 1930s, limited in scope even at the time, and were subse-
quently contested and transformed in the following decades leading up to national inde-
pendence (Cooper, 1996). There was a “political opening” offered up by the colonial 
citizenship on offer in Senegal’s Four Communes. And such claims to citizenship, 
Cooper argues, reveal a terrain of political struggle that is not captured by the idea of 
decentralized despotism, in which local government is simply a subordinate arm of a 
central authority. Claims to colonial citizenship not only offered electoral politics but they 
also offered an arena in which to make claims to public services, social protections, and 
employment. And beyond this, such claims were not a confirmation of colonial rule, they 
were understood as an anticolonial critique of it. Formal citizenship, in other words, was 
a central terrain of political struggle in French West Africa.  
 
But Cooper’s arguments are limited in other respects. What kinds of political prac-
tices—beyond the ballot box and the legal reform—might also structure the formation of 
African states? And how might this extended field of politics delimit such claims to sov-
ereignty and citizenship? There is an extant set of scholarly research that has taken a 
related approach to the African state. Rather than examining the state as an opening or 
foreclosure of politics, this scholarship engages the idea of “state formation”. From this 
perspective, the state and its elites are revenue-maximizing agents that follow a secular 
trend of modern state formation: they seek out more revenues to maximize the capacity 
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for war and gain more territory and resources (Levi, 1988). This is what scholars refer to 
as the theory of a predatory state. French medieval society first transformed sovereign 
authority into such a state, and kingdoms across Europe consolidated similar forms of 
authority in the image of France13. A long and expensive war provided the need for a 
centralized authority to extract regular payments of money to fund the defense—and 
justify the expansion—of its military jurisdiction. Here the state appears not as a site of 
political deliberation, but as a site of bureaucratic and military rule. 
 
Scholars across disciplines are still refining and debating the details of the political 
transformations through which the centralized, sovereign state emerged, but this secular 
trend of national state formation generally remains the same (Tilly, 1985). In the Global 
South, development experts and scholars have held up such state formation as both a 
normative goal and an ideal-type with which to analyze and evaluate the development 
and improvement of modern “state-building”. Some scholars have applied this concept 
to African states and argue that there is a similar tendency towards the predatory state 
across sub-Saharan Africa. But they also argue that this state has not yet resulted in the 
same kind of strong, cohesive, and responsive states as in Europe (Thies, 2007). There 
is, instead, a fragile, weak, or failed state (Collier, 2009). Others have examined the con-
ditions under which a legal-rational state emerged in specific countries (Robinson, 2006). 
These analysis have subsequently been operationalized into the idea of “state-building”, 
the “process of increasing the administrative, fiscal, and institutional capacity of govern-
ments to interact constructively with their societies and to pursue public goals more 
effectively” (Bräutigam, 2008). In other words, the secular trend of national state for-
mation doubles as a historical fact and normative value: scholars and reformers aim to 
create a singular and territorially defined national sovereignty and state administration 
with the capacity and authority to promote social welfare and civic inclusion.  
 
However, for other scholars, this concept of centralized state formation does not 
necessarily capture the diversity of governmental authority in Africa. And, further, it has 
been critiqued as a teleological model of state development founded on European norms 
(Hansen & Stepputat, 2006: 299). Across Africa, the singular sovereign has been, at best, 
a normative myth of modern state philosophy: there have always been a plurality of reg-
ulatory authorities in a contest for control over population, wealth, and territory (Mbembe 
& Rendall, 2000). For this reason, there as emerged in African studies a focus on regu-
latory authorities outside the confines of the modern state. Such non-state actors have 
historically established control over law and wealth at the limits of the modern African 
state and, at times, have positioned themselves as the obligatory passage points for 
state authority itself (Robinson, 2000). Such forms of non-state authority exercise an 
expansive and alternative form of power often at odds with state-sanctioned aims and 
																																																						
13 Norbert Elias (2000) examines the role of custom and courtesy in modern state formation, which falls 
outside the purview of predatory state theory. He does, however, demonstrate how the Venetians took 
inspiration from the centralized tax administration of the French state (359).  
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norms (Roitman, 2005). In many African places, there is a plurality—rather than a singu-
larity—of regulatory authority, to which scholars have responded by turning attention 
away from the bureaucratic and deliberative politics of the African state.  
 
Although non-state regulatory authorities are powerful and consequential, they 
may not pose a challenge to state sovereignty at all. Janet Roitman (2005) in fact argues 
that such non-state regulatory authorities should not be understood as sovereign; they 
are a distinct form of power and need not adopt the metaphors with which scholars have 
understood the authority of modern states. And these non-state authorities may be con-
duits and important intermediaries in the re-assertion and expansion of central state au-
thority (Ballvé, 2012). Such analyses resemble a relocated version of Mamdani’s (1996) 
“decentralized despotism”. But the problem of the commune in Senegal is about some-
thing different: it entails the freedom from central state authority, not the re-assertion of 
it. In Dakar, the problem of the commune is a question of the distribution of sovereignty 
among overlapping jurisdictions. And many of the disputes over such jurisdictions are 
about when and where communal authority may legitimately be exercised.  
 
But how might these scholarly analyses help us understand the problem of sub-
national government? While scholars have turned towards “non-state” regulatory au-
thority—as an alternative to or conduit of centralized state authority—there has at the 
same time been a proliferation of democratic local states in many countries across the 
world. So, with which concepts should one make sense of the problem of municipal state 
formation? In other words, with what tools should we bring contemporary transfor-
mations of the democratic, sub-national government back into focus? 
 
Scholars of municipal states trace their origins to the medieval town. Many medi-
eval towns—and their contemporary descendants—were legally incorporated. They 
were referred to as “charter cities” and eventually gained a new legal status of the public 
or municipal corporation. The first corporate charters for medieval towns were created 
at the request of the urban merchants, the Burghers, who were seeking a form of political 
organization that could protect the commercial interests of the towns (Frug, 2001). Me-
dieval towns were complex social organizations with diverse and emerging classes of 
people, most prominent of which was this new class of wealthy merchants. Town auton-
omy largely meant the autonomy of the merchant class from the King, and the urban 
commonwealth served only the economic interests of this commercial class. In this 
sense, town autonomy became “the ability of a group of people to be governed at least 
to some extent by their own rules, free of outside interference” (Frug, 2001: 28). These 
claims to community were subsequently embodied in a municipal form.  
 
Such an autonomous association of people is what Max Weber (1958) terms the 
politico-administrative “city”. This notion of the “city” extends beyond physical or eco-
nomic form: “besides possessing an accumulation of abodes, the city also has an eco-
nomic association with its own landed property and a budget of receipts and expendi-
tures” (Weber, 1958: 31). The city became a social organization aimed at regulating var-
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ious aspects of the urban economy, and could no longer be defined in terms of its eco-
nomic aspects alone (i.e. as a kind of urban agglomeration of market exchange). It is in 
this sense that cities came to be understood as an urban authority with regulatory aims. 
Weber, in other words, advanced a political definition of city form.  
 
This city authority established something new and distinct from the towns that 
preceded it: a military jurisdiction. And the first civic obligations to this authority were the 
guard and garrison duty (les gens d’armes) for medieval fortified towns. These civic ob-
ligations were later replaced by the tax. And with urban taxes came a concomitant shift 
in the kind of wealth that preoccupied ruling elites. In place of a contest over increasing 
the territorial dominion—and therefore the wealth-in-land—of the sovereign, the king 
turned inward to the money economy of the towns (Foucault, 2009). And merchants, in 
turn, were attracted to the protection offered by the military jurisdiction of these same 
towns. And this focus on urban wealth introduced a new set of techniques for the gov-
ernment of the economy and the health, well-being, and productive capacity of the pop-
ulation, what Michel Foucault (2008) has termed the biopolitical. In other words, the reg-
ulation of the money economy in the towns functioned as a novel source of wealth for 
an emerging social—and urban—institution14. 
 
 The concept of the politico-administrative “city” has several elements. According 
to Weber, for a town to constitute a full urban community—and therefore, a “city”—it 
must have a military jurisdiction or fortification, a market, a court and partially autono-
mous law, a related form of association (such as a municipal corporation), and an auton-
omous administration whose authorities are elected (38). As an ideal-type, the “city” was 
empirically rare. Leading up to the Middle Ages, there were few places in the world in 
which an autonomous city administration governed an urban population who, in turn, 
had specific sets of rights and obligations to a municipal association. Indeed, in most 
places across the world this form of “citizenship as a specific status quality of the ur-
banite is missing” (Weber, 1958: 41). There was, in other words, no formal membership 
in an urban community that exercised authority over a terrain no longer exclusively under 
the King’s sovereign rule. 
 
Urban citizenship, in this sense, pertains to the rights and obligations of the mer-
chant class to the urban community and, later, the municipality. The King obligated mer-
chants into military service to protect the dominion, the merchants subsequently re-
placed this service obligation with regular and permanent cash payments, and—apart 
from the King’s estate—there emerged a municipal government which took on the ad-
ministrative affairs of this evolving constellation of civic duties and regulatory techniques. 
This “city”, according to Weber, was only found in Ancient Greece and Medieval Italy. 
Elsewhere, there were no fixed competencies among urban authorities and a govern-
ment of the merchant class never fully established authority over any given town. In other 
words, “the idea of an association which could unite the city into a corporate unit was 
missing” (1958: 45). But how do cities outside Europe compare to Weber’s ideal-typical 
																																																						
14 This institution is what Schumpeter (1991) terms the “tax state”. 
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understanding of the politico-administrative “city”? Or, how might the “city” and its citi-
zenship transform once the colonial town makes a historical appearance?  
 
 To be clear, scholars have long recognized that the African city pre-dated the 
arrival of European colonies along the coasts (Coquery-Vidrovitch, 2004; Freund, 2007). 
But my object of analysis here is the communal form introduced in the West African 
colonial town. And this object suggests something new and different about scholarly 
understandings of the African city. There is now an exciting amount of scholarship on 
the African city, but for now I will engage here with the work of AbdouMaliq Simone as 
exemplary of two trends in this scholarly thought. First, the emergence of the colonial 
city appears as a foundational moment of segregation and control. Following Frantz 
Fanon (2007), Simone has characterized this segregated city as a “town on its knees”, 
in which African town dwellers were subjugated, policed, and where, as such, there are 
few long-lasting institutions (Simone, 2010). Although Fanon called attention to the anger 
and envy that arises from such segregation, many other scholars have examined how 
colonial urban planning justified and exercised segregation in practice (Bigon, 2009; 
Goerg, 1998; Wright, 1987). 
 
 But there is another vision of the African city that emerges from this “town on its 
knees”. As Simone argues, the native town’s absence of long-lasting institutions was, in 
part, a political necessity to evade colonial control. A lack of colonial knowledge about 
political opposition in the town was a strategic resource for anticolonial militants15. And 
Simone contends that such unknowability remains a defining characteristic of life in Af-
rican cities (Simone, 2004). Along these lines, there has emerged an understanding of 
the African city as elusive, as a shifting set of alliances and capacities through which 
urban dwellers of limited means create a still unknowable “city yet to come”16. Institu-
tions, in this sense, are a much more ephemeral set of relationships that must be actively 
maintained and re-configured based on contingency and circumstance. Simone has 
gone so far as to refer to such forms of associational life as “infrastructure”, the primary 
means through which life and livelihoods are maintained in the African city.  
 
 These are two powerful—and in many respects, accurate—ways of understand-
ing African cities. But the communes in Dakar reveal something different from what may 
be learned about urbanism from postcolonial cities like Algiers, Freetown, Kinshasa, or 
Johannesburg. There is a distinct form of urbanism at play in Dakar, and a different form 
of colonial and postcolonial politics. Alongside the threat of warfare and segregation, 
Dakar offers up assimilation, democracy, and communal government. Dakar is not a 
barracks (Hoffman, 2007) but a vast patchwork of municipal democracies. It is in this 
																																																						
15 Simone, like Fanon, is drawing on the example of Algiers. The strategic resource of this native town—
the Medina—was perhaps most famously characterized in the film The Battle for Algiers (Pontecorvo 
1966). In it, the Medina emerges as a battlefield unknowable to the colonial army.  
16 Two exemplary texts that bring together a collection of essays in this approach are Pieterse & Simone 
(2013) and Nuttall & Mbembe (2008). De Boeck and Plissart (2004) similarly characterize public life in 
Kinshasa as spectral, elusive, and beyond the immediately perceptible.  
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sense that the African “city” in Dakar does not quite conform to the dominant theorization 
of colonial or postcolonial cities in Africa. The commune is not ephemeral or provisional 
or unknowable, but a durable form which its African inhabitants have long imagined as 
a claim to civic inclusion and belonging in a sovereign collective. It is a central object of 
knowledge and reform, reflection and intervention.  
 
Further, Dakar poses a problem for many of the scholarly conceptualizations of 
the “city” and state formation. For example, there is no doubt a plurality of regulatory 
authorities across the Cap Vert peninsula, and it would be a mistake to suggest that 
communal authority is legitimate, expansive, and singular across any part of this urban 
terrain. There is similarly no doubt that Senegal’s legal reforms—like any law—are only 
unevenly enforced and observed throughout the country. There is no trend towards a 
centralized, legal-rational state with the capacity or authority for effective biopolitical 
control. And the ongoing iterations of the communal form have little to do with a collec-
tive fear of violence from an outside threat. In fact, none of the scholarly assumptions 
about the European “city” and its government may reasonably be applied to Dakar, tout 
court. But at the same time, it is evident that the dominant theorizations of African cities 
also do not adequately make sense of Dakar. So, how should one approach such a 
hybrid form? 
 
*** 
 
In following these scholarly debates, we have now come closer to the problem of com-
munal form in Dakar: How should a sub-national government exercises legitimate au-
thority over urban citizens, populations, publics, and territory? How is it determined 
where and when such authority may legitimately be exercised? This problem exceeds 
the conceptual categories I have outlined above, which do not make adequate sense of 
the experiments I encountered during my fieldwork in Dakar. Scholars of the African 
state, for example, have little to say about the “city”, and scholars of municipal law have 
little to say about how communal authority in Africa. How, then, should one make sense 
of this African “city”?  
 
Indeed, much of the extant reflection on the problem of the municipality is located 
in Europe and North America, and it is the purpose of this dissertation to re-configure 
this geography of knowledge about the city more generally (Roy, 2009). And, more spe-
cifically, to ask how this might transform the linked concepts of sovereignty and its citi-
zenship. Scholars of contemporary state formation have often overlooked its urban ele-
ments, and I have revisited this thought to challenge its status as conventional wisdom 
on the state. In many of the arguments outlined above, there is stylized history of state 
formation which begins with the emergence of the medieval town, follows its growth and 
centralization into modern nation-state, and then turns attention to how sovereign states 
devolved limited authority to municipal governments through law.  
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But in this dissertation, I present a different story of municipal state formation. In 
the case of Dakar, there is not such a clear transition of political authority—from sover-
eign king, to town, to sovereign nation-state, and again to the City—that this conceptual 
history assumes. Instead, I reveal that the distribution of sovereignty has been and re-
mains a variegated and complex ground for dispute; it is never resolved or assigned to 
one scale of territorial governance or another, and it remains open to debate what kind 
of problem such a distribution should be. I advance an analysis of municipal state for-
mation which examines the experimental techniques through which such a re-distribu-
tion is understood to take place. Such techniques, I argue, are in constant transformation 
across a panoply of political terrains. They exceed the concept of the predatory state; 
they are not limited to the constitutional reforms or legal disputes over local government; 
they reveal a surprising form of liberalism founded in the colonial commune; and they 
regularly oscillate between a tendency towards centralization and decentralization. Such 
an analysis requires a reconsideration of municipal authority and a more concrete un-
derstanding of the specific techniques through which municipal governments are formed 
and reformed.  
 
Fiscal Technique and the Tax State 
 
To elaborate this point, let me turn to one of the most prominent scholarly interlocutors 
of the modern tax state. In his foundational work on state formation, Joseph Schumpeter 
argued that “taxes not only helped create the state, they helped to form it” (1991: 108). 
In other words, Schumpeter conforms with a chorus of scholars that tax collection is a 
foundational technique of modern state formation. For the purposes of my arguments 
here, I elaborate on Schumpeter’s lesser-known concept of the “fiscal technique” by 
inquiring into forms of political and technical experimentation that Schumpeter largely 
ignored. In contrast to Schumpeter, I examine how experiments in fiscal techniques be-
come the means through which municipal authority is contested, confirmed, distributed, 
and denied. They are the practices through which municipal states produce knowledge 
about fiscal subjects and territories; cultivate new norms for civic comportment among 
citizens, publics, and bureaucrats alike; and exercise authority over a changing urban 
terrain.  
 
In elaborating this concept, I draw a distinction between fiscal techniques and 
fiscal policies: fiscal policies set the rate and structure of the tax system; in contrast, 
fiscal techniques are the practices through which such a system is deployed, arranged, 
administered, and negotiated. They include practices like basic surveys of the fiscal ca-
dastre, but also include the documentation of fiscal accounting practices and the more 
complex practice of producing new financial instruments like a bond. They are the vast 
constellation of provisional and practical solutions to the governmental problem of rais-
ing the necessary sums of money to meet a public need.  
 
I build this idea of the “fiscal technique” in conversation with—and in contrast 
to—Schumpeter’s (1991) influential essay, The Crisis of the Tax State. In the century 
since its publication, Schumpeter’s essay has shaped scholarly understandings of state 
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formation, social change, and fiscal policy. In this essay, Schumpeter outlines the emer-
gence of the Austrian state and tells a familiar story of state formation: the need for 
monetary resources to pay for an impending war gave rise to the regular collection of 
taxes and, in turn, the formation of the Austrian state. But the central focus of Schum-
peter’s essay is the potential unraveling of this tax state in the wake of the extreme fiscal 
pressure induced by World War I. Rather than focusing exclusively on the formation of 
the modern tax state, Schumpeter asks, what is the limit at which such a state collapses 
altogether? Or, what is the marginal rate of taxation that a society may bear before the 
tax state diminishes the private economy from which it extracts wealth? In this sense, 
Schumpeter analyzes the tax state at the level of its fiscal policy: the rate and form of 
taxation set by the state are the point at which one may discern the “thunder of world 
history more clearly than anywhere else” (1991: 101).  
 
Fiscal sociologists following Schumpeter’s approach have retained his focus on 
fiscal policy. Here, the predatory tax state is a symptomatic response to a military need. 
But scholars of a new fiscal sociology have further developed this research agenda and 
turned attention to the causal aspects of the fiscal policy of the tax state and a compar-
ative understanding of why states develop certain tax structures (Martin et al, 2009). 
Rather than understanding fiscal policy as something that is only symptomatic of social 
change, these new fiscal sociologists further examine how fiscal policy advances such 
change and summarizes it in particular directions. Fiscal geographers have adopted a 
similar focus on policy, largely organized around capitalist crisis and accumulation. As 
European and American governments turned toward austerity measures in the 1980s 
and 90s, they cut fiscal expenditures on social welfare programs (Davidson and Ward, 
2018). And in the new millennium, Detroit came to stand in as an exemplary case of the 
fiscal crisis of the municipal state in depopulated American cities (Hinkley, 2017). But 
apart from these crises of the tax state, the economic and financial crisis of 2007-08 
itself also effected a transformation of fiscal policy and introduced massive government 
bail-outs of the auto-making and financial industries. Fiscal policies like bail-outs, ex-
emptions, and tax-havens, function as new kinds of fiscal fixes for the crises of capitalist 
accumulation by incentivizing investment into historic buildings, infrastructure, and ur-
ban real-estate. At issue in this scholarship are the spatial consequences of fiscal poli-
cies, and their role in the re-production of urbanization and global capital (Tapp and Kay, 
2019) 
 
 Schumpeter and this subsequent social scientific research on the tax state have 
overwhelmingly focused on fiscal policy: the structure of tax codes and the spatial, so-
cial, and economic effects of the incentive structures embedded in these laws and poli-
cies. Fiscal technique, however, has largely fallen out of frame.  Few scholars have 
looked for the spirit of a people, its culture, and its social structure in the practical ad-
ministration and bureaucratic encounters of the tax state17. In Schumpeter’s (1991) ac-
count, fiscal techniques formed the Austrian state: the Prince wrote letters to the estates, 
begging for money to fund the Turkish wars. Had these letters continued, Schumpeter 
																																																						
17 For exceptions, see Muñoz (2010, 2014) Roitman (2005), and Olivier de Sardan (1999). 
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argues, they “might have come to take the place that in England is taken by the Magna 
Charta” (106). Fiscal technique, in other words, holds a place in modern state formation 
that is usually accorded to the constitutional laws of the nation-state. Yet there is here-
after a shift in Schumpeter’s analysis: he subsequently dismisses fiscal technique as a 
“subordinate problem” to that of fiscal policy. Although such techniques formed the 
modern state, they later become merely a “serving tool” for sovereign power: “if the 
finances have created and partly formed the modern state, so now the state on its part 
forms and enlarges them” (111). What, then, might be learned if we turn attention away 
from the idea of the “tax state” to the historical transformation of fiscal techniques them-
selves?  
 
The Problem of Communal Form 
 
In this dissertation, I return to this supposedly subordinate question of fiscal technique. 
Although Schumpeter foregrounded fiscal techniques—like written pleas for aid and, 
later, tax administration—as foundational features of state formation, they have largely 
fallen out of frame in more recent scholarly conceptions of the modern tax state in which 
the nation has come to be the world’s dominant political and sovereign form. But there 
have nevertheless been ongoing disputes within and among nation-states over how to 
delegate and distribute such sovereignty. Here, it is worth underlining how my approach 
to the “state”18 departs from Schumpeter and subsequent scholars of state formation, 
taxation, citizenship, and sovereignty reviewed above. The purpose of my investigation 
is not to reveal when, where, or under what conditions a municipal state actually exists. 
Rather, I examine the set of critical reflections and practical interventions that arise out 
of the problem of communal form. It is in this sense that I do not reveal a thing in the 
world (a commune), but I examine the kinds of problems and solutions that the concept 
of the commune brings to the fore at a specific historical conjuncture.  
 
This understanding runs counter to how the “state” appeared to my interlocutors 
in Dakar. Many invoked the “state” when referring to a hierarchical, omnipresent force 
with consequential and legitimate authority in the world. Such invocations of the “state” 
almost never referred to a local government, but the national one. However, I want to 
turn attention away from the appearance of this image of the state—as a state effect 
(Mitchell, 1999) or as an ethnographic fact (Ferguson and Gupta, 2002). Instead, I want 
to focus attention on some of the more specific forms through which power and authority 
are exercised. Asher Ghertner (2017) has put forth two conceptualizations of the state 
that help specify such techniques, what he terms the topological state and the state 
outside itself. For the former, Ghertner focuses on “how real-time connections are forged 
between residents and key nodes in the bureaucracy” (731). And for the latter, “how 
routine actions of water engineers and municipal officers challenge the common con-
ceptual mapping of the state as a surface with an inside and outside” (731). The purpose 
of Ghertner’s analytical shift is to, in part, to reveal how “the political practices of those 
																																																						
18 Once again, I put use “state” here in quotations to signal that I am discussing a conceptualization—
usually scholarly—of an object in the world. 
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who live on the margins of the state… [are themselves] constitutive of state form” (744). 
Such sites of decision-making were previously obscured by the conceptualization of the 
state as a hierarchical bureaucracy, where power simply flows from top to bottom.  
 
 Ghertner’s analysis reveals “nodes in the bureaucracy” like the fiscal techniques 
I engage with here. However, the topological state and the state outside itself retain a 
preoccupation with outlining when and where the state actually exists, a kind of meta-
phorical mapping of the state apparatus itself. In other words, Ghertner’s analysis shares 
with scholars of state formation a style of inquiry that seeks to reveal the changing on-
tological status of the “state”, wherever and whenever it may be. Of course, one conclu-
sion Ghertner draws from such an analysis is that the state has no fixed ontological 
boundary and is, as a result, outside itself. But if this is the case, what is the analytical 
payoff in the scholarly debates over the concept of the “state” in the first place? Because 
if the state is everything, then maybe it’s nothing.19 As Tim Mitchell (1991, pg. 90) has 
argued, the question is not to ask: who is the state? Or who dictates its policies? And 
this argument could be extended to Ghertner’s central question: when is the state? For 
Mitchell, the more appropriate question is to ask how the state comes to be understood 
as something that is distinct and autonomous from society.  
 
Following Mitchell, the shift that I propose here is to dwell less on what, when, or 
where scholars think the “state” is or should be. But unlike Mitchell, I am less concerned 
with how a conceptual division emerges between state and society. Instead, I ask: what 
kind of problem is the local state? In exploring this question, I turn attention to how 
bureaucrats, citizens, publics, officials, and various kinds of experts conceptualize the 
“state” as a problem worthy of intervention. Analyzing the “state” as a problem brings to 
the fore a set of techniques through which municipal authority is understood to be 
formed and reformed. From this perspective, the local state has not yet appeared as a 
“metaphysical effect” (Mitchell, 1991: 94). But there is nevertheless an emerging set of 
reflections and governmental interventions aimed at realizing it as such; the local “state” 
appears here not as a source of governmental power, but as an object of governmental 
reflection and intervention. Again, the purpose of such an inquiry is not to provide my 
own empirical mapping of the “state” or the “city”—topological, topographical, horizon-
tal, hierarchical, actually existing, or otherwise. But rather, to analyze how my interlocu-
tors have posed the local state as a problem which requires a distinct set of solutions, 
many of which are provisional, uncertain, and experimental. 
 
It is in this spirit that I pose communal form as a problem-space. David Scott 
(2004) defines problem-space as a discursive context, as “an ensemble of questions and 
answers around which a horizon of identifiable stakes (conceptual as well as ideological-
political) hangs” (4). Stephen Collier and Andrew Lakoff (2015) have schematized this 
																																																						
19 I adapt this from Wildavsky’s  (1973) essay titled “If planning is everything, maybe it’s nothing.” Wil-
davksy’s comments suggest a different kind of planning inquiry and practice: rather than define reason 
and rationality once and for all, the purpose is to understand the various forms that it may take in any 
given place or time. This dissertation is an inquiry into one such formation.  
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understanding of problem-space into four distinguishing elements: objects of concern, 
aims and norms, knowledge practices, and techniques of intervention. What emerges 
from holding these two understandings in common view is a method of investigating 
political rationalities. How is it, in other words, that an ensemble of questions and an-
swers come to make political sense to those tasked with reflecting on and addressing 
the problem at hand? I begin from the assumption that it takes a significant amount of 
work for a proposed set of solutions to make such sense; to transform from seeming 
non-sense into a reasonable mode of governmental intervention. Such a transformation 
is what I understand to be the process of problematization.  
 
Michel Callon (2009) defines problematization by drawing a distinction between 
issues and problems. An issue, for Callon is a situation “of initial shock, where there is 
still no indisputable formatting enabling us, for example, to say with any certainty that it 
is a strictly (or primarily) political, economic, or scientific issue” (543). In other words, 
issues have not yet emerged as a specific kind of problem assigned to the appropriate 
actors. Problematization, by contrast, entails the “gradual process of fragmentation and 
division of issues that evolves into a joint formulation of a set of different problems which 
in a sense, at least partially, are a substitute for the initial issue” (543). So, to problematize 
an issue is to parse its elements into discrete, identifiable, and well-defined problems 
which require a reasonable set of interventions and potential solutions. Again, the pro-
cess Callon describes here is one of making political sense of what previously emerged 
as non-sense. However, Callon also argues that the transformation of issues into prob-
lems is “never completely consensual or total” (543). There is always room for opposi-
tions, refusals, and extreme disagreements over how any given issue should be prob-
lematized.  
 
Let us reconsider, for a moment, the problematization of the communal form. For 
over a century, the commune has been an object of legal reform. The aim of such reforms 
was to promote democratic reform, civic inclusion, and liberal independence in what was 
previously a colonial city under intense supervision by a central state. What began as a 
claim to an existing kind of legal status then transformed into a much more elaborate 
problem involving municipal elections and a haphazard and corrupt municipal bureau-
cracy. The question of legal status never completely fell out of frame, but evolved into a 
discrete kind of problem for Senegalese officials: how to legislate the right kind of reform 
that would “fully empower” democratic local governments to respond to the collective 
will and needs of their inhabitants. Yet the communes themselves were left with a differ-
ent set of problems. How were they meant to identify and meet such needs? And even 
more puzzling, how on earth were they going to pay for them?  
 
Thus, a relatively ubiquitous issue among communal governments in Dakar—Act 
II devolved political authority without the fiscal resources to match—emerged as a dis-
crete series of experimental solutions to the more general problem of communal author-
ity and independence that had been up for debate since the end of the 19th century. This 
gradual process of problematizing the commune, however, has obviously resulted in an 
elaborate series of profound disagreements over when, where, and how a commune 
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may legitimately exercise its authority. During my fieldwork in Dakar, fiscal administration 
emerged as one of the central grounds for such disputes. And more than a simple ques-
tion of payment, I argue that these disagreements over communal form are key moments 
in the problematization of Senegalese sovereignty.   
 
State sovereignty is more than an achievement of law, war, or rational bureau-
cracy: it is a socio-technical project (Chalfin, 2010), a tenuous achievement of wealth 
accumulation (Cattelino, 2008), a rumor of violence (Hansen and Stepputat, 2005); a per-
formance for a real or imagined audience (Rutherford, 2012), and, at times, a refusal to 
be recognized by this same audience (Simpson, 2014). In the chapters that follow, I draw 
on these conceptualizations of sovereignty to make sense of the problematizations of 
communal form I encountered during my fieldwork in Dakar. In Senegal, sovereignty has 
always been up for debate, and the nation-state has never been its ideal or imagined 
form. Instead, this debate began in the communal governments of French West Africa, 
and I insist that it persists to this day in the panoply of bureaucratic disputes over the 
exercise of communal authority. Dakar’s complex fiscal bureaucracy emerges here as a 
ground for dispute among citizens, officials, and experts over the legitimacy of municipal 
government. Beyond policy and law, specific—and experimental—fiscal techniques are 
re-configuring this distribution of sovereignty. And these novel political terrains have 
emerged from a renewed set of reflections on the problem of Dakar’s communal form. 
 
Plan of the Argument  
 
So, what kinds of fiscal techniques are reforming communal Dakar? And how have they 
come to re-configure Senegalese sovereignty and citizenship? In the chapters that fol-
low, I explore a range of such experimental techniques. I draw on two years of participant 
observation, semi-structured interviews, and archival and documentary analysis in Da-
kar, Senegal. During these years in Dakar, I passed my time with the municipal bureau-
crats, financial analysts, development experts, elected officials, citizens, and street ven-
dors that were deeply involved in these experiments20. Many of my informants under-
stood their experience of such experimentation in radically different terms: what a mu-
nicipal bureaucrat understood to be a solution, for example, could come to be perceived 
as a pressing problem for the citizens it was meant to serve. And to add to the confusion, 
they did not always recognize—or publicly admit—that such deep disagreements over 
the aims and effects of these experiments even existed. How, then, should we make 
sense of urban situations in which the perspectives on how to define and resolve the 
problem are as diverse as the actors involved? I propose a path forward that pays atten-
tion to how diverse actors are themselves making sense of communal Dakar, and the 
deep disagreements over what exactly this sense is or should be.   
 
In chapter two, Constituting the Postcolonial Commune, I explore the history of 
the legal constitution of communes and the subsequent three rounds of decentralization 
																																																						
20 I return in my acknowledgements to a more extended methodological discussion of who I encoun-
tered and what I learned from them as I prepared this dissertation.  
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reforms that frame contemporary claims to communal authority. By the end of the 19th 
century, France established the original four communes of Senegal: Dakar, Saint Louis, 
Rufisque, and Gorée. The original constitution established political rights for inhabitants 
of the four communes which included local suffrage and metropolitan citizenship. How-
ever, as Black Africans made increasing demands for political representation and gov-
ernmental decision-making power, colonial authorities began to question their continued 
financial support for democratic government in West Africa. Decolonization, in part, was 
a result of France’s reluctance to finance a government for which it was losing political 
control. After decolonization, this fiscal controversy persisted between communes and 
central states across West Africa. In Senegal, scholars have characterized this relation-
ship as one of dependency in which central state transfers act as a form of patronage 
payments for local electoral support for the national party.  
 
After the 2013 reforms, the 19 communes now had the legal right to most reve-
nues on the Cap Vert peninsula. Rather than dependence, the communes now had a 
certain degree of fiscal and political independence from the central state. Locally con-
trolled revenues—not transfers—became the central mechanisms through which the 
communes accessed monetary wealth. Communes across Senegal began a widespread 
scramble to develop new and diverse revenue streams to pay for the new obligations to 
provide for the health and well-being of communal citizens. But local government efforts 
to collect new revenues were met with various forms of opposition from a panoply of 
fiscal actors. In this new configuration, the central state and constitutional law were not 
the only limits to municipal authority. Instead, such authority became increasingly con-
strained by widespread controversies over civic payments to local governments. 
 
In chapter three, Sovereign Sabotage, I examine the City of Dakar’s program to 
issue West Africa’s first municipal bond without the guarantee of the sovereign nation-
state. In 2013, development experts cemented Dakar as the flagship experiment in local 
fiscal autonomy in Africa. Dakar’s anticipated success in issuing the first municipal bond 
in West Africa would be replicated across the region. This program intended to cultivate 
more fiscally responsible and democratically accountable local governments in Senegal. 
Yet Dakar’s financial experiment was sabotaged by the central state. Political commen-
tators and experts alike explained the program’s failure in terms of political rivalries. At 
the same time, however, the sabotage brought renewed public attention to the fiscal and 
financial administration of local governments in Senegal. 
 
Beyond exposing a roiling electoral rivalry, the bond’s failure reveals a much 
longer set of disputes over local democratic rule and municipal finance in Senegal. In 
this chapter, I show how electoral aspirations became wrapped up in a broader intellec-
tual “paradigm shift” in the theory and practice of urban public finance in Africa. Although 
my interlocutors often framed the sabotage as the introduction of politics into technical 
concerns, I argue the program was always political: it shifted the terrain of political de-
bate to the expert realm of financial evaluation and analysis. Here, I develop the concept 
of “financial publics” to describe how collectivities are called into being through shared 
participation in—and observation of—financial analysis. 
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In chapter four, Refusing Relocation, I examine a user-fee financed commercial 
center in which municipal authorities planned relocate thousands of informal street ven-
dors. In response to the reforms, local governments in Senegal developed new tech-
niques to diversity their revenue streams. One experiment involved the collection of user-
fees and a new institutional configuration to manage it. In partnership with a private firm, 
the City created a public-private partnership to finance the construction and operation 
of a commercial center in which to house thousands of Dakar’s walking street vendors.  
 
Payments from the vendors were anticipated to create a new revenue stream that 
would pay back the costs of construction and, eventually, turn a profit for the PPP op-
erating the building. However, these efforts were met with a widespread refusal of ven-
dors to pay. For the duration of my fieldwork, these buildings remained almost entirely 
empty. I draw on participant observation with street vendors to explore the conditions 
under which this sustained refusal became possible and effective in Dakar’s urban po-
litical scene. Many vendors aspired to have a space in such a commercial center, but 
they took issue with the cost of rent and the size and location of the stalls. Although 
scholars often frame street vendors as excluded from democratic participation, I argue 
that their refusal to be included in a participatory relocation program was a powerful 
political act. This refusal to pay is exemplary of the obstacles to raising revenues in Da-
kar’s communes, in which local governments struggle to exercise the legitimacy and 
authority to collect payments from the Dakarois public. 
 
In chapter five, Local Tax, Local Territory, I draw on participant observation with 
a communal tax collection team. I explore here how one communal government in Sen-
egal exercised fiscal authority after the reforms. And I show how the reputation for vio-
lence is tightly linked to the administration of local tax collection. I extend the concept 
of territory to examine how municipalities are territorial in a double sense: they are an 
administrative accounting of a physical landscape; but they are also a taxable terrain 
controlled by a reputation for violence. I argue that one mayor’s public reputation as an 
armed murderer shaped how and where street-level bureaucrats collected taxes. 
 
This local commune pushed the boundaries of communal rights to enforce tax 
collection. In one incident, dubbed “The Billboard Affair”, the Mayor and his staff seized 
and destroyed the assets of advertising firms who refused to pay a fee. The commune 
created the fee after the reforms, and the firms contested their legal right to do so. In 
this final experiment in municipal state formation, I return to consider some familiar as-
pects of state formation: the links between violence, legitimacy, and taxation. But even 
in this supposedly familiar form, I reveal how bureaucrats and officials nevertheless must 
experiment with novel techniques of rule in order to exercise the authority supposedly 
delegate to their commune by sovereign decree.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
Constituting the Postcolonial Commune 
A Historical Ontology of “Free Administration”  
 
The Commune of Dakar was one of the first of four local democracies on the continent, 
and in the early 20th century, became the colonial capital for French West Africa. As such, 
Dakar’s democratic form has had an outsized influence in African territorial administra-
tion, and it marks an important contrast from the style of indirect colonial rule practiced 
across much of the continent. Dakar began as a democratic exception in Africa, but has 
today emerged as democratic norm. Yet from the early colonial period to the present, 
there have been significant transformations and disputes over the distribution of munic-
ipal rights and authority. The City of Dakar’s territorial footprint has expanded over the 
past century, for example, and much smaller communal governments have at the same 
time proliferated across the peninsula. What started as a dispersed archipelago of 
French colonial governments along the Senegambian coast has today transformed into 
a dense, expansive, and often overlapping patchwork of communes that stretch from 
Dakar to Niamey. But what kinds of administrative and fiscal techniques did such trans-
formations in democratic form entail? And what does this reveal about the proliferation 
of disputes over the ongoing re-distribution of sovereignty today?  
 
2013 was an historic year for public law and local democracy in Senegal. The 
central government passed the third round of decentralization reforms since independ-
ence in 1960. Act III of decentralization claimed to inaugurate the “complete communal-
ization of the national territory” (Loi no 2013-10, p 1). It intended to realize the political 
values put forth in the 1872 constitution by “reinforcing autonomy of management”, lift-
ing central government oversight and promoting the value of “free administration” (libre 
administration) (Loi no 2013-10, p 1). Such free administration was the hallmark of French 
West Africa’s constitutional reforms, and Act III was the most recent intervention in this 
long record of governmental legislation aimed at entrenching local democracies and self-
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rule in West Africa. And many administrators in Dakar framed the law in exactly these 
terms: it was, according to one municipal bureaucrat, “almost a revolution” in local de-
mocracy. Yet what remained, in his view, was the detailed administrative labor of rein-
forcing this newly legislated political autonomy with a stronger and more substantive 
fiscal autonomy. The commune has long been the preferred category and site of demo-
cratic reform. And debates over fiscal administration have long figured as a key terrain 
through which communal authority has been transformed.  
 
In this chapter, I lay out a historical ontology of communal authority in Senegal. 
By historical ontology, I mean the constellation of practices through which a concept 
and its form are made knowable and therefore actionable (Hacking, 2004). I anchor this 
narrative in what Sheila Jasanoff (2011) terms constitutional moments21: “brief periods in 
which, through the unending contestation over democracy, basic rules of political prac-
tice are rewritten, whether explicitly or implicitly, thus fundamentally altering the relations 
between citizens and the state” (2011: 623). Jasanoff recognizes, however, that consti-
tutional moments may not be limited to written laws. Nevertheless, in Senegal, the law 
has remained a central reference point for negotiations over communal sovereignty and 
local democracy for over a century. Law alone does not constitute a commune, but the 
extended field of experiments in Senegalese municipal state formation nevertheless un-
fold in relation to the country’s long history of legal reason and reform.  
 
Although many historical accounts of African sovereignty have focused on the 
mid-century moment of decolonization and national independence, I draw on an alter-
native history of sovereignty. Rather than beginning with the nation, I begin with the 
commune, and I follow the disputes over territorial administration that the constitution of 
communes entails. Such disputes have largely been understood in terms of the legal 
debates over central government oversight (la tutelle). In Senegal, the central govern-
ment began as the colonial administration of metropolitan France and later transformed 
into the independent nation state. The commune, however, has remained a constant. 
And for communes, constitutional and decentralization laws are the central mechanisms 
through which such oversight—and freedom from this oversight—is exercised. Indeed, 
law, litigation, and legal reasoning remain the most common language with which terri-
torial administration is discussed in Senegal today. But how is this legal history invoked 
in contemporary disputes over fiscal technique in Dakar? And what consequence does 
the law have for such disagreements in a context where law is unevenly enforced? 
 
Since the late 19th century, law has transformed the spatial organization of state 
authority, sovereignty, and democracy. However, it is not only lawyers that engage such 
legal reason: a broad culture of legal debate has emerged around urban administration 
in Senegal, and the Commune of Dakar has long been a source of such argumentation. 
In this sense, constitutional laws have had significant effects on the form of democratic 
administration in contemporary Senegal. Yet, in keeping with the broader argument of 
																																																						
21 Jasanoff draws here on Bruce Ackerman’s use of “constitutional moments” in Reconstructing Ameri-
can Law (1984), We The People: Foundations (1991), and We the People: Transformations (2000). 
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this dissertation, legal reform is only consequential insomuch as it affects administrative 
technique: “Law,” as one municipal official argued, “is the theory, but administration is 
its practice.” Dakar’s constitutional moments are a dynamic interaction among adminis-
trative experts, urban publics, and, of course, legal texts. In sum, legal and fiscal disputes 
are the constitutional moments of communal sovereignty. An examination of this trans-
formation of administrative law in Senegal reveals how such laws intervene in more con-
temporary disputes over the distribution of sovereignty in the present. 
 
A Constitutional Moment and the Legacies of Law 
 
Monsieur Sarr is the municipal secretary at a commune in Dakar. I came to his office in 
February of 2017—four years after the latest decentralization reform—to pick up some 
communal budgets. But I instead found myself in the middle of an argument. Sarr and a 
middle-aged woman from the neighborhood were in a heated dispute over her construc-
tion permit. She came to City Hall to pay her planning tax (taxe d'urbanisme) and to 
purchase a municipal revenue stamp (timbre fiscal), the final steps of the administrative 
process through which she could formalize the approval to begin construction of a new 
home. But Sarr’s office had not yet received her application. The central government 
recently digitized the application process, he told me, and it often took months for new 
applications to appear on their digital platform. And with no evidence of her construction 
permit application, Sarr could not give her an official authorization, let alone accept her 
payment.  
 
The planning tax and revenue stamps are relatively small cash payments: 5,000 
fCFA ($10 USD) for the former and 1,000 fCFA ($2 USD) for the latter. The planning tax 
is only paid once at the time of approval. But most of its small counterparts are paid on 
a plethora of time schedules, from daily fees to annual taxes. The planning tax is also a 
special category of revenue which Senegal’s budgetary nomenclature refers to as mu-
nicipal taxes (les taxes municipales). Municipal taxes are controlled by local govern-
ments, in contrast to the various ministries of the central state that make transfers or 
collect local taxes on their behalf. Most municipal taxes are similar in size to the planning 
tax—50 fCFA flat rate for the daily street vending tax and a variable rate for a monthly 
tax on the occupation of public space, for example. Despite the small size of such pay-
ments, these taxes figure rather prominently in the fiscal and political life of local gov-
ernments in Dakar. Not only do they constitute the largest source of tax revenue for many 
local governments, they are also the only legal category of tax that are set and adminis-
tered by local governments themselves.  
 
As she left, the woman in Sarr’s office loudly made known her personal connec-
tions to the Mayor, and that she was planning to speak with him to resolve this matter of 
the missing authorization. After she left, Sarr slumped back into his seat, threw his hands 
up in the air and sighed heavily. “Good,” he said, “let the Mayor deal with it.” Sarr was 
not a political man, but a self-identified administrative one. He was not swayed by the 
personal favors common in Dakar’s local government. This attitude, he argued, was ex-
emplary of his long-held approach to communal administration.  
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 In the 1980s, Sarr worked for the Mayor of the City of Dakar, Mamadou Diop, a 
well-respected politician and prominent member of the Socialist Party. Diop is known as 
a leader in administrative reform and as a prominent intellectual of public administration. 
Sarr, like many of the other administrators who worked for the City at the time, regarded 
Diop’s term as a golden age of urban administration. It was an intellectual environment, 
Sarr suggested, in which municipal staff were encouraged and supported to take time 
to receive administrative training abroad. Diop even published several manuscripts on 
urban public administration while in office.  
 
But Sarr began his career under the tutelage of another, more polemical man in 
Dakar’s Directorate of Technical Services (DST). This man, unlike Diop, only supported 
the staff who he had trained personally, and he ostracized those who were not in his 
circle of protégés. Sarr was not in this circle, as he had been recruited from outside the 
municipality—called back before finishing his professional training in France—and was 
therefore not trusted by his new boss. Relegated to a small corner in the hallway of the 
DST, Sarr had himself paid a carpenter to build a small wooden table to use as a desk.  
 
One day, Sarr recounted, Mayor Diop passed by this makeshift office. Struck by 
its appearance, the Mayor inquired as to how he had come to work in such an atrocious 
arrangement. Sarr, by his own account, responded honestly: “This,” he said, “is simply 
the office I was given,” and further insisted to me that he was not the kind of man to 
“participate in politics.” The week after this encounter, Sarr found that Mayor Diop 
moved him to a new and large office, even providing him with a new chair and a legiti-
mate desk. Sarr took extreme pleasure in recounting this story of the upheaval of office 
patronage, slapping his knee and leaning back confidently in his chair as he narrated his 
early triumph of moral, technical, and apolitical administration.  
 
Sarr, like many of the municipal secretaries in Dakar, enjoyed debating the legal 
details of urban administration. At times, such administrative debates are jovial and re-
flective, but others are more spirited arguments over public law. The secretaries enjoyed 
challenging others’ knowledge of the law, and were especially keen to point out my ig-
norance or lack of understanding about municipal tax codes. Yet they were always 
pleased when I challenged their own legal and administrative knowledge, and were even 
thrilled in the rare event that I understood obscure legal details about public finance. 
These debates so often hinged on these details of public law: what rights does the com-
mune have in relation to the central state? And how may a commune legitimately exer-
cise such rights within its territorial borders? With what obligations must the central state 
uphold local decision-making and local statues?22  
 
																																																						
22 In January and February of 2017, I conducted a survey of nearly all the municipal secretaries in the 19 
communes that constitute the City of Dakar. The survey consisted of semi-structured interviews in which 
I posed general questions about their views on urban administration, and the most salient challenges for 
their communes after the 2013 reforms. Only two communes refused to participate. 
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The intellectual life of Senegal’s urban administration is not marginal to Senega-
lese culture; rather, it is a point of national pride. Sarr, for example, had himself studied 
urban planning and administration in Brussels, and lamented that he had to abandon his 
studies before completing his higher degree. He had studied The Frankfurt School of 
social thought and claimed to bring these Marxist interpretations of culture to bear on 
his own administrative work. And he situated his vocation at the commune in relation to 
one of the most prominent Socialist intellectuals in West Africa: Léopold Sédar Senghor, 
the first president of independent Senegal and foremost voice of the Négritude move-
ment. Although Senghor is more famous in scholarly circles for his poetry and art criti-
cism, he has also left an administrative and political legacy at home in Senegal. 
 
Senghor’s legacy is expansive and contradictory. Yet there is an important origi-
nally gesture that stretches across Senghor’s engagements: he takes up European con-
cepts and practices and puts them to critical use at the service of African liberation. In 
his writings on African art, for example, Senghor challenges—and inverts—the dominant 
understandings of Senegambian traditional art objects (Diagne, 2011). European schol-
ars and artists at the time viewed these objects as evidence of the absence of rational 
thought. They understood these objects as ritual artefacts which Africans believed were 
small gods able to effect change in the material world. This, however, ran counter to the 
emerging faith in rational thought in the Enlightenment tradition. Believing in the magical 
properties of magical objects, violated the long-held belief in a singular Christian deity 
and the growing investment in physics as a science.23 Though ethnologists had long 
dismissed these objects as lacking rational thought, Senghor understood them as a ma-
terial embodiment of rational thought. He reframed the African art object as a distinctly 
African contribution to philosophy that should not be dismissed as a mere “fetish” or 
magical object (Diagne, 2011).  
 
Sarr believed that urban administration should be understood similarly. The Sen-
ghorian legacy, in his view, was to take up “Western” forms of administration that had 
formerly been used to colonize the continent, to master them, improve them, and to put 
them to use for the benefit of African people. The idea, in his words, is to “take the tools 
from Western society and make them even better.'' Yet Sarr’s own attempts to rule by 
modern law puts him in direct contestation with residents who challenge the legitimacy 
of such techniques of bureaucratic administration. Nevertheless, Sarr’s beliefs are ex-
emplary of how many of Dakar’s administrative experts understand their vocation: they 
perceive themselves as a modernizing, apolitical force in communal administration. They 
hold a set of classically liberal values in which the commune is the contemporary reali-
zation and classical origin of West Africa’s contribution to global democratic form. Like 
Sarr, many administrators view their role as ensuring that officials and citizens are held 
accountable to the democratic norms outlined in Senegal’s constitutional laws.  
 
																																																						
23 For a more detailed examination of the relation between Enlightenment and the concept of the fetish, 
see Pietz (1985, 1987, 1988).	
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In this sense, many municipal secretaries view themselves as technical experts, 
and they often emphasize the apolitical nature of their work. For example, they are not 
political appointees but instead work at the service of Mayors regardless of their party 
affiliations. Sarr narrated the beginning of his career at the commune in a similar way to 
his career at the City of Dakar: he had been called back from his studies in Belgium to 
help a mayor establish a new commune in the northern end of the Dakar peninsula. 15 
years ago, he noted, this area was the bush (la brousse) and he, along with the first 
Mayor, had to create a commune in a sparsely populated place controlled by a local 
ethnic authority, the Lébou. Unlike today, all of Dakar’s mayors at the time, including 
Diop, belonged to the Socialist Party. As Sarr narrated it, today’s urban administration 
was a long way from the technical proficiency of the Diop years. It was, in his estimation, 
less rigorous and more violent than in the past. Yet many of Dakar’s municipal secretar-
ies persisted in bringing the administrative and intellectual spirit of Senghor to bear on 
their present-day administration of Dakar’s growing number of communes.  
 
So, how does an administrator like Sarr make sense of this shift in communal 
administration? And how does Senegal’s history of legal reason intervene? Sarr’s en-
counter with the tempestuous resident is exemplary: although the law guides his practi-
cal administration of the commune, Sarr is nevertheless required to engage in distinctly 
different styles of bureaucratic reason. In this case, this resident introduced a familiar 
criterion for access to bureaucratic services: personal affiliation with the Mayor. This, of 
course, is precisely the kind of bureaucratic norm that Sarr and the decentralization laws 
sought to reform. And as such, Sarr framed Dakar’s communal present as one that was 
out of joint with Senegal’s legacy of administrative reform. Far from eliminating “politics” 
from the application of the law, there remained contrasting—and often conflicting—
forms of political reason at play communal administration.  
 
Recurring waves of legal reform have introduced and sustained such legal rea-
soning as an important reference point for administrative work: many communal admin-
istrators view their profession as the practical application of the norms established by 
law. Far from being a distant or forgotten past, the intellectual legacies of law—and legal 
argumentation—are regularly invoked by bureaucrats to explain their approach to ad-
ministrative practice in the present. 
 
Colonial City, Communal Democracy 
 
The Four Communes of Senegal were created by law in the 19th century, and they inau-
gurated a new set of rights and responsibilities for a limited number of French colonial 
subjects. This history of civic liberation and inclusion is set against the backdrop of im-
perial transformations of the 18th century which in turn transformed the logic of colonial 
rule. In place of indirect or absolute rule, French colonial authorities began experimenting 
with a secular and civic form of cultural assimilation. The Haitian Revolution of 1791 set 
an early precedent for former slaves making new claims to civic independence, but it 
wasn’t until 1848 that the institution of slavery was—once again—outlawed across the 
empire. This was a watershed year in the French empire in which the abolition of slavery 
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transformed former colonial subjects into a new kind of political subject: citizens. Sene-
gal’s communes were the earliest jurisdictions within the French Empire to achieve such 
a status. Although Senegal’s communes began as colonial enclave of civic rights and 
liberties for elites along the coast, they have since spread across the Dakar peninsula, 
rural Senegal, and across West Africa more generally.  
 
In 1872, the Governor General of the West African colonies passed a decree that 
granted the communes of Saint-Louis and Gorée a new legal status. These communes 
were established two decades prior, but lacked many of the communal rights accorded 
to the communes of Metropolitan France. In the decades to follow, colonial authorities 
passed two further decrees creating the communes of Rufisque and Dakar. By the letter 
of the law, this meant voting rights in the French national assembly, French citizenship 
for residents of Senegal’s Four Communes, and electoral autonomy for the communes. 
These laws are exemplary of Senegal’s early claims to independence from—and within—
the French colonial state. Yet municipal authority in Senegal has been caught between 
two opposing logics embedded in these legal reforms (Diop & Diouf, 1992). On the one 
hand, there is the constitutional logic of la libre administration (free administration) which 
established local democracy and self-rule for Senegal’s coastal communes. On the 
other, there is the logic of la tutelle, or central government oversight. Although free ad-
ministration reflects the broader principles of assimilation, central government authori-
ties have persistently advanced forms of oversight that limit this very freedom.   
 
For decades, these four communes remained the only local governments outside 
metropolitan France with the designation of commune en plein exercise (or, fully em-
powered communes). And up until independence there were ongoing debates among 
officials and administrators as to how much local authority should be delegated to the 
municipal councils and mayors. Nevertheless, this fully empowered status endowed the 
Four Communes with the primary institutions of local democratic government: municipal 
councils and mayors, the deputyship, and the General Council of Senegal. Further, these 
decrees permitted the communes to set and collect several local taxes, supplementing 
those already collected by the Governor General (Diouf, 1998). The final decades of the 
19th century, in other words, marked a constitutional turn in Senegal towards local au-
tonomy. And this turn was a response to the changing political, social, and economic 
conditions of the colonies themselves. The end of slavery and the French revolutions 
were particularly important shifts in this respect, and in their wake, the cities of Senegal 
emerged as the prototypical form of la libre administration and local democracy across 
the empire.  
 
The first two colonial cities in Senegal were founded in the 17th century24. Saint-
Louis and Gorée were both small island towns that functioned as the primary port of 
entry for Europeans merchants and key access points to the West African trade in slaves 
and agricultural goods. Gorée was founded by the Dutch as a stopover in the Atlantic  
																																																						
24 Unless otherwise cited, for this sections I draw on Pasquier (1960). 
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Figure 2.1 History of the Spatial Development of Dakar 
Source: Dakar Master Plan 2025 
 
slave trade and is memorialized as such to this day. This introduction of European 
trade—in slaves but also in agricultural goods, namely peanuts—marked an intensifica-
tion and spatial re-configuration of the existing networks of trade across the region. No 
longer exclusively a trans-Saharan trade oriented towards the interior of the continent, 
these colonial cities re-oriented exchange toward the coasts. Saint-Louis was located at 
the mouth of the Senegal river and, as such, was an access point to the exchange routes 
along the river to the north. The island of Gorée was further south, located several kilo-
meters from the coast, and functioned as an access point for exchange routes toward 
the southern interior of Senegal and along the Southern coast. Both cities are islands 
which offered security and maritime access to early European merchants and settlers. 
Rather than erecting walls around a continental base, these early colonists favored the 
established security of small islands.  
 
Both cities functioned as colonial stopovers in these regional trade routes, and by 
the 19th century they had developed a unique form of colonial cosmopolitanism specific 
to Atlantic enclaves of the West African coast (Diouf, 1991). Although the cities were 
creations of colonial authorities, these cities were overwhelmingly populated by a vast 
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diversity of African ethnicities, mixed-race elites, and Arab merchants from North Africa 
and neighboring Mauritania. And since 1778 in Saint-Louis, a mayor was appointed from 
this diverse mix of residents as a kind of intermediary between the higher levels of the 
colonial administration and its urban population. In Saint-Louis, the mixed-raced elites 
significantly outnumbered their European counterparts. And far from excluding Africans 
from these cities, the colonial authorities actively encouraged rural-urban migration. The 
need for labor power in the city created a new kind of African urbanite who retained little 
connection to his rural village of birth. And in this respect, these Atlantic enclaves be-
came the central sites of cross-cultural contact and mixing in the region. But their loca-
tion on small, militarily secured islands began to pose a geographic limit to their urban 
growth.  
 
In 1852, Gorée was officially established as a French port, unlike Saint-Louis 
which gained its formal status seventy years prior. And it was only a short two years later 
in 1854 that it gained communal status. With Gorée’s new status came a renewed at-
tention from French colonial authorities to investments in the urban development of the 
island. By 1860, Saint-Louis had created its first master plan in response to the public 
health threats posed by the lack of sanitation and water infrastructure. However, these 
interventions were largely limited to the material upgrading and installation of infrastruc-
ture systems. Gorée was competing with Saint-Louis for similar kinds of infrastructural 
investments, as both islands were rapidly running out of space on which to build. And a 
new transportation technology—the steamship—required larger ports and large stores 
of coal which neither island had the capacity to accommodate.  
 
On August 10,1872, the Director General of the colonial government signed a de-
cree that granted the communes of Senegal—at the time, Gorée and Saint Louis—the 
same municipal prerogatives as the communes in metropolitan France. This law embod-
ies France’s colonial logic of assimilation: the colonial communes and their inhabitants 
were, by law, provided the same rights and responsibilities as citizens and municipal 
governments in France. The laws of 1872 have today become the central reference point 
for “free administration” Senegal’s contemporary communes, and the decentralization 
laws reference this legacy to this day. In this way, 1872 set an important precedent for 
the centuries to follow: hereafter, growing cities in the colonies would make similar 
claims to communal status, albeit with significant challenge and resistance from certain 
corners of the colonial administration itself (Goerg, 2006). The laws of 1872 still embody 
this logic of assimilation and free administration, which has been carried on—and con-
tested—to the present (Diop & Diouf, 1992) 
 
Yet the economic ascendance of Rufisque was in full swing, and its location on 
the mainland offered a more spacious alternative to the increasingly outdated and clois-
tered security of the islands. Gorée, for example, was entirely dependent on the mainland 
for its provisioning of drinking water, firewood, construction material, meat, vegetables, 
millet, and rice. Rufisque, on the other hand, was located several kilometers south of the 
Cap Vert peninsula and had established itself as the warehouse and stopover for the 
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growing peanut trade with the southern interior of the territory. Indeed, the private enter-
prises working on the continent favored Rufisque as their economic hub and had trans-
formed this small merchant town into the preeminent city in the Atlantic economy of 
Senegal. With the end of the slave trade, Atlantic exchange in the region turned towards 
the booming peanut economy, for which Rufisque was advantageously located to ac-
cess.  
 
By 1880, the population of Rufisque surpassed that of the two island cities, and 
subsequently gained communal status. Communes are established by law at the request 
of city inhabitants. At the time, there was no demographic criteria through which colonial 
authorities would automatically establish a commune. Instead, the establishment of 
communes came at the request of the inhabitants themselves. In the case of Rufisque, 
there was a large and dominant class of merchants and traders that had come to control 
the economic life of the town. These elites petitioned to the colonial government for the 
creation of the commune, arguing that their burgeoning city was deprived of the munic-
ipal services for which it was deprived (Légier, 1968). The elites of Rufisque sought to 
create a public entity that could collect taxes and make expenditures in the public inter-
est. The bourgeois elites of colonial Senegal constituted communes in response to the 
need for public services in response to the rapid urbanization of the coast. As a result, 
in 1880, Rufisque now had its own mayor and municipal council and equal rights to 
citizenship and representation as the inhabitants of Gorée and Rufisque. Had the city’s 
development been left to the private interests of the town, Rufisque perhaps could have 
emerged as the primate city of colonial Senegal. However, the colonial authorities had 
long favored Dakar as a secure urban alternative.  
 
Dakar was unlike any of the other three colonial cities in Senegal. By 1880 it was 
still, as one officer described it, “a kind of colonial city outlined in some sand and red 
rocks” (qtd in Pasquier, 1960: 411). There was almost no private investment in the city, 
owing its existence almost entirely to the limited material investments of the French. 
Colonial officials had ventured the idea of an official relocation to the peninsula since the 
beginning of the 19th century. And several officials had even signed contracts with ethnic 
authorities to occupy small strips of land along the coast. From the perspective of French 
colonial officers the Cap Vert peninsula seemed to offer a “marvelous fertility” in com-
parison to the “sterile rock” of Gorée (396). However, several attempts early in the 19th 
century to develop an agricultural enterprise on the cape were abandoned due to the 
widespread sickness and death of the settlers. Further, the colonists had ongoing dis-
putes with another ethnic authority on the peninsula, the Lébou, over the use of land. 
 
Nevertheless, by 1848 colonial authorities turned to Dakar as a geographic solu-
tion to the tight constraints of urban development on the islands. The solution, however, 
was deferred until the turn of the 20th century. As Pasquier suggests, the emancipation 
of slaves across the French Empire in 1848 stalled the development of Dakar, because 
the administration feared that any political upheaval would be more difficult to control in 
the new and comparatively insecure terrain of the peninsula. Colonial authorities were, 
in other words, not prepared to leave the security of the islands. In the following decade, 
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however, a new Chief Engineer installed in Gorée, Pinet-Laprade, began making plans 
for the relocation of the administrative and political center of the West African colonies 
to the peninsula. And by 1855, Pinet-Laprade sent troops, constructed a fort, and offi-
cially took possession of the territory of Dakar in the name of France. The colonization 
of the cape was quickly followed by the first master plan in 1862 and new requirements 
for construction permits in preparation for the urbanization of Dakar.   
 
But in 1880, Rufisque was leading urban and economic growth among the cities. 
In contrast, Dakar was still a relatively empty, planned, governmental stopover. Yet Da-
kar received several new functions: it received the center of colonial communications for 
the region and a new rail line connecting directly to Saint-Louis. Colonial authorities even 
went so far as to deny the Commune of Rufisque’s request for credit to build permanent 
sanitation infrastructures in the city. They instead favored making investments in the 
comparatively “dead city” of Dakar, a “checkerboard whose squares were still waiting to 
be occupied” (Pasquier, 1960: 406). Still, many officials continued to oppose new fiscal 
charges dedicated to any of the other three cities. Indeed, the growth of Dakar is owed 
to the will and fiscal strength of the centralized colonial government.  
 
Colonial authorities continued to funnel their fiscal expenditures into the infrastructural 
development of Dakar. Gorée, Saint-Louis, and Rufisque were still the cultural, eco-
nomic, and political capitals of French West Africa. Dakar, by comparison, had few build-
ings and lacked the cultural and economic viability of these neighboring colonial towns. 
As one colonial official noted at the time, “we can make Dakar a serious maritime estab-
lishment, but we are going to need money, a lot of money” (qtd in Pasquier, 1960: 411). 
In this last quarter of the 19th century, a series of pivotal investments turned in favor of 
Dakar: the completion of the port, the full transfer of the administrative services of French 
West Africa, the relocation of the courts and the colonial bank, the completion of the rail 
line from Saint-Louis, and the relocation of the Chamber of Commerce which unleashed 
a wave of private land speculation on the peninsula. And finally, in 1887 the colonial 
authorities legally established the Commune of Dakar, giving the city its own form of 
political representation and civic rights like the other three communes.  
 
By the turn of the 20th century, Dakar was receiving more investment from the 
colonial government than its urban counterparts across Senegal. Dakar became the cen-
tral passage point for colonial fleets along the coast, as the peninsula offered the access 
and security of an island without the difficult detachment from the goods and provisions 
of the mainland on which the island cities still relied. The Governor General in 1903 fur-
ther entrenched Dakar’s position by dedicating 10 million francs to an existing loan of 65 
million for a further expansion of Dakar’s port. But an outbreak of yellow fever in the 
burgeoning city prompted a significant change in Dakar’s urban form. Dakar’s planners 
introduced a strict segregation of African neighborhoods from the European core (Bigon, 
2009). Again, colonial authorities addressed this problem with a massive investment in 
urban infrastructure: open sewage drains were covered, a new sewage network was 
built, a new water system installed, and new boulevards—les cordons sanitaires—and 
an entire planned neighborhood, Médina, on which the African inhabitants of Dakar were 
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Figure 2.2 Map from 1951 Master Plan of Dakar 
Source: National Archives of Senegal 
 
relocated and segregated. Dakar was a planned, segregated city; a stark contrast to the 
créole culture that had developed in Saint-Louis, Gorée, Rufisque and similarly across 
New Orleans and the Caribbean colonies. 
 
 This turn towards Dakar marked and important shift in colonial urbanization and 
rule. Although the Four Communes were held out by officials and citizens alike as exem-
plary of the colonial governments assimilationist policy, Dakar marked the beginning of 
opposition to these rights and a shift towards the primacy of security and segregation in 
the urban planning of colonial Dakar (Bigon, 2012; Echenberg, 2002). Although Rufisque 
offered the wealth and vibrancy of a booming trade town, the colonial authorities favored 
the relative security of the Cap Vert peninsula. In this sense, the peninsula reflected the 
tensions within colonial rule at the time: economic and urban growth required the geo-
graphic terrain that the islands could not provide, but the mainland exposed the colony 
to the perceived insecurity of the interior. The peninsula offered a kind of tentative com-
promise between security and circulation, and the extension of metropolitan rights be-
yond Dakar was similarly tentative. The constitution of the Commune of Dakar did not 
inaugurate communalization of the territory, and instead, “closed off the extension of the 
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metropolitan municipal regime” (Légier, 1968: 427). Communal rights were reserved for 
the coasts, and “transforming the village chiefdoms into communes seemed out of the 
question” (427). The founding of Dakar, in other words, marked a geographic and politi-
cal limit to colonial assimilation and communal independence.  
 
The Limits of Communal Independence 
 
Although France’s policy of assimilation opened small pathways to democratic inclusion 
for its colonial subjects, the expansion of communal independence and citizenship in 
Senegal has had highly contentions limits25. In 1924, the Governor General passed a 
decree which subordinated all municipal public services to the authority of the Lieutenant 
governor. And, as Diop & Diouf (1991) argue, this law is exemplary of the logic of la tutelle 
(oversight), a set of legal constraints on local decision making governed by the central 
state. The progressive expansion of such oversight marks a distinct contrast from the 
“free administration” put forth in the constitution of 1872. According to Diop & Diouf 
(1991), “the history of the municipality is that of the reinforcement of the central state’s 
tutelle” (8). And they argue that the central dynamic between the communes and the 
central state has been one of “mercenary support” in which communes received fiscal 
transfers in return for political patronage to the central state. The communes were known 
as “perfect models of administrative counter-performance” due to widespread corrup-
tion, patronage, and seemingly little interest in providing public services (Diop & Diouf, 
1991).  
 
From this perspective, the 1924 reform is exemplary of a broader trend in com-
munal politics: the increase of oversight, the onset of fiscal dependence on the central 
state, and the curtailment of communal rights. But this trend began far before the 1924 
reform itself and entailed a series of legal transformations that provided the conditions 
for communal dependence on the central state. Although the 1872 laws established the 
formal rights of communes and their inhabitants, they also inaugurated a different and 
somewhat counterintuitive limit on communal independence: fiscal administration was 
delegated to the communes and became, by all accounts, a financial disaster. This fiscal 
mismanagement provided the justification for the “juridical gap” (Légier,1968: 417) be-
tween municipalities in France and in Senegal, and the colonial authorities were reticent 
to expand the metropolitan regime across the colonies. The Four Communes, in other 
words, were meant to remain exceptions in colonial rule.  
 
 Although the laws of 1872 and 1884 introduced communal democracy, this did 
not necessarily translate into political independence for African inhabitants. In Saint-
Louis, for example, there was a long tradition of African and métis mayors which pre-
dated the 1872 laws. These mayors were appointed by the colonial authorities as a kind 
of intermediary between the administration and its subjects. But they were Mayors with-
out elected councils, without independent budgets, and therefore “without real power” 
																																																						
25 Here I leave Pasquier’s (1960) account of 19th century urbanization in Senegal and turn to the work of 
Henri Jacques Légier (1968) on municipal institutions of French West Africa. 
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(Légier, 1968: 424). The introduction of elections opened the Mayorship to European 
nobles with the intended effect of reducing the influence of these African Mayors. Previ-
ously, it was out of the question for such an African Mayor to control a commune with 
political authority equal to the communes of Metropolitan France. As communal authority 
expanded at the end of the 19th century, French authorities at the same time curtailed 
African representation and participation in communal democracy.  
 
Beyond elections, the laws of 1872 and 1884 also introduced the financial auton-
omy of the communes of Senegal (Légier, 1968: 424). The laws replaced a fiscal transfer 
authority with a collected tax. Although the central administration remained responsible 
for the tax collection itself, the law changed the kind and rate of revenues directed to 
communal governments. Instead of receiving a transfer whose amount was determined 
by the central administration, taxes were now based simply on the number of taxes col-
lected from the roles. In more contemporary terminology, this was a shift towards the 
“own-source” revenues of communal governments themselves: they would only receive 
the revenues collected—and not the fixed criteria of a transfer. Communes then became 
legally entitled to set the rates for these new municipal taxes.  
 
However, the communes were a financial disaster, and for this reason the laws 
on hand favored strong intervention and oversight of local fiscal administration. At the 
same time the communes received new constitutional powers, accounting errors and 
fiscal mismanagement were rampant. The communes were deeply in debt, often ignored 
their debt obligations, and omitted much of the financial audits that the administration 
required of them. All the communes—except Rufisque—were hard pressed for revenues 
and the Governor General criticized the massive disparities between revenues and ex-
penditures in Gorée and Saint-Louis. The colonial administration became hostile to the 
communes and took several measures that undercut the fiscal authority of the com-
munes, such as refusing to guarantee loans for public works and limiting the regular 
grants for these same services. In response, the communes proposed several increases 
and “exceptional taxes” in order to address the fiscal crisis. These new revenues, how-
ever, required approval from the Governor General, leaving the communes themselves 
both politically and fiscally dependent on higher levels of the colonial administration. 
 
 For the colonial administration, fiscal mismanagement at the municipal level jus-
tified the limitation and oversight of communal authority. And the fiscal crisis in the com-
munes offered an opportunity to undercut their recently established legal authority. Elec-
tions introduced a new set of European Mayors to supplant the tradition of African and 
métis mayors established in Saint-Louis, but the growing debt and budgetary deficits of 
the communes themselves nevertheless spurred a renewed round of legal limitations on 
communal authority. The assimilationist principles of the constitution of the Four Com-
munes offered a path to political inclusion for the African inhabitants of these colonial 
cities. But this inclusion was heavily circumscribed by stringent suffrage requirements, 
new legal limits on communal decision-making, the introduction of European candidates 
for Mayor, and the ongoing fiscal crisis of the communes. The French policy of assimi-
lation created, on paper, a democratic alternative to colonial rule, but there was at the 
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same time a strict limitation on where and how such liberties were extended to commu-
nal governments and the citizens they represented. Towards the end of the 19th century, 
the four communes made small steps in regaining fiscal authority—such as the ability to 
contract loans—but it was not until the mid 20th century that claims to communal status 
expanded across the colonial territories.  
 
Independence, Recentralized?  
 
Decolonization in Senegal ultimately took the form of national independence. But as 
Fredrick Cooper (2014) argues, the nation-state was not the political form that most Af-
rican elites, citizens, and subjects imagined as a desirable alternative to colonial rule26. 
Instead, they envisioned an expansion of the rights and entitlements of the colonial ter-
ritories and those that inhabited them. The question was not how to expel the French 
government, but how to improve their political standing within it. Rather than remaining 
subjects of a colonial state, they envisioned become citizens of a global federation. In 
line with this vision of decolonization, colonial authorities and local officials transformed 
the legal categorizations for units of territorial administration. Since 1848, African activ-
ists and elites within the colonial administration held out the commune en plein exercise 
as the promise for expanding local democracy and civic rights. But it wasn’t until a land-
mark legislation in 1945 that the delegation of administrative authority shifted in favor of 
African controlled local governments.  
 
These laws provided an opening for a partial autonomy of colonial territories, but 
with continued military, economic, and technical support of France in West African coun-
tries in the postcolonial period. By 1945 the categorizations of the colonies had under-
gone significant transformation. It was no longer possible to think of a singular relation-
ship between the “metropole” and the “colonies”, but was instead an increasing mix of 
territorial designations which accorded different rights and different competences to 
governmental units across the French Empire. In fact, the idea of the “French Empire” 
was increasingly being replaced by the idea of the “French Union”. The Four Communes 
of Senegal remained the locus of French citizenship and participation in this emerging 
Union. But there were also the “protectorates” of Morocco, Tunisia, and Indochina, as 
well as the “mandates” of Togo and Cameroon, and the “territories” of Senegal and Mali. 
Like the Four Communes, these categories entailed France’s general oversight of inter-
national standards of governance. But they also assigned international diplomatic sov-
ereignty to, for example, the Sultan of Morocco. 
 
The Loi-Cadre (framework law) of 1945 devolved significant authority to the Afri-
can colonies, but still retained the lingering values of high imperial rule. Prior to the law, 
however, much of African colonial politics centered around a “culture of demands” in 
which Africans in the colonies formulated requests for resources and rights, but were 
not responsible for the management of their distribution. And politics within the French 
African Union (AOF) was largely centered around political leaders’ ability to successfully 
																																																						
26 In this section I draw on the work of Cooper (2014) Chafer (2002). 
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maneuver these requests at the level of the territory (Chafer 2002). The Loi-cadre was a 
declaration of intent to devolve political responsibilities to the colonies. However, the 
plan did not specify precisely how rights and responsibilities were to be distributed 
among the various levels of government. Instead, there was a general recognition that 
France would maintain control over the military, the police, education, and customs 
agencies—all the central political mechanisms for claiming French sovereignty over the 
colonies. Responsibility for budgetary matters, however, was devolved to African offi-
cials, forcing them to leave behind a “culture of demands” and do the unpopular work 
of making strict cuts in the context of scarce resources.  
 
The Loi-cadre prefigured much of France’s involvement in the region through the 
postcolonial period: it provided a way for France to maintain French strategic interests 
without incurring the monetary costs of colonial governance (Chafer, 2002). African po-
litical leaders remained dependent on France for technical, military, and economic re-
sources despite the sovereign independence they achieved on paper. At the same time, 
France enjoyed the international prestige of laying claim to successfully managing an 
enlightened process of decolonization. The experience of decolonization was different 
than its counterparts in North Africa and Southeast Asia. What is distinct about West 
Africa is the relative absence of violence and the relatively smooth transition of power 
coupled with the enduring political presence of France in the region post-decolonization. 
Algeria and Southeast Asia violently expelled the French, but West African states—par-
ticularly Senegal—have maintained close connections in the postcolonial era.  
 
West Africa’s decolonization was an experiment in global federation, in which for-
mer colonial territories imagined transforming into governmental units with expanded set 
of rights and responsibilities in the French Union. It was through these debates over 
territorial status that African politicians and French colonial authorities negotiated decol-
onization in West Africa. The federation provided a “model for Africans who were thinking 
beyond the level of the individual territory—if only an administrative unit could be turned 
into a political one, governed democratically, pooling resources, and expressing Afri-
cans’ ‘horizontal’ solidarity with each other” (Cooper, 2014: 23). The French Union would 
have been constituted as a federation of governments, autonomous from the political 
control of the metropole yet united by a shared budget and the shared management of 
sovereign responsibilities like national security and monetary policy.  
 
The Loi-Cadre, in other words, assigned to the “territory” a political status like 
that of the communes: rights to political citizenship and the entitlements it entails, but 
limited control over various elements of sovereign authority. The debates among colonial 
officials during decolonization largely hinged on this relationship between the territories 
and the metropole. A “territory” in this sense is a colonial category for a sub-national 
government which is at a significantly larger scale than a small commune. And it was at 
the scale of the territory that officials were debating the future of inter-governmental re-
lations in West Africa. The commune, however, did not disappear; it proliferated. In the 
Senegalese communes, elites had been negotiating municipal independence for well 
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over a century. And although debates over decolonization largely hinged on the relation-
ship between territory and metropole, the communes nevertheless remained a more lo-
calized site for making claims to civic inclusion in the French Union.  
 
In the 1940s, an increasing number of local governments making claims to com-
munal status. Local governments outside the Four Communes held the status of cercle, 
a French colonial equivalent to the English form of the Native Administration. The cercle 
was a local government that ruled over colonial subjects by appointing local leaders to 
positions within the colonial authority. In the French colonies, bi-furcated rule was split 
along the lines of cercle and commune, in which civic rights and protections for citizens 
were not extended out into the hinterlands for the subjects of the cercle. However, the 
elites in the cercle increasingly recognized the political benefits that came with commu-
nal designation—they received an increased power to collect tax and more control over 
local government. If the cercle allowed some access to colonial resources, the commune 
en plein exercise would by comparison unyoke them from the oversight and control that 
these resources entailed. As a result, claims to communal status became, from the 
1940s on, a central technique through which local officials and their subjects advocated 
for communal independence. Although this was not a form of national independence, 
communal independence nevertheless accorded to local governments an increased 
amount of political control over local state administration.  
 
However, colonial authorities continued to curtail the expansion of such claims to 
communal status. Even in the years following the communal laws of 1872, colonial au-
thorities introduced elsewhere new designations for local governments with less rights 
than the communes en plein exercise of the Four Communes, but more than the rural 
administrative units of the cercle. In Algeria, for example, the designation of “mixed com-
munes” offered some control over local service provisioning, but also allowed the Gov-
ernor General to appoint the Mayor (Légier, 1968: 429). Mixed communes had a further 
tiered designation of first, second, and third degree with ascending levels of political 
participation and independence. Mixed communes of the first degree, for example, were 
led by appointed commissions, and the commissions of the mixed communes of the 
third degree were elected by universal suffrage.  
 
These colonial designations for municipal units entrenched the exclusion of Afri-
cans from the city and its citizenship (Goerg, 2006). Rather than offering full communal 
status, the colonial administration put forth these partially autonomous communes to 
limit African political inclusion in colonial government. By 1945, the demographic explo-
sion in West African colonial cities was pushing the limits of municipal services and the 
boundaries of the cities themselves. And in the new French Republic after World Word 
II, colonial Senegal once again restored the communal independence set forth in the 
1872 laws that had been steadily eroded since. The communes recovered, for example, 
their competencies in public health and transportation that had been usurped by the 
colonial administration. And localities across Senegal made similarly successful claims 
to communal status which resulted in the creation of 29 communes en plein exercise 
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and 23 communes mixtes across French West Africa (Légier,1968: 420). As Légier ar-
gues, these communes were still under a strict oversight of the colonial administration, 
and the failure of this form of municipal decolonization would not be taken up again until 
national independence.  
 
Independence, Decentralized 
 
National independence in 1960 did not stall this expansion of communal status, and 
postcolonial leaders across West Africa continued to legally transform local governments 
across the region into communes en plein exercise. Senegal remained the leader in the 
respect. President Senghor, in his first decade in office, began a tradition of decentrali-
zation reforms, first focusing legal attention on the rural governments historically ex-
cluded from communal benefits. In 1972, the Senegalese government passed Act I of 
Decentralization, what was then known as the “Rural Community Laws”. These laws 
created yet another governmental designation which was intended as a transition to 
communal status. The “Rural Community” was primarily responsible for the allocation of 
land, as much of the land in Senegal after independence was transferred to the national 
domain.  
 
The Rural Councils in these areas were charged with allocating land to Senega-
lese citizens who were using them in a “productive manner” (Dunton, 2017). Represent-
atives on the councils were locally elected, served 5 year terms, and were intended to 
cultivate democratic participation in rural areas that had hereto been excluded from the 
urban democracies in the communes. However, Rural Councils were still under the su-
pervision of a Sous-Préfet who had the authority to override the decisions of the Rural 
Council, and was further charged with managing the annual budget. Like the urban com-
munes, these Councils were filled with local representative of the Socialist Party, which 
maintained one-party rule over Senegal for decades after independence (Dunton, 2017). 
Nevertheless, communal administrators today cite the Rural Community Laws as the 
first step in expanding democratic participation and decentralization in the postcolonial 
period.  
 
In 1996, administrative laws changed once again. The central state ushered in Act 
II of decentralization, which provided larger budgets and delegated more responsibilities 
for service provisioning to the communes. It created a new territorial unit—the region—
and set the stage for further devolution of governmental authority. By the 1990s, urban 
administration in Dakar turned once again towards increasing communal autonomy. But 
many perceived this devolution to have taken place at the expense of the City of Dakar. 
One of the central reforms of 1996 was the decoupage, or the partitioning of the City of 
Dakar into 19 separate communes d'arrondissement. Historically, the City of Dakar had 
legal standing as a commune. But the 1996 laws gave the City a different kind of territo-
rial designation: it also became a ville (city). Yet no sections of the new law outlined the 
responsibilities of a ville, compared to the 70 pages of text dedicated to the new com-
munes d'arrondissement. Many of the City’s legal mandates were subsequently de-
volved to the 19 communes that now cover the exact same terrain as the City. The 1996 
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laws inaugurated an ongoing legal confusion: was the municipal government of Dakar 
considered a commune or a ville? If it is a commune, then how would rights be allocated 
between the communes covering the same terrain? If it is a ville, what kind of rights does 
this designation entail?  
 
Dakar is a small, hooked cape that juts out into the Atlantic Ocean, and most of 
its borders are defined by this geographic limit. But the City’s limit to the east ends in 
the middle of a tight geographical bottleneck, which separates about one half of metro-
politan Dakar’s residents from the other. These are the geographical limits of the City of 
Dakar, including the islands of Gorée and N’Gor. In the suburbs, there are two further 
suburban jurisdictions: the City of Guediawaye and the City of Pikine. Together, these 
three cities cover all metropolitan Dakar. However, within each of these cities there is 
also a collection of communes. Within the City of Dakar there are 19 communes, within 
the City of Pikine there are 14 communes, and within the City of Guediawaye there are 
5 communes. All these territories are politically and administratively independent of one 
another. None holds any legal oversight over the other, and each commune has an 
elected mayor and municipal council which are not subordinate in any way to the City in 
which they reside. These communal governments are free to govern their territories 
within the constraints set out by their constitutional laws. This is the official territorial 
organization of public authority across the peninsula. Although the 1996 reforms set the 
physical boundaries of these territories, Act III reconfigured the distribution of compe-
tences among them.  
 
In 2013, the central government passed what is known colloquially as “Act III of 
Decentralization”, but is legally termed the Loi No. 2013-10 du 28 Décembre 2013 
portant Code Générale des Collectivités Locales. Lawmakers intended realize the vision 
for local government outlined by its 1996 predecessor. And Act III law intended to “fun-
damentally modify the relationship between the State and local governments by rein-
forcing the autonomy of management through…free administration, the lifting of super-
vision (contrôle), and the competences [of local governments]” (Loi No. 2013-10, p 1). 
Rather than re-thinking these principles, Act III intended to correct the weaknesses pre-
venting their realization. It claimed to change the state’s administrative architecture, clar-
ify the partition of competencies between state and local government, and reform local 
finance.  
 
Act III’s “complete communalization of the national territory” extended and ex-
panded a juridical movement that began during French colonial rule. And in Senegal’s 
postcolonial period, President Senghor set the legal trajectory on the path towards local 
democracy with the 1972 passage of the Rural Community Laws, or, Act I of decentral-
ization. The authors of Act II and Act III consciously followed in Senghor’s footsteps, 
extending the powers of the commune en plein exercise to local governments across 
Senegal, and expanding the rights and responsibilities of existing communes. Like the 
debates over the relationship between territories and the metropole, the communes and 
the nation have had a similar set of disputes post-independence. How, for example, 
would the new nation reconcile the desire for local autonomy with the newly formed 
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authority of the sovereign state? And how would these debates play out across a national 
terrain with persistent and capacious material inequalities?  
 
Act II and Act III were written with the same values in mind: “reinforcing the au-
tonomy of management by, among others, the free administration and lifting of supervi-
sion (contrôle), as well as the competences [of the communes] in the nine domains (Loi 
no 2013-10, p 1). But Act III, claiming nothing short of a “modernization of the state”, 
took these values a step further by enacting what its authors called “complete commu-
nalization”. In this scheme, the “communes d'arrondissement” would instead become 
“communes en plein exercise”, and the “région” was being replaced by the “départe-
ment” as the official inter-communal territory. Thus Act III, reduced the legal categories 
to two: the commune and the “département”. However, the law still did not present a 
clearly defined role for a “ville”, which now carried a legal identity situated somewhere 
between these two new designations. On the one hand, the law outlines the responsibil-
ities of a “ville” alongside those of the “commune”, with the two sharing many of the 
same responsibilities and provisions. At the same time, the law permits a “ville” to also 
act as a “département”, “if its perimeter corresponds to the territory of the department” 
(5). For the City of Dakar, Act III meant a double role as “commune” and “département”, 
but this did not equate to an expansion of the City’s administrative reach. In fact, quite 
the opposite. 
 
 After the 2013 reforms, municipal officials often quipped that “the City had no 
territory”. The comment reflects the widespread confusion over the City’s new legal des-
ignation: the law had empowered the communes at the expense of the city. Of course, 
the City does have a territory, in that it has a legally delimited physical boundary. But 
these administrators were instead suggesting that the City did not have a legal claim to 
provide services or collect taxes. In other words, the City had a boundary, but its rights 
to exercise its communal rights within this boundary were increasingly absent. The re-
forms devolved these rights to the communes, and many officials in Senegal believed 
that this devolution was exemplary of another kind of political project at work: stripping 
down the administrative authority of the City of Dakar to quell the nascent presidential 
campaign of then Mayor Khalifa Sall. And alongside this emerging electoral contest, 
there also emerged a host of disputes over the proper assignment of fiscal functions 
among the 20 local governments on the Cap Vert Peninsula.   
 
A Return to Fiscal Disputes 
 
In 2016, the political life of public finance was making front page news. The Mayor of 
Guediawaye, Aliou Sall, had garnered a deluge of negative attention for his role in secur-
ing off-shore oil drilling contracts for a friend and business partner, Frank Timis. Timis is 
the CEO of Petro-Tim, a firm who was awarded two offshore permits by the Senegalese 
state in 2012. Sall is the brother of President, Macky Sall, and at the time the drilling 
contracts were awarded, he was also leading Petro-Tim’s Senegalese subsidiary. Aliou 
Sall’s connection to Petro-Tim provoked widespread public protest against nepotism 
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and corruption in the Senegalese state, a movement that was arguably ignited by Abdou-
laye Wade—a former president—and the subsequent governmental investigation into 
Sall’s role in the awarding of contracts to Petro-Tim. Wade’s accusations came on the 
heels of a similar battle in which the Senegalese anti-corruption court sentenced Wade’s 
son to 6 years in prison for embezzlement of public funds. Such political battles between 
the Sall family and the Wade family were for years capturing the attention of local and 
global press, and these political fault lines became increasingly intertwined with local 
financial administration in Dakar. 
 
Aliou Sall’s comments came during the governmental review of the state’s recent 
decentralization program, Act III. In 2017, Aliou Sall was again appearing in the media as 
a prominent voice in a similarly heated debate about public finance in Senegal. He was 
now the Mayor of one of the three municipalities that constitute the urban area of Dakar, 
and the head of the Association of Senegalese Mayors. This new debate was not about 
National-level embezzlement and nepotism, but was instead a more pointed focus on 
the distributional criteria for local taxes. Echoing previous charges of corruption, Aliou 
Sall directed his criticism squarely at the Mayor of Dakar, Khalifa Sall, an emerging po-
litical opponent of Aliou’s brother, then President. Instead of accusing Khalifa of corrup-
tion, Aliou put into question the legitimacy of the City of Dakar’s principle revenue 
stream: the business tax (la patente). 
 
In Senegalese budgetary nomenclature, the business tax is a category of taxes 
referred to as local taxes (les impôts locaux). Unlike municipal taxes which are controlled 
by the local government itself, local taxes are set and collected by central state agencies 
and subsequently made available in local government accounts. These accounts are 
also administered by the central state. By law, 100% of the business tax should be di-
rected to the local government (collectivité locale) in which the business resides. The 
metropolitan region of Dakar, however, has a territorial problem. It is divided into three 
separate municipalities, referred to in Senegalese law as cities (villes): the City of Dakar, 
the City of Guediawaye, and the City of Pikine. But each of these cities is further divided 
up into communes. Both cities and communes are therefore entitled to 100% of the 
business taxes collected within their territory. But in the case of Dakar, a business always 
sits within both city and commune, as cities’ territories are also entirely constituted by a 
patchwork of communal territories. For this reason, Dakar has a special re-distribution 
of the business tax: 60% for the City and 40% for the commune.  
 
At the official opening meeting of the central government’s Coordination Commit-
tee for the preparation of the new Decentralization support program, Aliou Sall put this 
distributional practice into question. But instead of calling attention to the repartition 
between city and commune, he argued that there should be a greater equality among 
the three cities in the Dakar region. His city, Guédiawaye, dedicates 90% of its invest-
ment budget to its debt service for the 300 million fCFA it owes to the central state’s 
lending authority. But at the same time, he noted, “a city like Dakar finds itself with a 
surplus of resources from its business tax, which is a tax applied to enterprises whose 
workers come from Dakar, Guédiawaye, Pikine, and Rufisque” (Gomis, 2016). Not only 
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was this a matter of “regional solidarity”, he argued, but also a solution to the suburban 
debt crisis. The City of Guédiawaye and Pikine are the municipal governments of the 
suburbs of the urban region of Dakar, and the City of Dakar governs the downtown and 
urban neighborhoods. There is a vast wealth inequality between the City of Dakar and 
its suburban counterparts. And as a populist appeal to the frustration with such inequal-
ities, Aliou Sall directed his criticism explicitly at the surplus of public wealth in the City 
of Dakar. But as one commentator noted, there was also a clear political motive in Aliou’s 
declaration: it was “as if he already announced [decentralization] as a power strategy to 
further weaken the Mayor of Dakar as a potential presidential candidate” (Gomis, 2016).  
 
Such controversies are not new. However, as one municipal secretary argued, 
Act III incited a host of new disputes over communal rights, especially the rights to rev-
enues. Although the laws devolved rights and responsibilities to the communes, each 
commune was left to pay for its new obligations with the resources to be found within 
its own communal borders. But as Alione Sall made evident, there were vast disparities 
between the Dakar peninsula and the suburbs stretching out into the periphery. To leave 
each commune “in their own corner” meant re-inscribing these existing inequalities. The 
redistribution of resources via central government fiscal transfers had long been a solu-
tion to this problem in Senegal. But with the emergence of hundreds of new communes 
across the national territory, the central state resources for ensuring equitable redistri-
bution were increasingly stretched thin. And the central state programs for equipping the 
communes with the administrative capacities to collect new revenues were only slated 
to begin after the reforms, as a solution to the problem presented by the reforms them-
selves. In this way, the communes were largely left to their own devices: they were re-
quired to develop their own tools to collect the revenues within their own communal 
borders.  
 
It is in this sense that Monsieur Sarr, the Municipal Secretary in Dakar, described 
Act III as “almost a revolution” for local democracy in Senegal. Complete communaliza-
tion promised more legal responsibilities for the newly established communes to provide 
services and, at the same time, expanded their rights to raise revenues. However, mu-
nicipal secretaries in Dakar regularly cite this fiscal aspect as the key limit to the reform: 
although it had devolved service responsibility to the communes, it did not provide 
enough fiscal resources to meet these new obligations. Sarr, like many other adminis-
trators, pointed to a change in central state transfers as evidence of this problem. Before 
the reform, his commune received 120 million fCFA in annual transfers from the central 
state. But after the reform, Sarr noted, the annual distribution had been reduced to 
around 40 million fCFA, a third of its previous size. In the budgetary nomenclature, this 
transfer is referred to as the Fonds de Dotation de la Décentralisation (FDD) and is in-
tended to provide an additional revenue stream for communal operating costs, particu-
larly for communes who do not have access to regular tax revenues.  
 
But a central constraint, as one administrator pointed out, was that the complete 
communalization had created nearly six times the number of legal communes across the 
entire country. This subsequently increased the number of FDD transfers made by the 
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state and decreased the size of individual transfers themselves. In line with this vision of 
complete communalization, the law intended for communes to pay for their new service 
responsibilities with municipal taxes. The planning tax and revenue stamp are exemplary 
of this kind of tax, own-source revenue that is controlled and collected by local govern-
ments themselves. For these taxes, individual payments are relatively small, attached to 
a bureaucratic procedure performed by communal staff, and for which cash payments 
can be made directly at City Hall. Although these taxes were understood to be the reve-
nue streams with which local governments could meet their new service obligations, 
municipal secretaries argue that they are not enough.  
 
In Sarr’s commune, just over half (55%) of revenues come from such taxes. The 
other half come from central state transfers and local taxes (les impôts locaux) that are 
collected by the central tax authority. But Sarr claims that such transfers are made at 
random. He cannot anticipate how much they will be or when they will arrive, and has 
little control over his interactions with the central government. He exclaimed in frustration 
that he had before gone three months without contact from the central government. 
Property and business tax are the largest local taxes for many communes, but are out-
side the commune’s administrative control. Sarr claimed that the annual revenues de-
rived from local taxes were recently and unexpectedly cut in half, a fall from 120 million 
fCFA to 60 million fCFA. It is for this reason that Sarr claims to put an emphasis on the 
collection of taxes that the commune manages itself.  
 
Sarr’s commune contains a heavily trafficked vegetable market that spans several 
blocks and has been expanding into surrounding neighborhood. Many vendors rent mar-
ket stalls that are owned and managed by the commune, but most vendors simply sell 
from large cloth sheets they lay out on the street. The commune extracts wealth from 
these market activities through, for example, a daily fee for vending and the monthly tax 
for the occupation of public space. In a commune with a large daily market such as 
Sarr’s, such taxes and fees can account for around a quarter of own-source revenues. 
It is for this reason that Sarr understands municipal taxes to be a solution to both a fiscal 
and a political problem: the commune can increase its revenues while also unyoking it 
from a fiscal dependency on the central state. In his words, “we focus on the taxes that 
we control”.  
 
In terms of revenues, Sarr suggested that central state transfers are the most po-
litical. In Senegal, like in much of the Francophone world, fiscal administration is heavily 
centralized. Not only do central state ministries control the distribution of such transfers, 
they also administer expenditures and revenues for all local governments. In principle, 
these funds are intended to promote fiscal equality among local governments in Senegal, 
a corrective to the vast financial disparities between sub-national governments. But 
many urban administrators, including Sarr, feel that the size of these transfers is linked 
to affiliation with the political party in power. In terms of today’s electoral arrangements 
in Senegal, many assume that the municipalities with mayors in the Alliance for the Re-
public (APR), the President’s political party, would receive the largest transfers. Sarr’s 
mayor was high up in the hierarchy of the Sociality Party and often appeared in the local 
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press as their spokesperson in matters of municipal government. From Sarr’s perspec-
tive, this is what diminished the size of the transfers to the commune and led him to 
deride these revenues as “too political”. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Senegalese democracy has largely been celebrated as a national achievement, in which 
the public participation in presidential elections and peaceful transitions within a multi-
party state have become models for the rest of the continent. But Senegal’s history of 
communal independence, and its generalization across West Africa are a less remarked 
upon facet of decolonization and democratic independence. In shifting attention to the 
communal and municipal scale of government, an analogous—yet distinct—terrain of 
contestation over democratic independence emerges.  
 
The Cap Vert peninsula is today covered by an expansive patchwork of overlap-
ping territorial jurisdictions. This territory has undergone significant transformation from 
the colonial period to the present, and these postcolonial communes share an uncanny 
resemblance—and legal legacy—with the communes of metropolitan France. By post-
colonial communes, I do not refer to communes in Senegal after the end of colonial rule. 
Senegal’s communes are not only “post” in an epochal or transitional sense. Instead, 
these communes anticipated a platform for decolonial politics before a broad-based de-
colonial political movement had ever arrived. This postcolonial political imaginary, in 
other words, emerged not from an opposition to colonial government, but through com-
munal claims to belonging and independence within the territorial administration of met-
ropolitan France.   
 
The 2013 reforms are the latest legal transformation in the historical constitution 
of Senegal’s postcolonial communes. And beyond a simple expansion of formal demo-
cratic rule, this reform incited series of fiscal disputes, confusions, and controversies 
across the city. Such disputes, of course, are not new. As one municipal official argued, 
the law did not create these conflicts, many of which existed long before the 2013 re-
forms. However, the reforms did, in his view, “incite” such disputes and bring long-held 
disagreements over communal authority into public view. Many administrators and offi-
cials in Dakar critique these laws for not having anticipated such fiscal and financial 
problems. As such, they similarly argue that the laws should be rewritten to account for 
the unintended consequences of the law.  
 
As Annelise Riles (2011) argues, such claims for reform assume that it is indeed 
possible to craft a law able to account for all anticipated issues. The problem, from this 
perspective, is that the “legal architecture” itself is flawed and must be replaced by an 
entirely new architecture. Yet Riles (2011) calls attention to a different field of regulatory 
reform. She argues that such reforms need not be undertaken as a total overhaul of the 
law. Instead, reform may derive from the debate and transformation of legal technicali-
ties. Rather than posing regulation and deregulation and inevitable alternatives, Riles 
argues there are already technicalities undergoing constant revision and reform. And it 
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is around such practices that there is a new potential to gather a public debate on reg-
ulatory reform.  
 
Riles’ argument offers a way to re-conceptualize fiscal technique and fiscal dis-
putes in Dakar. Rather than view such techniques as a revelation of the inherent defi-
ciencies of a law—an unintended consequence for which the subsequent reforms must 
account—they may instead be viewed as central sites in which the problem of the com-
mune is taking shape. It is through the experimental exercise of fiscal technique that 
experts, the public, and state officials together dispute when, where, and how a com-
munal authority may legitimately be exercised. Beyond the law, such fiscal techniques 
are the constitutional moments of communal sovereignty. Communal sovereignty is, in 
part, a legal achievement. These laws govern the territorial organization of postcolonial 
democracy, independence, and sovereignty. However, a historical ontology of the com-
mune reveals that such points of contention—in terms of law and fiscal technique—have 
extensive precedent. But it also reveals that the historical ontology of the autonomous 
commune has never been complete: laws do not constitute a commune, they incite new 
disputes over how communal authority may legitimately be exercised.  
 
To conclude, I have demonstrated in this chapter several features of the distribu-
tion of Senegalese sovereignty from the perspective of the communal form. The relation-
ship between the communes and the central state has undergone significant transfor-
mation. Formerly characterized by strict dependency and “mercenary support”, today’s 
communes are significantly more independent. However, not all communes experience 
such independence equally. The City of Dakar, for example, lost much of its rights and 
responsibilities guaranteed by constitutional law and, at the same time, suffered a sig-
nificant decrease in central state transfers. In contrast, the 19 communes have gained 
more rights to resources and more responsibilities to their citizens. The reforms have 
empowered the communes—and the City—to administer their own governmental re-
sources, which has shifted the terrain of debate away from law and towards local gov-
ernment experimentation with fiscal technique. In this respect, communal control over 
administration has increasingly become a matter of establishing new forms of fiscal au-
thority. 
 
Yet as I have stressed in this chapter, such disputes over the dependence and 
independence of Senegal’s communes have—from the colonial era to the present—
taken place in terms of law and fiscal administration. This debate is not new, but it is 
today taking a new form. In the following chapters, I examine this proliferation of fiscal 
experiments through which communal authority is contested and reformed.  
 
	  
54 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
 
Sovereign sabotage 
A Municipal Bond Program and its Financial Publics 
 
In April of 2016, The City of Dakar hosted the inaugural meeting of the annual African 
Municipal Bonds Forum. Although many participants were Senegalese, a broad array of 
municipal officials, investors, and development advisors flew in from across the world to 
debate the opportunities and challenges of establishing municipal bond markets in Af-
rica. From the crisp, sunny comfort of one of Dakar’s luxury beachfront hotels, the forum 
further cemented the city’s image as the continent’s most prominent experiment in mu-
nicipal bond financing. 
 
Yet at the time of the forum, the City of Dakar’s municipal bond was not a positive 
example of innovative financing, but was instead widely perceived as a failure. One year 
prior, in February of 2015, the Senegalese Ministry of Finance withdrew its legal approval 
for the bond two days before its initial offering on the West African stock market. And 
the withdrawal ultimately caused the cancellation of the entire program. Nevertheless, 
the forum and its participants framed Dakar as a model for other African cities, an early 
experiment in establishing municipal bond markets on the continent.  
 
The Mayor, Khalifa Sall, and his administration had transformed Dakar into a la-
boratory for modern municipal finance. But the central government’s sabotage of the 
program had, in turn, transformed the bond into an exemplary case of the extreme cen-
tralization of state power. As one official at the forum chided, African municipalities like 
Dakar cannot grow when they are under the control of a dictator. This sardonic remark 
reflects the consensus among scholars and officials that many of Africa’s postcolonial 
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states have inherited and consolidated a heavily centralized state control over local ad-
ministration and public money27.  
 
Municipal bonds today have arrived in the Global South at a radically different 
historical conjuncture than their American forbearers, yet they are modelled after munic-
ipal bond markets in the United States. In 1997, the United States Agency for Interna-
tional Development (USAID) published a working paper on municipal bond development 
in emerging economies (Phelps, 1997). Like other reports in the 1990s, this working pa-
per framed municipal bonds as a solution to new problems posed by local and demo-
cratic decentralization. Although nation-states across the developing world have legally 
delegated some decision-making powers, they often did so without the fiscal resources 
to match. And as official development assistance and central bank transfers were on the 
decline, the report outlines, it was becoming the increasing prerogative to finance such 
investments from local governments’ own resources.  
 
Today there is a broad consensus among development experts that current levels 
of financing cannot meet the service needs of rapidly expanding urban populations in 
the Global South28. At stake in such forms of experimental financing like the bond is more 
than just making new capital markets; it is about the provision of clean water, reliable 
electricity, accessible transportation, and the basic infrastructures of well-being and 
economic development in cities across the world today. To illustrate this epochal mo-
ment, one official at Dakar’s bonds forum quoted the Colombian singer Shakira’s theme 
song from the World Cup in South Africa: he threw his arms in the air and cheered, “Now 
it’s time for Africa!…to invest the 45 billion dollars we need to welcome new urbanites to 
Africa’s cities!”  
 
But credit markets provide more than just money: many development experts be-
lieve they will also provide democratic accountability. In 2004, the World Bank published 
an edited volume titled Subnational Capital Markets in Developing Countries: From The-
ory to Practice, which outlines the best practices for municipal bond issuances through 
a survey of 18 different case studies from across the world (Freire and Petersen, 2004). 
The report self-consciously begins “from the premise that subnational control and deci-
sion-making are desirable outcomes that should be cultivated” and further articulates 
how this “liberal view entails a presumption that these governments assume the risks at 
their own peril, but they do so in capital markets that are fair and reasonably efficient” 
(4). In this liberal view of public finance, the report’s authors frame municipal bonds as a 
very different kind of debt than previously offered by institutions like the World Bank.  
 
Rather than focus on the nation, these experts turned to the municipality as a site 
of developmental intervention. It is the municipality that chooses—not the bank—how to 
evaluate the risks of an issuance and which risks they are willing to take. And instead of 
																																																						
27 See Footnote 12 for a summary of this argument.  
28 For the most general statement on this see the United Nations’ New Urban Agenda (2017). For a more 
specific statement on Africa see Paulais (2012) discussed in this chapter.  
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a loan with policy conditions imposed directly by the bank, the municipal bond is a fi-
nancial instrument with accountability to capital market regulators and bond holders29. 
Such financial accountability allows the report to frame municipal bond issuances “as a 
positive development in prompting the movement towards greater democratization and 
decentralization.” And that, “the day-to-day scrutiny of government operation by credit 
markets helps to reinforce transparency and encourage efficiency and prudence” (2). 
Capital markets, in other words, are understood as a novel mechanism through which to 
cultivate democratic norms.   
 
The dispute over Dakar’s municipal bond was a pivotal experiment in this new 
paradigm of local democracy and local finance in Africa. But for the officials and experts 
involved in this experiment, it was decidedly a failure. The timing of the blockage, as it 
came to be known, was suspect. The central government withdrew its support at the 
last minute, after years of preparation and two formal approvals issued by the Ministry 
of Finance. Forum participants therefore speculated that it was for political reasons that 
the central state blocked the program at the last minute, despite the Ministry’s claim that 
it was for technical and financial reasons. The debate over the blockage became the 
central theme of nearly every session at the forum, in which supposedly technical work-
shops for bond issuances quickly transformed into heated political disputes over local 
government authority and electoral politics.  
 
Most of the forum’s participants believed that the central state had overstepped 
its authority. From their perspective, it was up to the capital markets to decide if the 
bond was profitable, and not up to the central government. They understood the central 
government’s role to be exclusively legal authorization—not financial and fiscal evalua-
tion. And the central government had not only approved the bond issuance twice, but 
had been approved several different forms of municipal debt—commercial and devel-
opment bank loans—in the past. At stake in the dispute over Dakar’s bond was the au-
thority and autonomy of the municipality, and with it, the promise of a developmental 
future in which democratic local governments could access African wealth to meet Af-
rica’s growing urban needs.  
 
During the forum’s plenary address Khalifa Sall, the Mayor, and Cheikh Tidiane 
Diop, the Secretary General of the Ministry of Finance, sat side by side on stage. They 
were flanked on the front by a wall of local reporters snapping photos and taking footage 
to air on local news outlets later that day. The Secretary General’s presence was sur-
prising, as he was the representative of the public authority that had signed the letter 
revoking the legal authorization for the bond program, effectively turning Dakar from a 
“best practice” to a “lesson learned” with the stroke of a pen. Yet he was on stage par-
ticipating in an exemplary performance of political theatre alongside his president’s an-
ticipated electoral rival.  
																																																						
29 See Ndongo & Klein (2014) for a discussion of the World Bank’s role in municipal lending in Senegal. 
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During the session—but after the characteristically polite introductions and 
acknowledgements—a fiery city councilor from Kampala leaned in to this apparent ten-
sion with a pointed question for the Secretary General: “Why,” he shouted, “has the 
central state refused to support innovative finance in Africa? And why does it continue 
to block Dakar, a program all of Africa is looking to for inspiration? This is what I would 
like to know! Why?!” Quickly and graciously, the Mayor intervened. He smiled wide, put 
his hand on the Secretary General’s shoulder, and informed the room that Mr. Diop had 
not been invited to a “tribunal” but had instead been invited to discuss the issues to-
gether as a “forum”. He also provided the Ministry with an excuse, suggesting that it was 
normal to be reticent with new and unfamiliar debt programs such as bonds. Neverthe-
less, the Secretary General took off on a technical tirade, citing the financial uncertainties 
that, in his view, made the program “not viable” and “too risky”. And this decision, he 
claimed, had nothing to do with the Mayor’s political opposition to the President. In his 
words, “it is not political. It is technical.”  
 
The controversy over Dakar’s municipal bond is exemplary of the kinds of fiscal 
experiments afoot across Senegal today. Municipal governments throughout Senegal—
and throughout the continent—are turning to new taxes and new techniques to access 
more revenues to meet growing public needs. But such experiments are more than just 
a question of revenue: it is through such experiments that municipal authority and state 
sovereignty are contested, confirmed, distributed, and obviously denied. In most coun-
tries, nation-states have legally delegated limited aspects of their sovereign authority to 
municipal governments. Constitutional and decentralization laws are the central terrain 
in which this delegation of sovereign authority takes place. In this respect, Senegal is not 
an exception to this global trend and its local legal code assigns rights and responsibil-
ities among its sub-national territories. But Senegal is exceptional in other respects. 
While other states in the region have legally centralized authority in the hands of an au-
tocratic elite, Senegal has stood out as a democratic alternative.  
 
Yet Dakar reveals a different story of municipal democracy: far from being fixed 
by law, municipal states are constituted by diverse, provisional, and often highly dis-
puted techniques of rule over revenues. Although Senegal’s 2013 reforms legally as-
signed new revenues to municipal governments, widespread political and technical 
blockages regularly confound access to this much-needed wealth. There is, in other 
words, a persistent mismatch between political and fiscal decentralization in Senegal. 
As a result, novel fiscal flows have today become particularly contentious experiments 
in Dakar’s municipal state formation. And Dakar’s failed municipal bond program was a 
dispute over how this process of state formation should be conceptualized. It proposed 
a new political terrain—financial evaluation—through which the legitimacy of municipal 
authority could be exercised and upheld.  
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Figure 3.1 An Ivorian Financial Analyst and an American Lawyer at the Forum 
Photo by Author 
 
Financial Publics 
 
In this chapter I examine how, in the case of Dakar’s much anticipated yet never realized 
municipal bond, the technical had always been tightly linked to politics, even as each 
side studiously tried to separate political concerns from technical ones. Contrary to the 
prevailing interpretations I encountered during my fieldwork, I suggest that it was not the 
blockage that introduced politics in the technical realm of public finance. Instead, the 
municipal bond program was shot through with politics since its inception; it was a tech-
nical program that put forth an argument about the appropriate way to determine the 
legitimacy of municipal authority: in this case, it briefly introduced a form of political rea-
son drawn from the expert realm of fiscal and financial evaluation. Rather than asking if 
the City’s actions made legal sense, officials countered that the bond program instead 
made financial sense. In this way, the program did not exclude publics from political 
argumentation. The program introduced a new kind of public—a financial public—by 
experimenting with public financial evaluation as a legitimate form of argumentation over 
municipal authority in Dakar’s political scene.  
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 Technical interventions—from infrastructure provisioning to a national census—
are not separate from political cultures, authority, and values. Instead, they are tightly 
intertwined with the reproduction of inequality, the expansion of existing forms of rule, 
and the creation of new political subjects (Anand, 2011; Collier and Ong, 2005; Mitchell, 
2002). Antina Von Schnitzler (2013) argues that such a technopolitics is a “politics of 
nonpublics” which takes place through political contestations obscured from public de-
bate in the terrain of the technical, material, and the administrative. Such contestations 
do not take place through discourse in the public sphere, but instead “take shape at the 
register and the language of technology” (673). In contrast to a debate in civil society, 
technopolitics foregrounds material and administrative forms of power often obscured 
from public view. This political terrain more closely resembles an enclosed domain of 
experts who nevertheless encounter, govern, and respond to a public. And expert eval-
uations—such as a cost benefit analysis—often reflect a legitimacy and trust in techno-
cratic methods that elide the values embedded in these practices (Porter, 1995). Such 
interventions can shift the terrain of politics and obviate opposition by excluding certain 
publics from participating in collective contestation—a practice scholars have termed 
“anti-politics” or “rendering technical” (Ferguson, 1990; Li, 2007).  
 
But scholars have also argued that technical choices are themselves a form of 
political authority; they are one element in a broader political project of enacting social 
imaginaries. From this perspective, financial evaluations could be viewed as a market 
device that is constitutive of financial markets more broadly (Çaliskan & Callon, 2010; 
LiPuma and Lee, 2004). Such devices do not simply reflect the movements of financial 
markets, they also create new forms of investment such as trading in futures and deriv-
atives (MacKenzie, 2006). Scholars of financialization have taken a related yet distinct 
approach. Rather than focusing on the performativity of specific market devices, they 
ask how such practices serve as new sites for global capital accumulation (Christophers, 
2015). It is in this sense that Rachel Weber (2010) defines financialization as the pro-
cesses through which “income streams from a wide range of assets are converted into 
new investment products for dispersed investors through techniques that disaggregated 
and continually reassign ownership to allow for more fast-paced exchanges” (252). From 
this perspective, political project served by financialization is capital accumulation. Yet 
Desiree Fields (2017) has argued that this process is far from inevitable: although finan-
cialization subjects spaces of everyday life to capital accumulation, it can also be re-
sisted by the very people dispossessed by such imperatives.  
 
But the DMFP is obviously not a positive example of financialization, nor is it a 
case of the popular resistance to or refusal of financial logics. Beyond capital accumu-
lation, there was something else at stake in Dakar’s bonds: municipal authority. Although 
scholars have argued that municipal bonds have had the consequence of imposing ne-
oliberal conditions on municipal governments in North America (Hackworth, 2002), Da-
kar’s bond program resulted in no such concrete administrative or material changes. 
However, it did result in a novel practice: the production and dissemination of standard-
ized financial evaluations. In this respect, the DMFP is a different kind of financial prac-
tice. Here, financial logics like arbitrage, amortization, or credit risk—and not financial 
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assets themselves—increasingly circulate in novel domains of social and cultural life de-
spite failures and crises of accumulation (Miyazaki, 2003). From this perspective, the 
purpose of Dakar’s evaluations can be understood not exclusively as capital accumula-
tion, but also as recognition. The DMFP experimented with a form of urban politics in 
which the City’s political authority could be recognized in the novel domain of financial 
evaluation—not law. In this way, debates over urban political authority transformed into 
debates over solvency, credibility, and financial accounting.  
 
Technical discourses are domains of expertise in which specific styles of argu-
mentation are recognized, valued, and effective. Rather than characterize such domains 
of technical argumentation as separate from the public sphere—as a kind of “non-pub-
lic”—I argue that they should instead be understood as a financial public. Letter writing, 
print publication, and street demonstrations are now widely recognizable styles of public 
address (Anderson, 2006; Warner, 2002) and scholars have identified expanded means 
of circulation for public forms (Coleman, 2013; Fennell, 2015; Gaonkar and Povinelli, 
2003; Hirschkind, 2006). The public in this sense is not singular, but multiple: there is 
instead proliferation and diversity of public spheres, with distinct technical forms and 
styles of argumentation (Callon et al., 2009; Latour & Weibel, 2005). In contrast to a focus 
on the hidden terrain of politics, the concept of publics orients attention to the highly 
perceptible aspects of technical interventions, the styles of address proper to such in-
terventions, and the various audiences that find such interventions noteworthy.  
 
In this chapter, I explore the financial publics of the Dakar Municipal Bond Pro-
gram. I focus on the DMFP’s financial evaluations because the material, administrative, 
and financial effects of the bond program were never realized in Dakar. Yet even as the 
program became widely understood as a failure, it nevertheless had significant effects 
on urban politics in Dakar. Thus, the bond’s central effects were not its programmatic 
goals, but instead entailed the calling up of a new audience of interlocutors through a 
distinct style of address: financial evaluation. I term this type of audience a financial 
public: a collectivity called into being through the shared participation in global forms of 
financial reasoning and analysis. A financial public is more than just a market of willing 
investors: it is the broader audience imagined to place political value on the practice of 
undergoing financial evaluation. In this sense, Dakar’s municipal bond program exceeds 
scholarly understandings of technical politics. It was not an effective form of technical 
authority nor did it foreclose contestation or dispute. Instead, the DMFP was materially 
ineffective and publicly contested—and as such, it cannot be understood as a case of 
technopolitics, antipolitics, or a politics of financialization. Yet I argue that the program 
was nevertheless political: it introduced a novel form of political recognition—a financial 
public—into the ongoing contestations over municipal authority and urban democracy 
in contemporary Senegal.  
 
In addition to electoral debate in Senegal’s liberal public sphere and legal contro-
versy over decentralization laws, contestation between the municipality and the central 
state took place—for a brief moment—in the logic and language of financial evaluation. 
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Despite the failure of the program to produce a financial asset, these documents never-
theless displayed a key value of contemporary development thought: public accounta-
bility. Although political accountability is an established metric through which experts 
evaluate the merits of decentralization reforms, Dakar’s bond program held out a prom-
ise for a renewed focus on financial accountability. And the publication of financial eval-
uations allowed the municipality to participate in and expand the reach of this broader 
financial public organized around a new vision for municipal government in Africa. This 
vision began as an intellectual shift and has today transformed into a set of concrete 
policy experiments focused on promoting fiscal accountability and autonomy for local 
governments. As a key node in this practical shift, the production and publication of the 
municipality’s financial evaluations spurred a surprising turn in Dakar’s urban politics. 
Seen from this perspective, the bond program was successful in addressing and assem-
bling a financial public, with significant consequences for the Mayor’s subsequent, albeit 
embattled, presidential campaign.  
 
A Fiscal Experiment and its Forum 
 
The African Municipal Bonds Forum brought together a diverse constellation of 
fiscal and financial actors concerned with the future of municipal government in Africa. 
The forum and its participants sought an alternative to the present municipal depend-
ence on central state fiscal transfers, which many in Senegal equate to political subor-
dination and hollow democracy. In developing a capital market for municipal bonds, the 
forum made an appeal to investors—instead of appealing to the central government—to 
legitimize the municipality’s access to revenues. They made this appeal in explicit con-
trast to sovereign authority: much of the press surrounding Dakar’s issuance celebrated 
that this would be the first municipal bond in West Africa without the sovereign guarantee 
of the nation-state.  
 
There were few representatives of the central state at the Forum, and most par-
ticipants were either local municipal officials and administrators, development experts, 
or financial analysts. At the time of the Forum, it was not yet clear if the City’s bonds 
would ever be issued. The Ministry of Finance had withdrawn its letter of non-objection, 
claiming that the financial and legal details of the issuances needed to be more fully 
considered. There was no official forum in which these details were to be debated and 
decided, and there was no timeline for the Ministry to make its final decision. In this 
context, the African Municipal Bonds Forum gathered together a diverse crowd around 
an ongoing fiscal experiment whose future remained uncertain.  
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Figure 3.2 Family Photo at the Forum, A Financial Public 
Photo: Markets of Africa Newsletter 
 
The first day of the forum included formal conference sessions in which panelists 
presented their work and took questions from the audience. For the second day of the 
forum, however, the conference organizers replaced formal proceedings with “training 
sessions” intended to introduce municipal officials to the practical aspects of issuing 
bonds. One workshop titled “Bonds for Project Financing: A Possible Source of Financ-
ing for Infrastructure Projects” provided a detailed accounting of how to track the reve-
nues and expenditures of a project bond in Microsoft Excel. In the warmth of the after-
noon, audience participation was lackluster. But most other workshops were organized 
much like the panels of the previous day, with several experts making a short presenta-
tion followed by Q&A.  
 
In another workshop, a staff member of the City of Dakar moderated a panel of 
experts and officials to discuss the topic of the “Structure and Functioning of Municipal 
Bond Markets”. The room was packed with a Francophone audience, but most presen-
tations were in English. And although the workshop was intended to introduce municipal 
officials to the benefits of bond markets in general, the discussion transformed into an 
extended and lively disagreement about Dakar. This disagreement was about more than 
just the bond; it concerned municipal authority in Dakar more generally. In this sense, 
there was more at stake than the central state control over the City of Dakar, and forum 
participants quickly turned their attention to the panoply of actors involved in these dis-
putes that were roiling across the city’s small peninsula.  
 
Dakar’s municipal bond was a project bond. In contrast to a general obligation 
bond, it would not be guaranteed by the taxing power of the City of Dakar and it would 
not be repaid from tax revenues. Instead, like all project bonds, it would be repaid with 
the revenues drawn from the bond’s proposed capital project. Dakar’s municipal bond 
was slated to fund the construction of a commercial center in which to house thousands 
of Dakar’s urban street vendors. Particularly at issue were the city’s walking vendors 
(marchands ambulants) who sold goods in the small spaces between vehicles trapped 
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in gridlock, along the city’s sidewalks, and throughout the patchwork of urban roads on 
which the city’s urban markets are located. The City of Dakar argued that vendors wors-
ened the city’s traffic congestion and, in turn, slowed urban economic growth. The City, 
however, had few fiscal resources with which to address this problem, and turned to 
external development institutions to help finance a solution.   
 
At the Forum, there were no workshops or panels dedicated to project selection, 
and there was little discussion of Dakar’s proposed commercial center. But in this work-
shop, a Senegalese lawyer and former official at the national revenue authority made an 
intervention (in French) regarding the markets: “What,” he asked, “would happen if the 
vendors would not relocate to the new building? How would the City of Dakar repay its 
debt?” One of the few people to bring up the problem of street vendor participation, this 
lawyer recalled that several buildings had been constructed elsewhere in the country and 
remained unused to this day. Further, he noted, street vendors were poor and likely could 
not accommodate any increase in their monthly expenditures. It was unlikely, then, that 
vendors would voluntary relocate to an expensive market stall away from clients and, 
thus, away from their primary source of income. To this lawyer, it seemed like an obvious 
yet overlooked problem. 
   
One of the panelists, a Black municipal official from Johannesburg, agreed (in 
English). This official had just introduced the South African model for the financing of 
urban public utilities, a well-known privatization scheme called Build-operate-Train and 
Transfer (BoTT). BoTT contracts became the service delivery model in South Africa after 
apartheid, in which governments awarded contracts to private companies to deliver fee-
for-service utilities. Delivering electricity and water to those communities denied such 
services during apartheid was a core platform of the ANC government in the 1990s, and 
this service delivery method had become a hallmark of the South African model (Bakker 
and Hemson, 2000).  
 
But the municipal official from South Africa noted an immense and obvious ob-
stacle to such reforms: service-delivery protests. In privatizing the provision of public 
services such as water and electricity, South African municipalities introduced user-fees 
into service delivery alongside a host of new technologies to ensure payment (Von 
Schnitzler, 2016). And according to this official, although such fees offered an exciting 
solution to the problem of service delivery, the assumptions underpinning the model 
were wrong and, as a result, these projects were a failure. It was an error to assume, he 
noted, that an indigent and poor consumer would be willing or able to pay such a fee. 
And the service delivery protests and widespread refusal of Johannesburg citizens to 
pay reflected this deeper problem with municipal finance: that “municipalities need to 
fund projects the people actually want.” 
 
The moderator from the City of Dakar translated this intervention to the Franco-
phone audience. Spinning the conversation in a positive light, she began by stating that 
the South African official had judged the commercial center a useful public infrastructure 
which presented a positive opportunity for the City of Dakar. He had, of course, said 
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nothing of this sort, and the moderator seemed to be hedging against any doubts the 
audience might have about Dakar’s program. She went on to describe the South African 
experience as a problem of planning, that the officials directing the service delivery pro-
gram had mistakenly assumed the public need and the profitability of their project. Alt-
hough private firms had brought their experience managing such services, they did not 
rely enough on the planning expertise of local governments who were more adequately 
prepared to understand the needs of their citizens. She contrasted Johannesburg’s ex-
perience with that of Dakar, where the municipality itself had crafted the relocation plan 
for the commercial center with the participation of market vendors themselves. In other 
words, Dakar’s program had identified a viable market and, therefore, a reliable revenue 
stream with which to pay off the bond debt.  
 
Injecting her own analysis into this translation, the moderator framed the South 
African failure as a result of bad planning. Dakar, in contrast, had carried out an elaborate 
planning process and would therefore not meet the same level of public opposition as 
the service delivery protests in South Africa. The planning documents and presentation 
of the commercial center had indeed predicted near 100% occupancy in the commercial 
center a short four years after its completion. Although taking on initial losses as the 
municipality completed the relocation process, the building was anticipated to quickly 
turn a profit for the municipality and the private firm contracted to operate the building. 
The real problem in Dakar, she pivoted, was that there was not an institutional or legal 
framework in which municipalities could contract out to private service providers. In 
other words, City was well-equipped to plan for public needs, but they did not have the 
resources or expertise to meet them. The central challenge for Dakar, she claimed, was 
to create a positive enabling environment in Senegal for local governments like the City 
of Dakar to contract with private firms and private investors to provide much-needed 
services across the peninsula.  
 
These laws have also re-configured the territorial borders of these communes, 
expanding the footprint of some and transforming others from small local governments 
into region-wide administrative bodies. The City of Dakar, for example, has been trans-
formed from a small commune on the tip of the peninsula into an expansive local gov-
ernment that now nearly covers the peninsula’s entire terrain. Around half of metropolitan 
Dakar resides within these city limits, and the other half live in Dakar’s nearby suburbs 
which are governed by the two independent municipalities of Guediawaye and Pikine. 
But municipal authority is not a simple partition between city and suburb.  
 
Many of the Mayors and head administrators of the communes across Dakar 
came to the African Municipal Bonds Forum. These communes are legally independent 
and incorporated municipalities: they have their own municipal elections, their own mu-
nicipal councils, they are assigned their own revenues, and they have their own admin-
istrative services to suit. And after the recent reforms, the City of Dakar shared resources 
and responsibilities with the 19 smaller communes covering its same jurisdiction. Most 
forum participants framed the sabotage of Dakar’s bond project as a battle between the 
Mayor and the President and they often took a side in the stand-off. Those from the 
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communes, however, were critical of everyone. They thought the central state’s sabo-
tage of the municipal bond posed a problem for communal autonomy more generally, 
but they were also making claims to the revenues and responsibilities formerly allotted 
to City of Dakar.  
 
During the forum workshop, a small group of communal officials intervened. They 
pivoted away from the question of street vending and re-focused attention on finance. 
What forms of finance, one official asked, were the rest of the communes supposed to 
use? The City of Dakar had struck out on its own to create and innovative financing 
program, but what about the rest of the communes who shared the same territory? How 
would they meet their increasing public needs? Mayor Sall, he argued, had not included 
them in his financial plans and the entire municipal finance program had been carried 
out without their consultation, without their participation, and without benefit to the rest 
of the communal coffers on the peninsula. From their perspective, the municipal bond 
program was a prestige project and political spectacle intended to advance the public 
profile of Mayor Sall as a future presidential candidate. Although the communes who 
belonged to the Mayor’s party supported such an electoral bid, communal officials also 
resented their exclusion from the bond program.  
 
By law, these communes gained more public authority over the peninsula than 
the City of Dakar. Act III had allocated new revenues and new responsibilities to com-
munal governments across the country. It also created hundreds of new communes, 
nearly tripling the number of local democratic governments in Senegal with the passage 
of a single law. Elsewhere in the country, and especially in rural areas, local governments 
did not exist before the law was passed and there certainly did not exist a meso-level 
local government like the City of Dakar. Nowhere else in the country was there a gov-
ernment legally termed a “City” that sat somewhere in the administrative hierarchy be-
tween a commune and the central state. So, for the local governments on the Cap Vert 
peninsula there now existed an additional set of disputes between “communes” and “the 
City”: How, exactly, would revenues and responsibilities be divided up among them? 
Although the law was intended to resolve this problem, it instead engendered a host of 
new confusions and new disagreements over it.  
 
One such disagreement concerned innovative financing mechanisms like the 
bond. As the communal officials at the Forum claimed, they should be the ones at the 
forefront of municipal financing, not the City. After all, it was the communes—not the 
City—who were the focus of the reforms and who were recently transformed into fully 
empowered local governments (communes en plein exercise). They had new revenues 
and they wanted to put them to use. One of the communal Mayors, then, brought mu-
nicipal bond-pooling up for discussion during the Forum workshop. Bond-pooling is a 
financial instrument intended to reduce the risks associated with financial assets. Rather 
than a single local government or a single project issuing debt alone, bond-pooling al-
lows proceeds and bond repayment obligations to be shared among several local gov-
ernments.  Such pooling reduces risks for investors and therefore reduces the cost of 
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borrowing for local governments who might otherwise face a high price barrier to bor-
rowing in capital markets. This communal Mayor inquired as to why the City of Dakar did 
not begin with bond-pooling instead of a single project bond issuance. Why not include 
more local governments in the benefits of capital market financing? The small group of 
communal officials sat close together in the workshop. They crossed their arms, fur-
rowed their brows, and collectively grumbled when other participants made positive 
comments about the City’s program. They did so until a senior official interrupted a 
presentation to hush them himself.  
 
Of course, communal governments in Senegal were not totally bereft of financing 
options. In fact, many of them were already awash in debt. In partnership with The World 
Bank, the Senegalese government had created a separate agency responsible for fi-
nancing local government projects. The Municipal Development Agency (l’Agence de 
Développement Municipal, ADM) trains local governments in budgetary best-practices 
and makes small loans for capital projects. The government created ADM in the 1990s 
as part of The World Bank’s “municipal adjustment” program which, like its national 
counterparts, intended to increase government capacity and fiscal prudence through 
conditional lending. ADM’s worked with smaller and less experienced communes in rural 
areas to build the basic administrative practices of public financial management. As 
such, the agency was not heavily involved in reforming communal governments in urban 
areas. But there were nevertheless several communes in Dakar that owed a great deal 
of money to the central government from ADM financing. The problem had become con-
sequential enough that communal officials had even begun to advocate for the national 
government to create a communal debt forgiveness program. The newly empowered 
communal governments, in other words, faced an existing set of fiscal concerns and 
financial programs that were not being addressed by the Dakar Municipal Bond Pro-
gram. They had been excluded from participating in Dakar’s financial public, and posed 
bond-pooling as a potential way to include them in such practices in the future.  
  
Bond-pooling, of course, would not solve these underlying issues with communal 
budgets, but the communal mayors nevertheless remained critical of their exclusion from 
Dakar’s municipal bond program. One Swedish financial expert at the forum, Lars M. 
Anderson, intervened into the debate and, in part, sided with the communal Mayors. 
From his perspective, it seemed that the Forum had overly emphasized municipal bonds 
and capital markets. And although bond-pooling could be a useful tool to expand such 
financial instruments to these communal governments, it needed to be accompanied—
and perhaps preceded—by a more central focus on increasing city revenues, improving 
budgetary management, and preparing to decrease the cost of borrowing for communal 
governments in the future. And these measures, he commented, must be done “for the 
communes and by the communes” themselves. He made this comment in French, which 
was met with nods of agreement from the critical gallery of communal mayors. In this 
sense, Mr. Anderson’s comments called attention to another set of fiscal issues of im-
mediate concern to most communal governments in Senegal. How were they going to 
collect and manage the revenues which they were legally delegated by Act III? And 
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how—and in which fora—were disputes over revenue assignment and collection going 
to be addressed?  
 
This set of debates, disagreements, and disputes at the African Municipal Bonds 
Forum are exemplary moments of municipal state formation. Although fiscal politics has 
always been central to governmental authority more generally, disputes over fiscal and 
financial administration are increasingly taking center stage across Senegal today. The 
Forum brought together diverse groups—and representatives of those groups—into a 
shared space in which they openly debated the political problems of Dakar’s fiscal ex-
periment. In this rare display, the Forum brought together representatives of the ongoing 
disputes over municipal authority across the Cap Vert peninsula. It was an assembly of 
the financial public that had been addressed by Dakar’s preparation for the bond, and 
by its ultimate sabotage by the central state. This public was more than what the DMFP 
has expected: it had not only collected together a room of financial analysts, develop-
ment experts, and Mayors from across the world, but a surprising array of critical law-
yers, local mayors, and oppositional central state officials. Such publics organize around 
a specific experiment as it played out on the ground. But there was a different and more 
circumscribed public imagined by the program itself. 
 
Accountability’s Public   
 
Municipal bonds are not new, but they are new to West Africa. In many respects, the rise 
of municipal bonds is a familiar story of liberal development institutions proposing mar-
ket-oriented solutions to problems of public finance, the most infamous of which were 
structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 90s. But today’s policy thinking is also 
a self-conscious departure from reforms of the past. How governments access capital 
is at the core of these interventions, but the actors involved, the technologies employed, 
and the values attached to them have changed. In the case of Dakar, municipal bonds 
embodied a now common-sense value of global development, and a renewed focus on 
fiscal decentralization has underlined the importance of good governance and urban de-
mocracy. But the mechanisms through which governments promote these values have 
changed: credit markets and municipal de-risking are a central mechanism intended to 
promote democratic accountability and access to capital.  
 
In 2012, an influential World Bank report titled Financing African Cities: The Im-
perative of Local Investment (Paulais, 2012) set the terms of the debate surrounding a 
new set of solutions for local government financing on the continent. Financing African 
Cities does not help understand how public finance works in African cities today, nor 
does it claim to. Instead, the book sets out a prospective vision for how public finance 
should work in African cities. It articulates “a total paradigm shift in the vision of the city 
and the way to finance it that transcends technical and financial issues—it forms part of 
changing African societies” (199). More than just what to do about African cities, the 
report intends to change how experts and officials think about them. This new way of 
thinking about urban Africa “drives a reformulated economic model in which the city is a 
productive factor and municipal financing rests primarily on local, endogenous solutions" 
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(199). Contributing to a growing consensus, the report argued for an increasingly com-
plex role for private wealth in African municipal finance. And this new wealth would come 
in the form of a financial instrument: municipal bonds. 
 
The report consolidated “structured finance” as a future path for municipal gov-
ernment. Structured finance is a way of distributing risk and providing credit enhance-
ments for municipalities on securities markets, to increase access to capital and lower 
its borrowing costs. In Africa, the report states, sub-national territories receive nearly all 
their revenues from central state distributions, which limits local governments’ access to 
and control over fiscal resources. This kind of municipal finance, the report outlines, will 
not be able to meet the current scale of urban investment need and, in its place, pre-
scribes a “modernization” of municipal finance achieved through endogenous, struc-
tured finance. Endogenous financing means leveraging African wealth—as opposed to 
wealth overseas—to invest in urban development. From this new perspective, the solu-
tion to the problem of fiscal accountability is solved by “de-risking”, rendering municipal 
debt attractive as a financial asset.  
 
Financing Africa’s Cities argues that increasing the scale in urban financing re-
quires a change in the paradigm of urban financing itself. The current paradigm perceives 
urbanization as a source of expenditures, not as a potential source of revenues. And this 
reflects a perspective on African development in which rural agriculture is the backbone 
of economic growth, and urban services are a drain on resources. The report, however, 
offers a new perspective of the city as a “productive investment” in which financing is 
provided by “urban growth’s own mechanisms” such as land values. Domestic investors 
are encouraged to see municipal governments as a potential source of positive returns 
on their investment. And the basis for these positive returns is present and future tax-
base of the municipality—particularly property taxes—or the revenues of a bond-fi-
nanced project. From this perspective, the monetary wealth created by urbanization 
should be mobilized to provide a fiscal foundation for the future repayment of municipal 
bonds. 
 
These interventions were a continuation of local democratic reform of the 1990s. 
The scholarly and policy literature on the subject frames local government as a trade-off 
between the two poles of efficiency and accountability, in which local government pro-
vided greater political accountability between governments and their citizens (Agrawal 
and Ribot, 1999). In part, local accountability was a response to the critiques of the 
structural adjustment reforms of the previous decade (Hart, 2010). If structural adjust-
ment was exemplary of the pitfalls of a technocratic approach, then decentralization was 
a positive example of a new and more democratic approach. But in its new formulation, 
accountability expanded the debate beyond civic need and included a new object of 
debate: fiscal and financial management. 
 
Financing Africa’s Cities is exemplary of this shift in development thinking towards 
endogenous financing in regional capital markets. And the public financial evaluations 
required to receive such financing are a novel mechanism through which governments 
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would be held accountable to investors and, in an unspecified way, to citizens. In the 
decades following these reports, USAID and the World Bank have further formed new 
programs aimed at realizing this broad vision as a practical intervention: the World Bank 
created the Sub-National Technical Assistance Program (SNTA) with the mission to pro-
vide technical assistance for local governments to access market-based financing; and 
USAID created the Development Credit Authority (DCA) which provides credit guaran-
tees for local governments. Neither institution acts as a bank, but both intend to help 
local governments leverage wealth from private investors on regional stock markets, and 
each played a key role in Dakar’s bond program.  
 
Acts of Accountability   
 
Prior to the anticipated launch of the bond, DMFP staff organized a municipal bond “road 
show” in which they pitched the financial details of the bonds to a group of local inves-
tors, comprising of insurance companies, various other institutional investors, and sev-
eral individuals. The marketing materials presented at the meeting included financial as-
sessment of the commercial center, the details of the bond’s amortization schedule, its 
loan history, its credit ratings, its credit guarantees, and its support from international 
funders and development agencies. The bond’s roadshow materials assembled infor-
mation from over three years of preparation and millions of dollars in grant funding which, 
as one staff member put it, had been rendered a “complete waste of money” in the wake 
of the blockage. Nevertheless, the bond’s marketing materials distilled the results of the 
two evaluations central to the program. The first was an evaluation program developed 
by the World Bank’s Public Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility (PPIAF) called the 
Public Expenditure and Financial Accountability (PEFA) program (2009). PEFA’s evalua-
tion framework is a standardized assessment tool intended to provide evidence-based 
measurement for public financial management. And the second evaluation was a credit 
risk rating of the municipality and of the bond instrument, carried out by a West African 
credit rating agency, Bloomfield Investments. 
 
Scholars have attributed significant power to such evaluations and the conditions 
they impose on local governments, especially in the case of credit risk ratings (Sinclair, 
2005). But Dakar’s evaluations did not yet come to impose such strict conditions. Alt-
hough both evaluations included recommendations and reservations about the city’s fi-
nances, they were intended first to make its financial information public. These evalua-
tions are an act of accountability in which the production and dissemination of financial 
information to relevant publics is intended to provide a form of constant oversight over 
public financial administration. The value of such public statements of financial account-
ability is to open the door to an expanded and informed debate over fiscal management 
and, ultimately, the city’s creditworthiness.  
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Figure 3.3 Summary of Evaluations from the PEFA Report (2009: 61) 
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Dakar’s PEFA evaluation, published in 2009, was the first of its kind in sub-Sa-
haran Africa, and development experts anticipated that such evaluation could be repli-
cated across the continent. Yet the recommendations from the evaluation were never 
implemented. The summer after the blockage, I met an accountant who worked on loan 
programs for local governments in Senegal. As with most public administrators, he was 
quick to throw his hands up in the air in frustration with the most obvious and salient 
obstacle to implementing the recommendations from the PEFA evaluation: “it is politi-
cal!” he shouted, “the politicians block everything!” He pointed to the City of Dakar’s 
PEFA evaluation as exemplary of such blockages. Far from having consequential power 
over Dakar’s fiscal administration, all the recommendations for reform had been ignored 
because of, in his analysis, “political reasons”. The accountant’s comments are exem-
plary of the gruff dismissals and frustrated admissions that, locally, implementing the 
evaluation’s recommendations had been strategically side-lined.  
 
What, then, are the possible effects of an evaluation whose recommendations 
were never implemented? Although the report received little fanfare locally at the time of 
publication, it expanded the public debate over the City of Dakar’s fiscal management. 
First, regardless of its longevity as a base for regular evaluation and reform, Dakar’s 
evaluation was the first time that PEFA had been applied to a sub-national government. 
Originally, PEFA was intended for use with national governments, and Dakar provided 
an opportunity to adapt the evaluation to a local context. Second, such an evaluation 
provides an overview of a local government's financial position, so that, “officials can 
obtain a document that opens a conversation with a funding agency” (Paulais, 2012: 46). 
In the PEFA report, this conversation entails not only an analysis of the city’s financial 
situation but, more importantly, a public ranking of its fiscal management practices. 
 
The report opens by noting the significant legal constraints on the municipality in 
a highly centralized Francophone system of fiscal administration. Although the City of 
Dakar establishes its own annual budget, the central state controls most of its revenues 
and expenditures, except for the 10% of own resources controlled by the City itself. 
Across the thirty-two indicators in the budget only twelve were above a “D” grade, and 
of those twelve, eight are a “C” grade. The City did, however, receive two “A” grades: 
one for the “composition of real expenses compared to the initially approved budget” 
and another for “predictability of central government transfers”. The report highlights the 
large gaps between anticipated and expected revenues, and that the budgets them-
selves do not reflect the real changes in revenues and expenditures from the preceding 
three years, as is required by law. And although the report celebrates the public trans-
parency of tax obligations, it also notes that over 10% of taxes due remain uncollected 
every year. The report paints a broad picture of the City of Dakar as willing and capable 
of undergoing and respecting the democratic budgetary approval process that is laid out 
by Senegalese law. Yet it also expressed widespread reservation that this budget is “only 
partially executed in an ordered and predictable way” (PEFA, ix). In other words, Dakar 
respects budgetary procedure, but has little knowledge of or control over its actual rev-
enues or expenditures.  
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Although Dakar received extremely poor marks in its budget evaluation and sub-
sequently implemented none of its recommendations prior to the bond launch, the World 
Bank heralded the report as a first step in Africa towards improved public financial ac-
counting at the municipal scale (PPIAF, 2014). The results of the evaluation were not 
necessarily important, but it was important to undergo such an evaluation and “obtain a 
document” that reflects this process. And this is precisely the role that this evaluation 
played in the DMFP: providing a document that officials used to leverage further institu-
tional and financial support. 
 
Credit ratings provide similar forms of leverage to open a conversation between 
local investment and local governments. And like the PEFA evaluation, the City of Da-
kar’s credit rating was the first of its kind in West Africa. The City of Dakar received two 
credit ratings. The first was a general rating of the City and the second a rating for the 
municipal bond itself. The City’s rating was BBB+ in the-long term and A3 in the short-
term, both excellent investment-grade ratings that attested to the financial stability of 
the City of Dakar. In the note accompanying the rating, Bloomfield included a brief justi-
fication with a list of positive and negative factors contributing to their decision. The note 
highlights Senegal’s relatively stable political environment, a general investor interest in 
Senegal, and the high quality of the nation’s infrastructure system. These indicators are 
at a scale beyond the control of any local government, and more directly address the 
macro-political and economic context of the nation-state. But there is another set of 
factors that are more directly relevant to local government. The note highlights that the 
City of Dakar’s “governance and management is based on transparency,” and there is a 
“willingness to diversify funding sources to reinforce the city’s financial autonomy” 
(Bloomfield, 2013). Despite the positive rating, the note also points to a series of con-
cerns: a high dependence on central state transfers, limited operating revenues needed 
to provide recently decentralized responsibilities, and deteriorating infrastructures.  
 
This credit rating paints a portrait of a municipality that is “willing” to achieve fi-
nancial plans and has the “potential” to increase its revenues. Yet alongside this aspira-
tional language, the City is also marked by a “limited ability to anticipate revenues” and 
“lack of medium and long-term financial planning” (Bloomfield, 2013). Despite the antic-
ipated “strong support of the state”, the rating frames the city as largely lacking control 
over its own operating revenues. Yet from Bloomfield’s perspective, the municipality is 
on the correct path towards a better financial future. The positive rating, then, is largely 
written in the language of the vision, willingness, and potential of the City of Dakar to 
diversify its revenues and follow financial best-practices.  
 
However, the rating for the municipal bond itself tells a different story. It is a much 
more skeptical and cautious rating, but is also an objectively better one. For the bond, 
Bloomfield issued a long-term rating of A and a short-term rating of A1. Compared to 
the City’s rating, the bond itself is slightly lower in the short-term and higher in the long-
term.  
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Figure 3.4 Cover Page of Bloomfield’s 2013 rating of the City of Dakar 
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In this second rating, Bloomfied evaluated the municipal bond’s proposed mate-
rial project: a commercial center for walking street vendors. The commercial center 
would not have been the first of its kind in the city, but it would be the largest: a 6-story 
building with enough space for 4,241 boutiques, 14 underground storage spaces, and 
352 parking spaces. The commercial center relied on one key revenue stream to pay 
back the principal and interest on the bond: monthly payments from vendors to purchase 
commercial spaces in the building. Vendors, however, would not be renting their bou-
tiques, but were expected to purchase them. They would be required to make a down 
payment on these commercial spaces and pay off the rest in monthly instalments over 
the life of the bond. But these vendors were coming from Dakar’s urban street markets, 
what the credit rating identified as an “informal sector” whose merchants, “having no 
access to bank financing…might not be able to acquire commercial spaces” (Bloomfield, 
2015: 2). Thus, street vendors were imagined as the central, yet unlikely, source of rev-
enue to repay bond debt. 
 
From this perspective, although merchants want to relocate to the buildings, they 
currently lack the financial means to do so. This is a familiar view among prominent de-
velopment practitioners and scholars: that poverty is a problem that stems from eco-
nomic informality, and can be remedied by improving access to formal services (Roy, 
2010). But Bloomfield’s rating points to a “cultural obstacle” of the common use of two-
story market buildings, posing a potential problem for the proposed six-story building. 
Although the size and stature of the building offered and impressive image and large 
holding capacity for thousands of street vendors, the credit rating suggests that the City 
of Dakar’s financial projections for the occupation of the buildings may be “too optimis-
tic”. Where the project estimates 100% occupation after only four years, Bloomfield sug-
gests that similar projects have an average rate of occupation of 85% on the ground 
floor and 35% for the floors above. In other words, the rating highlights the financial 
limitations of the commercial center and argues that the City of Dakar will likely cover 
this anticipated fiscal shortfall itself. 
 
The rating points to another reason why vendors might be compelled to purchase 
space in the new center: the building is “in line with the new regulation prohibiting the 
occupation of public space for commercial purposes,” and its location in the city center 
“makes the shopping center more attractive to merchants and it appears as an alterna-
tive to the occupation of public space by enabling the continuation of their business” 
(Bloomfield, 2015: 3). In other words, the project’s “good strategic position in a compet-
itive environment” is grounded in the ability of the City to enforce the prohibition on 
vending in public space, forcing vendors to choose between banishment and payment. 
Yet even if the City could achieve such a massive relocation and guarantee 100% occu-
pancy by the fourth year of operation, Bloomfield argues that the City would still not be 
able to meet its debt service during these first four years on the profitability of the build-
ing alone. If the first year of activity is projected to generate CFA 695 million, it is nowhere 
near enough to close the gap with an annual debt service of CFA 1.6 billion until after 
the projected 100% occupation. Until then, the City of Dakar itself would have to close 
the gap out of its own budget, which the rating poses as a possible interim solution. In 
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other words, the solution would be to pay outright for the outstanding debt on an empty 
building.  
 
Despite the financial problems with the feasibility of the project itself, Bloomfield 
still maintains a positive, investment-grade rating for the municipal bond, which is upheld 
by the City’s ability to cover gaps with its own revenues, and the further guarantee to 
bond-holders that the U.S. government will cover half their losses in the unlikely event 
of a default. The positive rating reveals a relatively mundane feature of structured fi-
nance: credit enhancements decrease the investment risk for financial assets. In this 
case, the credit enhancement came in the form of a 50% loan guarantee on the principle 
of the issuance provided by USAID’s Development Credit Authority (DCA). DCA is 
charged with promoting “risk-sharing” by offering credit guarantees to local govern-
ments seeking to issue bonds. DCA’s guarantees provide credit enhancements to gov-
ernments seeking to leverage private capital with affordable interest rates and long-term 
payment schedules. In the case of a default on these bonds, the U.S. government would 
be legally liable for half of the debt, and the City of Dakar itself would be liable for the 
remaining fifty percent. Even though the rating suggests a rather skeptical evaluation of 
the financial returns offered by the bonds proposed project, the credit rating remains 
investment grade due to the financial backing of the U.S. government.  
 
These evaluations brought the City of Dakar into a conversation with investors, 
providing a foundation of public information on which to base their marketing in the road 
show. Such acts of public accountability are at the core of a new imaginary of global 
urban development. As one consultant on the program noted, the central lesson-learned 
from the program, despite its failure, was simply that a local government demonstrated 
itself as transparent, a first step in ensuring further financial accountability to stakehold-
ers. But it also brought the City of Dakar into conversation—and contestation—with the 
central government. And this contestation took the form of a debate over the solvency, 
veracity, and credit-worthiness of the City of Dakar’s fiscal management practices. On 
the ground in Dakar, a turn of unanticipated events enrolled the bond program into a 
long-held controversy over municipal authority in Dakar.  
 
The Prince’s Act 
 
“In the United States, you have three branches of government: the executive, the judici-
ary, and the legislative. But in Senegal, there are only two: the party in power and the 
opposition.” –A young militant of the Socialist Party of Senegal 
 
The blockage came as a surprise to the DMFP staff. Since 2011 the program had 
been preparing the City of Dakar for this initial issuance: it facilitated an independent 
evaluation of the City’s financial practices, underwent two different credit ratings, re-
ceived approval from the regulator of the West African Stock Exchange, and marketed 
the bonds to investors. By February of 2015, the expected date of the issuance, the 
DMFP had also requested and received a letter of non-objection from the Senegalese 
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Ministry of Finance on three separate occasions, the first in December of 2012, the se-
cond in April of 2014, and the third in July of the same year (Faye 2015). The regulatory 
agency for the stock exchange—the Conseil Régional de l’épargne publique et des mar-
chés financiers (CREPMF)—required that this letter be in place prior to the issuance, 
serving as a legal recognition that a Senegalese municipality has the legal right to acquire 
debt. Withdrawing the letter meant that the City of Dakar no longer met the bureaucratic 
requirements to receive an approval from the CREPMF.   
 
The Ministry of Finance held firm in its position that the withdrawal of the letter of 
non-objection was a technical consideration, not a political one. The Ministry argued that 
the problem was, once again, one of financial and legal uncertainty: the recent decen-
tralization reforms put into question the City’s future fiscal base and, with it, any certainty 
that it would be able to pay off its debt. Again, the CREPMF decided that these concerns 
“seemed pertinent” and would not proceed without central government support (Diatta, 
2015). From the Ministry’s perspective, the technical aspects of the bond were financial 
and legal ones: the central state could be required to repay the City’s debt in the case 
of default. 
 
The Ministry called into question the City’s existing debt. In preparations for the 
bond issuance, the City had taken out two separate loans from development banks to 
finance a couple modest public works projects. In 2011, the City borrowed 6.5 billion 
fCFA from L’Agence Française de Développement (AFD) to pay for the installation of 
solar-powered street lights on the city’s largest thoroughfares. And in 2013 it further 
contracted another 9.7 billion fCFA loan from the West African Development Bank 
(BOAD) to pay for the installation of traffic lights. In the March 2015 meeting of the Na-
tional Assembly, the Prime Minister argued that such existing debts required an exhaus-
tive review to determine if the City could support an additional 20 billion fFCA in debt. In 
his words, “yes to innovative finance but with transparency. We saw cities like Buenos 
Aires and Detroit collapse, and in the end who pays if it isn't the State?” (Pierret and Té-
Léssia, 2015). Building on this fear of default, central state representatives continued to 
cast doubt on the City’s financial management. One technician from the Ministry of Fi-
nance even argued that the City of Dakar could have provided “incorrect information” to 
its financial partners, and was therefore at risk for default (Thiès Vision, 2016). Although 
the bond program was built on an array of independent financial evaluations, the central 
government argued that there needed to be an extended review of the financial state of 
the City of Dakar before the program could go any further.  
 
In the wake of the blockage, The Mayor of Dakar Khalifa Sall critiqued the Minis-
try’s explanation for the withdrawal of its letter of non-objection. Not only did the City of 
Dakar have enough revenue to repay the debt, it also received the last letter of approval 
from the Ministry after the decentralization laws were passed. In contrast to the Minis-
try’s claims of potential default, the Mayor called attention to the independent financial 
evaluations the City had undergone to prepare for the issuance (Faye, 2015). One mem-
ber of the DMFP staff argued that this was a central paradox of the blockage: although 
the central state cast doubt on the City’s finances, investors were more than willing to 
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purchase the bonds. From her perspective, it should not be up to the central state to 
decide if such projects are profitable; instead, “it is the investors who know best what is 
financially viable and what is not. And they wanted to invest!” Rather than simply block 
the program on legal grounds, the Ministry of Finance took up the debate in the terms of 
financial evaluation, casting public doubt on the financial management and capacity of 
the City of Dakar, a practice well beyond what the CREMPF required from a “letter of 
non-objection”.  
 
The municipality took the controversy to the Supreme Court of Senegal, arguing 
that the Ministry had committed an “excess of power” in its withdrawal of the letter of 
non-objection. According to Senegalese law, an “excess of power” is an action taken by 
a public authority that lies outside of its assigned competencies. In this case, the City 
argued that the Ministry did not have the administrative right to evaluate the financial 
viability of the bond, its primary justification for withdrawing its letter. The “letter of non-
objection” was not intended to be a financial evaluation, but a legal evaluation in which 
The Ministry certified that municipalities were permitted to take out debt under Senega-
lese law. DMFP staff anticipated that this approval would be a formality, citing the city’s 
existing debt as precedent, and the longstanding central government institution—the 
Municipal Development Agency—that had been partnering with local governments to 
access World Bank financing for decades.  
 
However, just two months after the blockage, the supreme court ultimately de-
cided in favor of the central government, suspending the bond issuance indefinitely. Alt-
hough the blockage itself surprised the DMFP, they expected the court to uphold it. As 
one DMFP staff member pointed out, judges are appointed by the president and would 
therefore not rule against the leader of the political party who put them in power. From 
this perspective, the blockage was cemented as soon as the Ministry withdrew its letter, 
but the Supreme Court decision was nevertheless a legal confirmation of the sovereign 
state’s legal right to block the issuance. Rather than contesting municipal authority in 
terms of law, the central government engaged in a political debate by evaluating the 
municipality’s finances. Yet many in Dakar did not agree with this interpretation of events 
and instead argued that the blockage was an electoral strategy on the part of the presi-
dent to block the Mayor’s own presidential bid.  
 
Khalifa Sall is a prominent member of the Socialist Party (PS) and, at the time of 
the blockage, was a central figure in a growing division within the party. Ousmane Tanor 
Dieng was on the other side of the divide, and was a senior member of the party who 
formerly served under Léopold Senghor, the first president of Senegal and founder of 
the PS. In the years leading up to the blockage, Tanor served as the Secretary General 
of the PS in Senegal, and played a central role in the party’s coalition to elect the current 
president, Macky Sall. Although Macky came from a competing political party, the Alli-
ance for the Republic (APR), the PS had joined in a coalition to support the candidate in 
the 2012 elections best placed to unseat the then incumbent, Abdoulaye Wade. The 
election of Macky Sall to the presidency was a political revolution which marked Sene-
gal’s second peaceful change of political party in the presidency since independence. It 
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was a widespread mobilization of youth political participation exemplary of democratic 
citizenship on the world stage. But after this peaceful upheaval of Wade’s electoral dom-
inance, the PS was coming unraveled around its electoral strategy for the presidency: 
should the party continue to support the coalition for the re-election of Macky Sall, or 
should it put forward its own political candidate?  
 
In a controversial open letter, a young member of the PS, Modou Ndiaye, ex-
claimed that, “if our national general secretary does not want to be the party in power 
again, we, the militants, will do it ourselves” (Ba, 2016). Ndiaye’s letter articulated the 
growing sentiments of the younger militants of the PS who found in Khalifa Sall a political 
candidate emblematic of a new generation of politicians and political values. Although 
Khalifa was 58 years old at the time of this letter, he had come to represent a youthful 
contrast to Tanor, the aged and “unmovable dinosaur” (Ba, 2016). Khalifa’s public per-
sona was markedly different from his political contemporaries. Although he loved to read 
tabloids, he was not known for his participation in the rumors, accusations, and scandal 
that characterize much of the electoral debate in Senegal. 
 
 Instead, Sall was profiled as a unique kind of soft-spoken politician whose repu-
tation hailed from his steady dedication to public service and his popularity in a more 
cosmopolitan world of innovative development interventions (Khalifa Sall se dévoile, 
2016). Although critics suggested his reputation in Senegal was limited to the Dakar 
peninsula, Khalifa had created a more expansive, global reputation for himself in the 
professional realm of international development—one development expert at the World 
Bank even noted that even Mayor’s e-mail signature read “international development 
consultant”, a testament to his cosmopolitan appeal outside Dakar. Prior to the block-
age, Khalifa had not publicly announced his bid for the presidency, and he even denied 
having any such ambition. Nevertheless, the division surrounding the 2019 presidential 
elections vaulted the Mayor onto a national political stage at the behest of a militant and 
youthful wing of the Socialist Party.  
 
The blockage of the bond was not the only front in this dispute. The Mayor shared 
not only a political landscape with the central state, but also shared a physical one. Dakar 
is the capital city of Senegal, hosting City Hall and the Presidential Palace both within a 
short walking distance of the city’s famous central square, la Place de l'Indépendance. 
And a significant controversy emerged over whether the central state or the City would 
be responsible for the redevelopment. Although the Mayor had made the redevelopment 
of this public plaza a cornerstone of his vision for the redevelopment of downtown, the 
President claimed it as his own responsibility and blocked the development from going 
forward.  
 
Similarly, the President created a new Ministry responsible for planting trees in 
the city’s public spaces, an obvious counter to the Mayor’s vision for the “re-greening of 
the Green Cape” in the recently completed master plan, Dakar Horizon 2025. As one 
municipal employee of the program told me, the new Ministry even went so far as to rip 
up the palm trees planted by the City only to replace them with different set of palm trees 
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and an informative sign about the Ministry’s accomplishments. The Mayor’s programs 
had long been subject to such petty blockages from the central state, but the spectacular 
blockage of the municipal bond transformed this technical dispute into a politically 
charged public controversy.   
 
To many observers, the blockage was quite obviously more than a technical prob-
lem. It was an extension of what many in Dakar’s electoral public sphere began calling 
a “Mackyavélique” democracy, a portmanteau of the current president’s first name—
Macky—and the political theorist, Machiavelli. In this context, the pejorative reference to 
Machiavelli’s The Prince was intended as a critique of the unchecked and expanding 
sovereign rule, an unwelcome addition to Dakar’s democratic norm. As one lawyer in 
Dakar argued, the blockage of the municipal bond was a case of “le fait du prince” (the 
prince’s act), a term in French administrative law regarding acts of a government that 
break a contract to which the government itself a co-contractor. Yet according to this 
legal principle, the contracting party is entitled to a complete compensation for the dam-
ages resulting from the government’s breach of contract. In theory, this lawyer argued, 
le fait du prince is intended to protect from the arbitrary rule of sovereign elites. But in 
the case of the sabotage, the sovereign had no such legal or financial accountability and, 
as many critics argued, was instead an act of a Machiavellian prince.  
 
Dakar’s municipal bond program became embroiled in a much deeper trajectory 
of electoral politics in which the militants of the Socialist Party sought to regain the pres-
idency the party held for 30 years after independence. And the failure of the municipal 
bond program came to be understood as more than just a technical problem: it was an 
electoral sabotage. Electoral rivalries offer a sensible—and likely accurate— explain for 
why the central state chose to block the bond: in this sense, the bond should be under-
stood as one instance of a broader approach to a “Mackavélique” style of electoral sab-
otage. But beyond such rivalries, the blockage also reveals something about how local 
governments in Dakar are attempting to exercise municipal and fiscal authority after the 
reforms. Rather than appealing to the rights and responsibilities delegated to local gov-
ernments by Act III, the DMFP introduced a new style of reasoning about the fiscal rights 
and obligations of municipal government in Dakar. Rather than a legal debate over fiscal 
assignment of the decentralization reforms, the City’s financial evaluations introduced a 
debate over the veracity of the City’s financial accounting and its risk for default. In this 
sense, the longstanding debate over the distribution of public authority in Dakar took 
place in terms of financial evaluation.  
 
Sabotage and Circulations  
 
The bond program was a development intervention that never came to fruition, but nev-
ertheless had wide ranging effects. In contrast to exploring the material effects of the 
program, I followed the public life of the bond through the circulation of its representa-
tions: the financial documentation that was central to making the bond known to its pub-
lics and, ultimately, opened a new political terrain for the sabotage of the municipality’s 
novel attempt at exercising fiscal and political authority. Far from introducing political 
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concerns into what should be technical ones, the central state’s blockage of the program 
expanded this existing style of political argumentation. Indeed, the preparation and ulti-
mate blockage of the bond were not the last time that the City’s fiscal management 
practices were held up to public scrutiny.  
 
In 2017, Khalifa Sall was arrested by the State Inspectorate General who accused 
the Mayor of the embezzlement of public funds. In a striking echo of the blockage, the 
Mayor’s supporters argued that the arrest was an “instrumentalization of justice” aimed 
at furthering dampening the Mayor’s suspected presidential ambition. The “advance ac-
count affair,” as it came to be called, hinged on the Mayor’s usage of discretionary funds 
that did not require budgetary oversight by the central government. Previous Mayors had 
used the fund to provide rice and other small goods to their constituency in times of a 
need, a practice common to local governments across Senegal. Although the central 
state knew of the account since before Khalifa’s term, the State Inspectorate General 
accused him of creating false bills for millet and rice and transferring 30 million fCFA to 
a non-existent company (Liffran, 2017). The Mayor remained imprisoned without trial and 
in March of 2018 was sentenced to another 5 years in prison. In a surprising turn of 
events, the Justice Court of the West African Economic Community argued that Sene-
gal’s judicial process had violated the Mayor’s right to counsel, the right of presumption 
of innocence, and right to a fair trial (Liffran, 2018). However, the Mayor remained in 
prison, and the Socialist Party lost the legislative elections of 2017, which many sus-
pected meant that a new party candidate would not fare well in a bid for the Presidency 
in 2019.  
 
From the blockage of the bond to the Mayor’s imprisonment, the central state has 
countered the Socialist Party’s electoral ambitions through a “proxy war” in the suppos-
edly technical realm of fiscal management. Leveraging international attention for democ-
racy and good governance for access to wealth is a long-held practice of the Senegalese 
nation-state (Bayart, 1993; Ralph, 2015). Yet in this case it is the municipality, not the 
nation-state, that is taking up a similar global political economic strategy, but reconfig-
uring it to fit the values of contemporary development thought.  
 
Despite nearly 30 years of widespread experimentation with decentralization re-
forms across the continent, national governments continue to re-centralize control of 
urban services and revenues to maintain political and electoral control of increasingly 
influential capital cities (Fourchard, 2011; Gore and Muwanga, 2014). Policy research 
has long noted the influence of this central government oversight (la tutelle) on fiscal 
administration, and poses this legal constraint as a key obstacle to realizing local fiscal 
autonomy, particularly in Francophone Africa (Paulais, 2012). And scholars have similarly 
argued that colonial and postcolonial decentralization reforms in Senegal have paradox- 
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Figure 3.5 Banner on the Gates of City Hall: “Free Khalifa Sall: 100 Days of Arbitrary Detention by the 
Will of One Man”. A walking vendor selling bouye and bissap juice and two men resting on the gates.  
Photo by Author 
 
ically served to increase constraints on local autonomy by focusing local revenues on 
politically charged central state transfers (Diop and Diouf, 1992).  
 
The program’s blockage had consequences for the circulation of municipal bonds 
as an urban policy on the continent, but it did not dampen enthusiasm for them. In the 
wake of the bond’s sabotage, Kampala (Uganda) and Abidjan (Côte d’Ivoire) still held 
out promise for their own issuances. For the District of Abidjan, an unfavorable credit 
rating and unpredictable revenue streams have, for the moment, put the city’s financial 
ambitions on hold. And in the case of Kampala, its enthusiasm for participating in the 
rush towards structured finance is constrained by a legal limit on its borrowing capacity, 
currently fixed at 10% of its annual budget. Jeremy Gorelick (2018), a policy advisor on 
the DMFP, argues that the key lesson learned from these experiments is the importance 
of such legal frameworks. It is a problem of law that both Dakar and Kampala were un-
able to issue their bonds: for the former, the legal requirement for central state authori-
zation of sub-national debt, and for the latter the legal authority of the central state to 
set limits on the amount of debt a City can hold.  From this perspective, a key component 
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of future reforms should be changing the laws that govern municipal borrowing to allow 
for more control over fiscal decision making at the municipal level.  
 
But not all development professionals agree about the future of municipal bonds 
on the continent. A policy note from two researchers at the United Kingdom’s Depart-
ment for International Development (DFID) presents a much more cautious appraisal of 
the lessons learned from the experiment in Dakar (Neureiter and Jordan, 2017). The DFID 
researchers celebrate the program for permitting the City of Dakar to demonstrate its 
creditworthiness, improve its fiscal management, and “crowd-in” donor support as result 
of the PEFA review. But the researchers also point to what they term the “political sen-
sitivity” of capital raising schemes in the context of rivalries between municipal and cen-
tral governments. They argue that technical assistance for urban development “would 
be better directed to the broader objective of enhancing the financial sustainability of 
[sub-national governments]…rather than promoting specialized financial instruments 
with limited relevance to low-income countries.” In a rare contrast to the consensus 
around structured finance, this brief argues in favor of the relatively mundane tasks of 
improving fiscal management and increasing fiscal resources.  
 
The concept of financial public focuses attention on how the City of Dakar’s fi-
nancial evaluations addressed an audience of international development institutions 
around the anticipation of a relatively novel financial instrument. This address was a bid 
for political recognition; at stake for the City of Dakar was its capacity to leverage wealth 
without the guarantee or oversight of the central state. Rather than appealing to Sene-
galese law, the bond program appealed to an audience of development professionals, 
financial analysis, and investors who—unlike the central state authorities—shared in a 
vision for African development in which the municipality took center stage. In speaking 
the language of financial accountability and fiscal transparency, the City of Dakar intro-
duced a new political terrain of financial evaluation and its public. In the language of the 
DFID brief, the initial PEFA evaluation worked to “crowd-in” donor support, leveraging 
its willingness to participate in an evaluation despite the surprisingly poor ranking the 
City received as a result. But the program also unexpectedly “crowded-in” the con-
trasting financial argumentation of the central government. And it is the City of Dakar’s 
participation in this global public that made financial evaluation a particularly appealing 
terrain in which to expand the central state’s existing campaign of electoral sabotage.  
 
Cities have in recent years sped up the exchange of policy practices across the 
world, and scholarly research has documented how cities have rendered such policy 
models mobile by adapting technical programs to local contexts (McCann & Ward, 2012; 
Roy & Ong, 2011). Yet alongside the technical adaptations and developmental aspira-
tions required to circulate policies across the globe, they also introduce new forms of 
political argumentation. The paradox of the bond program is that the broader promise it 
held out for African urban development more generally also politicized the program in 
Senegal’s ongoing electoral sphere. The circulation of municipal bonds became enrolled 
in the Mayor’s broader rise to prominence as a young, technically savvy and forward 
thinking politician within the Socialist Party. 
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This paradox is reflective of a contemporary political moment in which Senegal’s 
postcolonial liberal democracy is meeting a new limit: as young politicians like Khalifa 
Sall make claims to inclusion in other forms of democratic practice—such as financial 
evaluation—there remains an electoral democracy with a qualitatively different form of 
political reason. The national success in transitioning to a multi-party democracy after 
nearly 30 years of Sociality Party rule has at the same time introduced a new set of 
“proxy wars” among sub-national governments and the central state. Nevertheless, the 
blockage of the bond program should be understood as more than a simple rivalry be-
tween two competing political personages and their respective parties, the sabotage 
was also a denial of a new form of political recognition for the City of Dakar. The City 
appealed to public financial evaluation as a novel technique of municipal and democratic 
state formation.  
 
The law ultimately denied the City’s right to issue bonds. But the program was 
grounded in an appeal to a form of governmental authority very different from public law: 
public financial evaluation. It is in this sense that political contestation over the distribu-
tion of public authority took the form of an appeal to a financial public. But in a surprising 
turn of events, some unexpected actors took part in this public: central state authorities 
weighed in with their own evaluations of the City, casting doubt on its creditworthiness, 
the accuracy of its data, and the potential fiscal uncertainty introduced by the recent 
decentralization reforms. And further, the Mayor’s subsequent imprisonment was justi-
fied in terms of his own corrupt fiscal practices. Public financial evaluation began as an 
appeal to municipal authority, but subsequently transformed into a justification for its 
denial. In other words, the problem of municipal authority in Dakar was, for a moment, 
transformed into a problem of public financial evaluation—an experimental way to de-
termine the legitimacy of municipal authority.  
 
	  
84 
	
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Refusing Relocation  
Urban Street Markets and the Problem of Fiscal Participation 
 
Dakar’s municipal bonds were slated to fund the construction of a commercial center for 
walking street vendors. But it the bond program was only one element of a broader vision 
to relocate the city’s urban markets. In 2011, the City of Dakar began a participatory 
approach to urban street market relocation. The program targeted walking vendors, or 
marchands ambulants, to free up traffic circulation downtown and reduce the economic 
costs of congested streets. The program entailed the political participation of vendor 
associations in the design and planning of the new Félix Éboué commercial center in 
which to relocate thousands of Dakar’s urban street vendors. It also required what I term 
the fiscal participation of vendors themselves.  
 
The City government expected vendors to make monthly payments for the use of 
commercial center space. These payments would provide the City and its private partner 
with a critical revenue stream. Yet Dakar’s walking vendors have unequivocally refused 
to relocate to the new center, citing its poor location and high cost. Scholars have largely 
understood street vendors as marginal to or excluded from the urban political sphere. 
But rather than framing vendors as a superfluous population, Dakar’s program centered 
vendors as the source of monetary value on which it crucially depended. In this chapter, 
I argue that fiscal participation provided the conditions under which vendors’ refusal be-
came a possible and effective political act. And this refusal is a novel kind of disagree-
ment surrounding experimental municipal fiscal contracts in Dakar. Rather than appeal 
to the legal authority to tax or the credibility of financial evaluation, the municipal gov-
ernment turned to a different form of fiscal contract in which user-fees from the vendors 
would finance the production of a public good.  
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Figure 4.1 Félix Éboué Commercial Center 
Photo by Author 
 
Yet the commercial center was a spectacular failure. After the construction of the 
building, most of Dakar’s street vendors unequivocally refused to relocate, citing its high 
cost and poor location. The building remains empty to this day.  
 
Many vendors, and particularly the vendors’ associations, believed in the vision 
of the Félix Éboué Commercial Center. They had long desired a respectable and iconic 
home for their beloved markets. Yet from a financial perspective, the relocation was sig-
nificantly less appealing. In addition to participating in the political process of relocation, 
vendors were also expected to pay for it. The building was not a public infrastructure like 
a street; it was not paid for with tax revenue and was not freely accessible to use for all 
of Dakar’s citizens. Unlike the street, the building was built and operated as a Public-
Private Partnership (PPP) between a private firm and the City of Dakar. Although the 
private firm financed the construction of the building, it depended on the user-fees gen-
erated by the vendors themselves to recoup the costs of construction, pay for operation 
and maintenance, and turn a profit. The Félix Éboué Commercial Center resembled many 
of the user-fee financed public infrastructures that have become the developmental 
norm across Africa today. However, unlike these infrastructures, Dakar’s commercial 
center was to be financed entirely by the cash payments of poor vendors. Most vendors, 
however, have unequivocally refused to pay.  
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What, then, are the conditions of possibility for such a refusal? Or, under what 
conditions does refusal become a possible and effective political act? And to what ef-
fect? In this paper, I introduce the idea of fiscal participation to characterize the unique 
blend of political inclusion and user-fees that was a distinctive feature of the Félix Éboué 
commercial center. I argue that although fiscal participation is a decidedly neoliberal 
technique of governance, it was nevertheless a key condition of possibility for street 
vendors’ effective refusal to relocate.  
 
In the practice of fiscal participation, financing and decision-making for a govern-
mental intervention are dependent on a public’s voluntary political inclusion and pay-
ment. To make the plans and pull in financial support for the relocation program, street 
vendors and their associations were required to participate throughout the relocation 
process—from census taking to making final payments. Vendors were expected to pay 
these user-fees for the use of space in the commercial center, and they were expected 
to sign contracts which resembled a loan more than a rental agreement. These contracts 
required a deposit followed by several years of monthly payments at the end of which 
vendors would become owners of their individual market stalls.  
 
So, what is new—and neoliberal—about this municipal fiscal contract? Increas-
ingly, it does not rest singularly on the power of taxation. A state’s right to collect a tax 
is established by law and enforceable by violence. In democratic formulations of the 
fiscal contract, the public consents to taxation in exchange for political representation, 
military protection, and public goods. But when exactly did this public consent? Where 
did they negotiate and sign such a contract, and who is going to enforce it and how? In 
many contexts, the social contract is a philosophical metaphor, an ex post facto justifi-
cation of the extraction of wealth and state formation. Although taxation is conceptual-
ized as consensual, it is in practice obligatory—citizens are not legally permitted to re-
fuse the payment of taxes. In a democratic society, they are instead expected to voice 
their disagreement in the public sphere. A tax boycott, for example, is a public with-
drawal of this abstract consent to taxation.  
 
But refusing fiscal participation is something different. Unlike a tax boycott, it is 
not a public, collective, and conscious challenge to the legitimacy of the fiscal contract. 
Consenting to fiscal participation is not abstract; it is literal, negotiated, and up for grabs. 
The public from whom wealth is collected, the purpose and form of this collection, and 
its legitimacy are in constant negotiation between citizens and the state. There is no 
permanent condition to this fiscal contract (Barry 1993). Its negotiation takes place in the 
terms of a contract for user-fees and, unlike a tax, refusal is permitted and payment is 
not obligatory. Further, refusal is an important part of any negotiation over price in Dakar. 
There is no better way to negotiate than to demonstrate a willingness to physically walk 
away from the conversation altogether. Ask any cab driver in the city. It is perhaps un-
surprising, then, that vendors have individually mounted a sustained refusal to pay for a 
public service with which they strongly disagree.  
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User-fees for public services are new to Dakar, but since the 1980s they have 
gained popularity among scholars and practitioners of public administration across the 
world. Advocates of New Public Management have posed such payments as a solution 
to a problem of public value in democratic societies. These reformers recognize that 
public value is not uniform or constant across a governmental territory, and have put 
forth private contracting for local public services as a democratic alternative to the cen-
tralized and highly bureaucratized provision of public services (Ostrom, 2010; Ostrom et 
al., 1961). Privatization is central to such reforms. In theory, privatization allows local 
governments to contract for the public service needs specific to their jurisdiction (Oates, 
1999). Rather than a centralized public authority making decisions about a uniform public 
need, a decentralized government can contract out to private firms to meet locally de-
fined public needs. And when such privatized services are funded by user-fees, they 
provide an additional pathway for citizens’ to “exit” their public service arrangements 
and express their disagreement with prevailing understanding of public value (Hood, 
1991, 1995). In this sense, the state transforms from a general social contract into a 
nexus of specific contracts that are each tested, and if need be, rejected. 
 
This is the novel—and neoliberal—version of the municipal fiscal contract at stake 
in Dakar’s relocation program. But engaging neoliberal techniques does not necessarily 
foreclose the advancement of contrasting political values (Bear and Mathur, 2015; Col-
lier, 2011; Ferguson, 2015; Gibson-Graham, 2006). The program put forth not only a new 
vision of public value, but also a new way to dispute this value. Vendors’ refusal is pre-
cisely such a dispute. Their refusal is at odds with the municipality’s vision for urban 
public space. It is an argument that the urban street is a legitimate space of popular 
exchange. But their refusal is also a neoliberal style of negotiating the fiscal contract par 
excellence. Fiscal participation was an experiment in municipal authority that did not rely 
on the legal powers of local taxation, but on an individualized nexus of contracts for 
user-fees. Rather than contest this neoliberal vision of the fiscal contract, vendors whole-
heartedly adopted it: the municipal state put forth a service that no-one wanted to buy, 
and as a result, vendors voted with their feet and the program failed. This exercise in 
neoliberal government provided the conditions of possibility for vendors to refuse and to 
voice their disagreement with the municipality’s vision of public value.  
 
Dakar’s relocation program was dependent on the fiscal participation of street 
vendors, and the introduction of fiscal participation became a central condition for street 
vendors’ unequivocal refusal to relocate. Vendors disagreed with the program’s methods 
and its aims, and they voiced this disagreement by refusing this form of participation 
outright. However, I argue that vendors are not refusing to engage in politics; their refusal 
is political. It introduced an experimental municipal fiscal contract, and it changed the 
understanding of how municipal authority may legitimately be exercised in Dakar. In this 
sense, the relocation program re-conceptualized the problem of communal form. Neither 
a question of law, nor credibility, this form of authority hinged in the consumption pref-
erences of street vendors.  
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Street Vending at the Political Limit 
 
Dakar’s failed participatory market relocation confounds much of the critical and con-
ventional understandings of street market politics. From these perspectives, there is no 
doubt that street vendors are politically marginalized: they lack a political voice in the 
formal structures of government, and are therefore subject to legal banishment and state 
violence. Due to their illegal status, vendors are excluded from voicing interests to state 
authorities and subject to police harassment and diverse forms of corporal and carceral 
punishment. In many democracies, they do not hold sway over crucial voting blocs at 
the municipal-level and, further, they are often not residents in the governmental districts 
in which they might make claims based on formal civic rights—in other words, migrant 
vendors are often bereft of formal citizenship. It is in this sense that street vendors are 
marginalized and regularly disenfranchised from the political sphere and therefore sub-
ject to neoliberal revanchism (Brown et al., 2010; Swanson, 2007). Despite this general 
state of political and economic marginality, vendors and their representative associations 
across the globe have nevertheless forcefully and successfully advanced their rights to 
participate in market society.  
 
 Vendors have made these claims in the form of an organized and collective resistance 
to programs of state regulation and neoliberal entrepreneurial urban governance (Brown 
et al., 2010; Crossa, 2009). It is worth remembering that many attribute the beginning of 
the Arab Spring in 2010 to the self-immolation of a 26-year-old Tunisian street vendor, 
Mohamed Bouazizi, who set himself on fire in protest of police harassment (Brown and 
Mackie, 2017). Yet similar collective movements are met with the supreme challenge of 
maintaining a sustained political momentum among a mobile, floating population who 
are often in direct competition with one another in the marketplace. In some exceptional 
cases, vendors have maintained such advocacy organizations, made increasingly suc-
cessful claims on municipal authorities, and advanced the legitimacy of work in public 
space (Bénit-Gbaffou, 2016; Milgram, 2014). And for decades, international organiza-
tions have advocated to transform governmental approaches to the management and 
regulation of street markets at a global scale and to assert the legitimacy and rights to 
livelihood of vendors themselves. There are two techniques central to this political ad-
vocacy. The first is repealing the municipal ordinances that have rendered street vending 
illegal in much of the world. Los Angeles’ recent passage of a law permitting sidewalk 
vending marks a notable success in this respect (Alpert Reyes, 2018). The second tech-
nique is advocating for the creation of formal political pathways for inclusion, much like 
the form of participation on offer in Dakar’s relocation program.   
 
 There is no doubt that most street vendors are a cash poor and economically pre-
carious group. They do not, however, always turn to collective political engagement to 
advance or protect their livelihoods. Instead, many vendors simply seek success in the 
market; they compete to make marginal gains with which they convert monetary value 
into social status, familial welfare, or even individual consumption (Bohannon & Dalton, 
1962; Guyer, 2004). Market vendors and traders across Africa, for example, use diverse 
and constantly changing affiliations to make urban livelihoods in the context of scarcity 
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(Simone, 2004). Much of the economic crises in Africa’s popular economies are at-
tributed to the economic shocks and dislocations of the structural adjustment programs 
of the late 20th century (Elyachar, 2005, 2010). And African vendors and merchants over-
whelmingly negotiated the market uncertainties of structural adjustment by hedging in-
vestments and capitalizing on arbitrage opportunities (Chalfin, 2004; Peterson, 2014). 
Rather than making political claims to the government for increased economic stability, 
merchants engaged in various forms of hedging and arbitrage. At times, vendors’ inter-
ests coalesce into organized collective resistance to state programs. But they more often 
resort to various forms of survival strategies to cope with economic scarcity, exclusion, 
and crisis. In short, urban street vendors across the globe blend economic survival strat-
egies, resistance, collective political agency, and rights to the city in order to combat the 
police harassment, evictions, and everyday insecurity in the world’s regularly dispos-
sessed and marginalized street markets (Bromley, 2000; Hansen et al, 2014).  
 
 However, political exclusion and uncertainty may not necessarily be a problem to 
solve. It may be a strategic resource (Tucker and Devlin, 2019). Asef Bayat (1997) argues 
that poor and “informal” people should be understood as an unrecognized, widespread, 
and collective force, a “quiet encroachment of the ordinary…a silent, patient, protracted, 
and pervasive advancement of ordinary people on the propertied and powerful to survive 
hardships and better their lives” (57). This quiet encroachment is not a sustained, inten-
tional act. Instead, it is marked by “atomized and prolonged mobilization with episodic 
collective action” (57). In this sense, street vendors become political once they intention-
ally engage in collective action. Although it is their “sheer cumulative numbers that trans-
form them into a potential social force” (58, emphasis added), it is their collective and 
defensive action that transforms them, infrequently, into a political force. Voice and rep-
resentation are not normative goals of these quiet encroachers, they are only seldom-
used tactics. Instead, the political strategy of “informal people” lies elsewhere: “to ap-
pear limited and tolerable while expanding so much that resistance against them be-
comes difficult” (62). From this perspective, much of market life sits beyond the limit and 
sphere of politics. Vendors become political only once they intentionally and collectively 
orchestrate actions against dominant political authorities. And this metaphor of “quiet” 
confirms the absent voice of “informal people” in the political sphere; in short, they are 
a decidedly un-civil society.  
 
Un-civil society lacks this institutional voice because it lacks the power of disrup-
tion, “in the sense of the ‘withdrawal of a crucial contribution on which others depend’” 
(Bayat, 1997: 59). But for Dakar’s new commercial center, this is obviously not the case: 
fiscal participation rendered the whole intervention as crucially dependent on street ven-
dors’ political and fiscal contributions. The conventional solution to vendor exclusion is 
to create new formal pathways to political inclusion. But most vendors in Dakar have 
unequivocally refused exactly this. Does this mean that vendors are refusing politics? Or 
that their uncoordinated, individual refusals to participate in a recognizable form of po-
litical practice are not political? To these questions, I answer unequivocally: no. I refuse 
to claim that street vendors are marginal participants in the political sphere (Simpson, 
2014). Instead, I argue that their refusal is at the limits of political recognition and, as 
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such, challenges conventional understandings of politics and forces it into new terrain. 
Vendors’ refusal delimits the political sphere: it is a consequential political act that 
shapes Dakar’s municipal fiscal contract and the possibility of state action. In Dakar, 
vendors became political due to their collective capacities to—consciously or not—dis-
rupt and derail governmental interventions. Refusal did not further marginalize or remove 
these vendors from politics. Instead, it was an effective political act in advancing ven-
dors’ understanding of the public value and proper use of the urban street.  
 
The Public Value of Vending 
 
The City of Dakar’s master plan, Dakar Horizon 2025, envisions the city as a hospitable 
environment for international business investors, with modern amenities and clean 
streets to match. During Côte D’Ivoire’s recent civil war, Dakar positioned itself as the 
safer alternative in which to host international business conventions. To remain compet-
itive, the City of Dakar formulated a plan to address one of its most visible infrastructural 
problems: road congestion. Slow-moving and crowded street markets posed an aes-
thetic and material problem for this vision of Dakar’s urban future, contradicting the im-
age of a “modern metropolis” inscribed in the pages of the plan (Marfiang, 2015). But 
more than a problem of the city’s image, officials also understood street markets as a 
problem for the urban economy. A World Bank report estimated that, in 2008, congestion 
in the City of Dakar was estimated to cost a total of fCFA 142.9 billion, amounting to 
2.2% of that year’s Gross National Product (2009). In other words, the congested urban 
street introduced what urban policy experts term an “infrastructural dysfunction” which 
limits monetary exchange in Dakar’s measured urban economy (Lall et al., 2017; Scott 
& Storper, 2015).   
 
This is a striking reversal of how most municipalities in Senegal understand the 
street market. For urban municipalities in which a street market is located, vendor tax 
payments account for most revenues. In this sense, street markets are a fiscal resource, 
not a fiscal drain. But officials at the City of Dakar had come to understand the market 
differently. In line with recent turns in development finance, officials at the City of Dakar 
thought in terms of the financial effects of congestion on the measured urban economy 
and, in turn, its fiscal effects on the City (Paulais, 2012). According to the World Bank 
report, Dakar had “crisis-level” traffic congestion which was caused, in part, by the pres-
ence of vendors (2009). Echoing this report, one of the Mayor’s deputies argued that 
relocating the markets would liberate public roads and avert this crisis of congestion. 
Although market vendors argue that they are following congestion in search of clients, 
official reports argued the opposite. From their perspective, the street market is a cause 
of traffic congestion, rather than an effect. In other words, street vendors helped to cre-
ate the “crisis-level” congestion which was costing the nation billions of fCFA each year. 
The City’s plan favored the measured economy over its often-unmeasured counterpart. 
In this sense, the City understood and calculated the public value of the urban street in 
terms of how it promoted an enabling environment for measured economic exchange in 
Dakar’s urban agglomeration. 
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Although financial cost was a new justification for relocation, this was not the first 
time that the City of Dakar posed street vending as an urban problem. During the colonial 
era, authorities understood disorderly markets as a public health threat (Betts, 1971; 
Goerg, 1998). As a result, the law has officially prohibited selling on city streets since 
1967 and the police intermittently enforce this law today at the discretion of local politi-
cians. Post-independence, this emerged again as a problem in which vagabonds, walk-
ing vendors, beggars, and people with disabilities were termed “human congestion” and 
“human garbage” (Collignon, 1984). For nearly a century, municipal officials have impris-
oned traders and demolished and set fire to market stalls. And although these tech-
niques began in the colonial period, they continue to this day.  
 
However, since independence the City of Dakar has introduced a new set of tech-
niques for governing the market, beginning with amendments to the law in the 1970s 
and 80s that permitted certain classes of trader to obtain weekly permits from public 
authorities. In 2007, street vendors rioted in response to municipal demolitions, and sub-
sequently organized over a dozen associations to voice their interests to the state. In 
response, public authorities developed a new approach to governing the market that 
sought to accommodate, rather than prohibit or banish street vending in the city 
(Dankoco & Brown, 2017). Street vendors today often look nostalgically upon this time 
in which Abdoulaye Wade, then President of Senegal, offered material upgrades to many 
of the city’s urban markets. For this, he gained the title “president of the informal” among 
vendors and remained widely popular even after the end of his term in 2012.  
 
Modernizing the Market 
 
The Félix Éboué commercial center introduced an entirely new approach to governing 
the street market. The City of Dakar partnered with a private firm to plan, build, and 
operate a commercial center in which to relocate thousands of street vendors. This mar-
ket building was unlike any that had been constructed in Senegal before. It was the 
largest of its kind, boasting four stories of market stalls, modern toilets, parking, office 
space for vendor associations, and a spectacular view of the city skyline from the roof. 
By comparison, many of the existing market buildings were either old colonial-era market 
halls—some quite beautiful and classified as world heritage sites—and others nothing 
more than concrete slab, single story storefronts. Like the new commercial center, these 
old buildings housed small-scale, cash-based businesses: vendors who sold vegeta-
bles, fruit, fish, grains and other food items, alongside used clothing, collared shirts, cou- 
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Figure 4.2 Interior of Félix Éboué Commercial Center 
Photo by Author 
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nterfeit football jerseys, used auto-parts, and jewelry. In other words, they housed Da-
kar’s popular economy, the often undocumented and untaxed commercial exchange in 
which most Senegalese access commercial goods and their livelihoods.  
 
Although officials branded the building as the new home of Dakar’s street mar-
kets, it was also stylized as a modern commercial center—a shopping mall. This was a 
significant aesthetic departure from the market buildings that preceded it. The new cen-
ter shared the minimalist concrete and steel infrastructure of the old buildings, but it 
drastically increased the scale of the architecture and, with it, the symbolic meaning of 
the building itself. In the preceding decade, Dakar had finally received its first large-scale, 
modern shopping malls. The most famous and luxurious of which, Sea Plaza, sits prom-
inently the city’s recently constructed corniche, just adjacent to the high-end Radisson 
Blu hotel, and offers stunning views of the teal waters and black volcanic rock of Dakar’s 
West African coastline.  
 
Similar shopping malls had been constructed throughout the city with varying 
success, like the mostly vacant Central Park commercial center which now houses Sen-
egal’s national archives, several call centers, used electronics stores, and assorted of-
fices spaces for industrial enterprises. Indeed, like Central Park and Sea Plaza, the new 
commercial center also aimed for the iconic status of the American-style shopping mall. 
However, unlike these commercial center contemporaries, the new building did not have 
an English language name. Instead, it donned a distinctly Black and French heritage: it 
was named after Félix Éboué, the first Black Frenchmen to climb the ranks of the colonial 
administration. Born in French Guiana, Éboué went on to become a colonial Governor in 
territories across the Caribbean and West Africa, and his ashes are today housed in the 
Panthéon in Paris.  
 
The Félix Éboué Commercial Center offered an aspirational vision for the urban 
market. It blended the global status of the American shopping mall with an undeniably 
Black namesake of the French Republic. In this sense, the commercial center re-config-
ured the symbolic meaning of the urban market. It would no longer be the messy, dan-
gerous, and cacophonous marketplace that was every day taking over more and more 
of Dakar’s public thoroughfares. It would instead be a clean, planned, and modern alter-
native. Indeed, the city’s intention for the building was to clear away this growing market 
from the city streets. Two markets were the key sites of intervention.  
 
The first, Marsé Sandaga, is Dakar’s most famous street market. Sandaga is a 
sprawling market located in the center of downtown Dakar not far from the presidential 
palace, and it is centered around a large, empty colonial-era market building. The build-
ing caught fire—or was set fire, as many vendors argue—in 2013, and several years later 
was uninhabitable and surrounded by market stalls, makeshift tables, and an endless 
stream of walking vendors (marchands ambulants). The second market, Marsé Pederson, 
is similarly iconic. It is not centered around an historic market building, but blends seam-
lessly into the city’s largest informal bus station, Gare Pederson, which services thou-
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sands of daily commuters from the city center to the suburbs (banlieues) of Pikine, Gue-
diawaye, and Rufisque. There is not a single Dakarois family that has not frequented one 
of these two markets and many do so regularly. They are, in many respects, two of the 
most central locations in the public life of the city. And the Félix Éboué Commercial Cen-
ter promised a new and modern and iconic home for these commercial hearts of Dakar.  
 
Inclusion and Co-optation of Vendors 
 
Vendors’ refusal to relocate came as a surprise to governmental officials. Beyond its 
aesthetic symbolism, the building also gained recognition for the political process 
through which the City of Dakar planned and financed the relocation. The program 
lauded itself as a political success for its active inclusion of vendors’ associations in the 
design of the new commercial center and the planning of the relocation. In contrast to 
the common practice of demolishing informal markets and arresting illegal walking ven-
dors, the program offered a participatory and gradual transition to formal commercial 
housing. Vendor associations, particularly the Syndicat des Marchands dits Ambulant 
(Walking Vendors Union, SYMAD), were included in the planning process. And this plan-
ning process figured as a crucial component of international support for the program. 
Indeed, the inclusion of vendors was a condition of its funding. The Bill & Melinda Gates 
Foundation and the ONE Campaign financially supported the City of Dakar and SYMAD 
to carry out this “pro-poor” approach to street market relocation. Bono—the lead singer 
from the rock band U2 and face of the ONE Campaign—had even visited SYMAD’s office 
in Sandaga, which was a big deal to everyone involved. Vendors and their associations 
were included in the process of relocation: they participated in the design of the building 
and they conducted the census with which market stalls were allocated to vendors.  
 
Rather than relying solely on demolition, policing, evictions, or material upgrades 
of the existing market, the program introduced a large new building, coordinated reloca-
tion, political participation, and self-financing. The Mayor of Dakar at the time, Khalifa 
Sall, made a global name for himself as a modernizing force in municipal management. 
He climbed the ranks of urban policy experts and had recently been appointed as the 
President of the Africa division of the United Cities and Local Governments. As both a 
cause and effect of his meteoric rise, Sall had forged a relationship with the Bill & Melinda 
Gates foundation whose pro-market solutions to urban poverty offered a novel and dis-
tinctly American approach to development. The Gates foundation funded an in-house 
financial team at the City of Dakar to shepherd the City through the issuance of West 
Africa’s first municipal bonds. And although the bond would never be issued, the City 
nevertheless spent years planning for it.  
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Figure 4.3 Sandaga Market After the Fires 
Photo by Author 
 
Officials at the City of Dakar originally proposed a parking garage downtown, 
which would provide a reliable revenue stream and address the problem of traffic con-
gestion. But the Gates Foundation required that the bonds finance a “pro-poor” project, 
and the team decided to finance a second commercial center for street vendors, even 
more modern and extravagant than the first. Its proposed location was directly adjacent 
to Félix Éboué on a lot owned by the well-known international advocacy organization, 
Environment and Development in the Third World. Although dozens of Dakar residents 
had built a small settlement on this lot, the City demolished these homes in anticipation 
of the second market building which, subsequently, was never built. Félix Éboué and this 
proposed center were not linked financially. Where the second center was tied to the 
anticipated project bond, Félix Éboué was financed by a private company, MADS, who 
had partnered with the City of Dakar to build, operate, and manage the building. MADS 
specialized in the modernization of street markets, and their primary service is providing 
tents for bi-weekly markets across Dakar. Although MADS framed their involvement with 
the City of Dakar as a public-private partnership, it was MADS alone who built, financed, 
and would eventually operate the Félix Éboué commercial center.  
 
The “public” aspect of this public-private partnership was the City’s management 
of the relocation program. With support from the Bill & Melinda Gates foundation, the 
City of Dakar established a new agency, la Direction des Halles et Marchés (Hall and 
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Market Management), to oversee the enumeration of vendors, their registration for 
spaces in new market buildings, and the final relocation process itself. Halles et Marchés 
consisted of only several employees based at the City of Dakar’s Direction des Services 
Techniques (Technical Services Department), a catch-all department which housed the 
budget office alongside road maintenance staff.  
 
This small office could not manage the entire relocation process itself, but the 
program was required to have an element of street vendor participation. For this role, 
the Syndicat des Marchands dits Ambulants (Walking Vendors Union, SYMAD) would 
play a double role in representing street vendors in the participatory relocation process. 
First, SYMAD had a seat at the table and represented vendors in the design and planning 
of the building itself. According to SYMAD organizers, MADS presented them with a 
proposal for the layout, location, and price of the building to which the association of-
fered their input. Second, SYMAD worked with Halles et Marchés to conduct a census 
and create a numerical representation of vendors. Vendors that were registered in this 
census were given priority allocation of space in the commercial center.  
 
SYMAD organizers took great pride in the work they had done for this program. 
In their small, open-air office on the second floor of a building in the center of Sandaga, 
they prominently displayed the census figures, photographs, and publicity they had re-
ceived over the years for their participation in the program. One representative took great 
pleasure in rattling off their statistics of the market, even arguing that their numbers were 
more accurate than the municipality which had severely underestimated the number of 
vendors in Dakar. Bono’s visit was a great point of pride to the association, and they 
kept his photo prominently displayed in the office. But Bono’s visit also symbolized a 
betrayal to SYMAD organizers. Although the ONE Campaign and the Gates Foundation 
had once offered financial support, SYMAD felt they had been left organized and in-
cluded, but totally broke. They were constantly searching for new sources of funding, 
and became disillusioned with their participation in the program. They pointed to their 
office’s state of disrepair and their single, virus-ridden computer as emblematic of this 
failure of support.   
 
SYMAD was charged with a nearly impossible task: counting and organizing the 
needs of a highly mobile, floating population into a fixed set of demands to represent in 
the process of relocation. Although SYMAD is one of the largest associations in the mar-
ket, it struggled to achieve this double role of representation. Many association members 
felt that they themselves had been excluded from their own participatory process, and 
that the market stalls were now smaller and more expensive than what they agreed to in 
the participatory process. To these vendors, the final form of the Félix Éboué commercial 
center came as a surprise. And in the wake of its construction, SYMAD representatives 
continued to meet regularly with city officials to negotiate down the price of the stalls. 
These negotiations frequently succeeded and, for a short time, use of the building was 
offered for free.  
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Many vendors outside the association, however, thought SYMAD had simply 
been co-opted by the state. SYMAD organizers wore suits, set up and held meetings on 
time, passed out printed business cards, wrote publications for a global audience, and, 
in the words of one vendor, “ate too much money”—a common euphemism for corrup-
tion. SYMAD, in other words, was caught between severely limited decision-making 
power in the relocation program and an increasing distrust from vendors in the market. 
Nevertheless, SYMAD had one notable success: they negotiated with the City to set up 
temporary relocation tents in several vacant lots in downtown Dakar, not far from the 
heart of Sandaga. Officials in Halles et Marchés conceived of these temporary markets 
as a transition towards a permanent location in the Félix Éboué commercial center.  
 
The markets were housed in large, white tents each covering hundreds of vendors 
selling mostly clothing and, for some, small wooden objets d’art. SYMAD had a constant 
presence, but vendors largely managed the tents themselves. Each vendor had a large 
table, and the vendors collectively paid to supply electricity to dozens of lightbulbs and 
small fans, hire wrestlers as security guards to protect their merchandise in the evenings, 
and employ an entire kitchen of cooks who made amazing ceebu jën (fish and rice) for 
lunch. Vendors also organized the collection of small cash payments of the tent’s col-
lective taxes, rent, and utilities. Many of the vendors were keen to keep the tent as a 
permanent home for the market. The Lebanese owner of the lot offered to sell for 
3,000,000 fCFA, but the City was not willing to purchase the lot on behalf of the vendors 
who could not collect enough money to pay. Vendors enjoyed the tent’s affordability and 
prime location and, in their view, they had already paid more than enough in fees over 
the past two years to purchase the lot. They agreed to stay in the tents temporarily. But 
after two pleasant years in these provisional tents, vendors had little interest in relocating 
to a ridiculously expensive building all the way across town.  
 
Although street vendors remained at arm’s length from the municipal government, 
they were not bereft of bureaucracy. They embraced the formal paperwork with which 
they recorded their census, paid their taxes, and paid their monthly bills. Formal paper-
work is an important field of politics (Hull, 2012). But this was not the most central con-
cern for most vendors engaged in the relocation and, to them, informality was not a 
meaningful political category. One SYMAD organizer even refused to use the term “in-
formal”, arguing that “popular economy” more accurately described market life. Ven-
dors’ livelihoods were at stake in the relocation, not the formality of their business prac-
tices. And in this respect, fiscal participation in the relocation program challenged ven-
dors’ ability to make a living in the city. It also transformed their political relationship to 
the state: they were no longer a marginalized, floating population excluded from state 
decision-making power. Instead, they became the central source of political and mone-
tary value on which the relocation program crucially depended. The program’s promise 
of political inclusion garnered the support of international development organizations, 
and its longevity depended exclusively on the voluntary relocation and payment of user-
fees by the city’s walking street vendors.  
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Relocation and Revenues  
 
Echoing the World Bank reports, municipal officials in Dakar claimed that congestion 
was decreasing productivity in Dakar’s urban economy and that vendors were a cause—
not as an effect—of this congestion. But street vendors have a very different understand-
ing of the public value of the urban street: it is a resource with which to make marginal 
gains in the bustling urban economy. Many vendors themselves aspired to have brick 
and mortar shops away from the hot streets of downtown, but could not afford the rent 
if they were removed from the street, immobilized, and prohibited from searching out 
clients on the street. Most vendors were not concerned with their access to formal bu-
reaucracy or political participation. But they were deeply concerned with advancing their 
livelihoods in the market. Fiscal participation presented a kind of paradox for vendors’ 
livelihoods: it crucially depended on the monetary payments that the relocation itself 
would render nearly impossible.  
 
Although SYMAD organizers engaged in an extended dispute over the price of 
the building, most vendors simply and privately refused to relocate. Take, for example, 
Oumar, a walking street vendor who sold second-hand clothing near Sandaga. I first met 
Oumar early on in my fieldwork, and would return to him for insight on the market over 
the course of several years. Oumar was a lively, jovial, and insightful vendor who had 
strong opinions on what was happening in the market. He had been a street vendor for 
most his adult life and was introduced to the profession later in life, after having studied 
courses in maritime trade at the national university in Dakar. I was introduced to Oumar 
on several different occasions by several different vendors. I started my inquiry into the 
market by chatting and walking around with the young men who would approach me on 
the street as a customer. Once it became clear that I was more interested in asking 
questions about the market than I was in shopping, these young men would often offer 
to take me elsewhere to discuss the market with other vendors together as a group. And 
in many of these surprise focus groups, I found myself led back to Oumar. It became 
clear to me that these young men understood Oumar as a kind of spokesperson: he was 
eloquent, educated, and confident enough to shout at foreigners (like me) in French. I 
was led to Oumar, in other words, as an authoritative voice on vendors’ concerns.  
 
Although Oumar identified as a walking vendor, he had a small table in the back 
of one of the City’s temporary tents. Oumar is a hard-nosed negotiator and had been an 
incisive critic of the relocation plan from start. In the tent, he made less money than on 
the street. Instead of actively searching for clients, he passively waited in the back of the 
tent. For a client to reach him, they had to pass by dozens of other vendors selling similar 
items. Like many other vendors, Oumar paid small commissions to young guides who 
sought out potential customers on the street and brought them directly to Oumar if they 
were looking for a modestly priced collared shirt. On top of the costs of maintaining and 
managing the tent, these payments cut into his profits. Oumar disliked the tent for this 
reason but not as much as he disliked fines and harassment from the police, and he 
reluctantly agreed to relocate.     
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Oumar, like all the vendors in the tent, were expected to eventually move into the 
Félix Éboué Commercial Center. SYMAD had counted them in their census, offered them 
a spot in one of these temporary tents and, as a result, promised preferential placement 
in the new building. However, vendors stayed in the temporary tents for over two years. 
Oumar, in many respects, had gained a special status in this new community. Most ven-
dors affectionately referred to him as “the president”, even though he held no formal title 
in any of the vendor associations. Rejecting formal organizations, Oumar was “with the 
people” and took great pleasure in openly insulting wealthy elites and foreigners who 
passed by in air-conditioned cars, who wore fancy watches, and who flew their wealth 
on airplanes out of Senegal. Oumar, like any good negotiator, enjoyed a convivial yet 
ruthless critique of basically everything existing (and I was no exception!). The tent ob-
viously cut into his profits. But it also offered the shade, security, community, and good 
ceebu jën that he could not easily find out in the hot sun of the sidewalk.  
 
After two years, vendors had created a small community of colleagues and a hos-
pitable working environment for themselves. But the tent was never intended to be per-
manent. Vendors never knew when—or if—the City would follow through on the next 
phase of relocation. In 2016, the City finally gave notice that the building was complete 
and that they were expected to relocate. But most refused. Oumar and his colleagues 
insisted that the building was not suitable. In a meeting with a sales representative at the 
commercial center, he and several other vendors held stern gazes, crossed their arms, 
and only spoke to denounce the high cost and poor location the building. The sales rep 
countered that they had already addressed these concerns by extending the payment 
plan from 24 to 30 months, which included a less expensive monthly rate. The City of 
Dakar, he pointed out, had even agreed to subsidize it. Nevertheless, the vendors re-
fused to engage. They threw their arms in the air and stormed out of the office. 
 
Leaving the office, Oumar insisted on studying the site. The Félix Éboué commer-
cial center was only about one hundred meters from a main thoroughfare and a heavily 
trafficked roundabout. This junction was well-known in the city and was a stone’s throw 
from Marsé Pederson. The new building featured a small open-air parking lot, but the 
road connecting it to the roundabout was unpaved, narrow, and often pock-marked with 
large puddles of sewage overflowing from a nearby drain. Trash trucks and horse-drawn 
carts came down the street often, but few pedestrians frequented the various used auto-
parts stores and the money exchange already installed along the side of the road. Many 
of the nearby buildings were empty, and the most vibrant residential settlement in the 
area had recently been demolished in anticipation of a second commercial center, leav-
ing in its wake an expansive pile of rubble on top of which several families had recon-
structed their homes. This small, quiet road was the central access point to the bustling 
thoroughfare. There was a second entrance, but it was blocked off by a large red barri-
cade that was, presumably, operated by a security guard. To access the building, Oumar 
pointed out, a client would have to either walk through the sewage or pass through the 
blockades. This was a bad design.  
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Figure 4.4 Small Market Stalls in Félix Éboué 
Photo by Author 
 
 
Figure 4.5 Oumar’s Critique, A Blocked Route to Félix Éboué  
Photo by Author 
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The building itself is a monolith. Its stark white concrete walls and imposing com-
pound aesthetic dwarfed all its adjacent buildings, giving the impression that it had 
simply been dropped on the site like a pneumatic shopping mall. Although it was mar-
keted as a modern commercial center, the construction was quite simple. Like most 
buildings in Dakar, it was built from concrete that had likely been mixed, poured, molded 
into bricks, dried, stacked, and smoothed out all on site. But unlike the buildings nearby, 
it is massive. Most streets surrounding the center are not paved, but are instead a dusty 
negative space between buildings common to new neighborhoods in Dakar. Four stories 
of market floor provide around 3,000 market stalls, the most expensive of which faced 
outward off the open-air balconies. The market stalls themselves vary in size and con-
struction. Some were built into the concrete walls of the building itself, with large metal 
shutters that could roll down and lock in the evening when most vendors would commute 
home out of the city. But most stalls are small metal structures, covering about two 
square meters of floor space, standing a few meters tall, and are packed tightly across 
each floor of the building except the roof. The metal stalls were painted either bright blue 
or green and welded into parallel horizontal bars on which vendors could hang their 
goods. They also feature a small metal container in which vendors could lock their valu-
ables. Although the bright colors added some levity to an otherwise imposing building, 
most people compared the structure to a prison.  
 
Oumar hated the building. Not only did it represent the waning days of life in the 
tent, but it also posed a potential threat to his income. To buy a shirt from Oumar, he 
noted, you would have to walk through sewage, pass a hundred other market stalls, and 
then decide which boutique to buy from. He had no faith that he would be able to make 
enough income to pay the monthly fees on his market stall, let alone feed his family and 
pay his children’s school fees. He was further angered by the needless redundancy of 
the building: along the busy road to centenaire, he pointed out a large, empty, colonial-
era building overgrown with old palm trees in which the City could have reasonably 
housed the market. Or as an even more obvious solution, he argued, they could simply 
stay in the tent.  
 
But later that year, the City of Dakar demolished Oumar’s tent. The police came 
unexpectedly in the early morning before the vendors had made the long commute into 
town to sell for the day, removing the tent and destroying everything inside of it. Oumar 
returned to his stall that morning and found in its place a giant pile of rubble. His inven-
tory was mixed in with the others and it was impossible to sort out in the wreckage his 
belongings from his colleagues’. What was not destroyed, groups of young men scav-
enged and looted later that evening. The demolition of the tents was one among many 
over the course of the relocation program. As it became increasingly clear to municipal 
officials that vendors were not going to relocate, they returned to the familiar practice of 
demolition and law enforcement.  
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The Limits of Demolition  
 
When I first met Oumar, many of the vendors were talking about an upcoming “ultima-
tum” from the City of Dakar: they either relocate to the building or their markets will be 
destroyed. Some vendors expected that after this demolition, the building would be full 
of vendors. One vendor even secured a prime location in the new building in anticipation 
of the wave of vendors flocking towards its walls. This wave, however, never came. In-
stead, the demolitions carried out by the police were infrequent, poorly enforced, incited 
both resistance and refusal from the vendors subject to this violence. This ultimatum 
created a political situation in Dakar in which the contact between government and street 
traders became increasingly diverse and contradictory: at the same time that the state 
was collecting revenues from vendors, the police were demolishing and setting fire to 
markets, and the city was constructing new buildings for a participatory relocation pro-
gram. Rather than one technique replacing the next, there was instead an accretion of 
contradictory encounters with municipal government. Although fiscal participation was 
a new approach to governing the market, demolitions returned as a governmental re-
sponse to vendors’ refusal of relocation.  
 
One demolition in Marsé Pederson incited a violent confrontation between ven-
dors and the police, followed by a massive street protest and widespread condemnation 
of the City’s actions. This was, in many respects, a revanchist demolition (Smith, 2005). 
The vendors did not consent to payment, and the municipality returned to familiar forms 
of state violence to coerce vendors into relocation. Ousmane called one day to tell me 
that one of the other markets in the city, Marse Pederson, had been demolished just the 
night before. There was, of course, widespread precedent for such demolitions, but 
Ousmane argued this one as particularly egregious, as many vendors had been away 
from the city to celebrate Korité, the end of Ramadan in Senegal, when the market was 
destroyed. I took a cab down to the market, sharing with the cab driver the story of the 
demolition in the hopes of eliciting some shared shock or outrage at the situation. He 
said he had heard the rumors, but he seemed to remain largely unmoved, and instead 
stayed focused on jockeying our way through the afternoon traffic.  
 
We arrived at a starkly empty street, where, just the week before, I could barely 
squeeze through a sea of people, busses, cars, and assorted stalls. And now, the only 
people on the street were half a dozen young soldiers dressed in military fatigues, leaning 
on their rifles and resting in the shade of the large police truck sitting in the center of a 
roundabout nearby. I, for one, stood shocked out in the middle of the empty street, while 
my cab driver seemed to remain nonplussed, seated quietly behind the wheel of his car. 
I got back in the taxi and tried one more time to connect with him about the scene, 
suggesting that, at the very least, a very big change had occurred. Finally, as we pulled 
away, he responded with a surprising mix of disdain and relief: “Now,” he said, “it is like 
a normal street, without all those people, where you can actually drive a car!” 
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Figure 4.6 Marsé Pederson After the Demolitions 
Photo by Author 
 
This market—Marsé Pederson—had existed in Dakar for at least thirty years: a 
friend and lifetime resident of Dakar took me to the market one day and noted that he 
remembered it well from his childhood. He grew up in the suburbs of Dakar and often 
traveled into the city with his mother to shop in the markets. Pederson is organized 
around a large regional bus station that, today, is bursting at the seams. The Friday be-
fore Korité, Pederson was packed, large white buses coming in and out, packed side by 
side with hardly enough space to fit your shoulders between them. In finding our way 
across the station and the market, we had to zig zag across buses and market stalls, 
and it was hard to see if there were actually any permanent structures in the market. The 
mass of market stalls soon broke way to a clean line of boutiques leading to a rounda-
bout. Stacked side by side on both curbs of the street were tall boutiques, filled with 
small, bright jewelry, women’s dresses, and young men shouting prices loudly and 
quickly into microphones. Although there was a small, two-story market building at the 
center of the bus station, it was calm by contrast: it housed only an assortment of me-
chanics and auto-part stores to service buses, an occasional tailor, and more than a few 
closed doors. From the calm of the building’s terrace, it was clear that the station and 
the market had blended into one massive and thriving crowd of daily commerce. Return-
ing to the market after Korité, the streets were empty and the vendors’ stalls reduced to 
rubble. 
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Figure 4.7 Settlement Demolition in Preparation for New Market Building 
Photo by Author 
 
Demolition in Dakar is carried out by the national and the municipal police. But it 
is the Mayor’s office in the City of Dakar and the Mayor’s office in the Commune of 
Plateau that can issue the order for demolition. The police come when the market is 
relatively empty—in the very early morning or during a religious holiday—to minimize 
confrontation with vendors. While the national police are equipped with trucks, M16s, 
and full riot gear, the municipal police have nothing. They are a “volunteer” police force 
of citizens who are paid a small monthly stipend—the equivalent income of home secu-
rity guard—and are responsible for, among other tasks, the cleaning of streets and the 
management of circulation in Dakar’s public thoroughfares. Although the national police 
use large trucks to bulldoze market stalls, many of the municipal police simply use their 
hands, feet, and, at times, machetes to chop apart the small wooden structures that 
constitute the market.  
 
Street vendors often refer to such demolitions as “déguerpissements”, which is a 
term used in francophone West Africa to connote a form of violent eviction. The term is 
a pejorative and its usage in Dakar first emerged to describe the forceful eviction of the 
Lébu during the founding and construction of colonial Dakar at the end of the 19th cen-
tury. The term and the practice associated with it have persisted ever since. And alt-
hough such demolitions are incredibly violent and obviously destructive, there is often 
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minimal physical injury to vendors themselves, even ones that are present to protest the 
demolition. In the case of the demolition of Marché Pederson, there was also a significant 
portion of the market that was set fire. Although the police claim that the vendors set fire 
to the market as a defensive strategy, the vendors countered that it was the police who 
set fire as an offensive strategy. The Municipal Police Commissioner was quite proud 
that the demolition had been carried out with minimal harm to vendors, claiming that 
they never fired a bullet, save for the few warning shots he fired into the air with a small 
rubber bullet gun he had brought to the demolition.   
 
Yet Dakar’s police did not have the material resources to sustain such enforce-
ment. The demolitions themselves lasted no longer than a morning, and police were 
never able to destroy a market entirely. Once the last police truck stopped standing 
guard at Marsé Pederson, for example, vendors rebuilt their shops and the market re-
turned within weeks. In Dakar, demolitions are not a persistent or widespread operation. 
Instead, they are irregular and focus on only small and specific parts of markets. Demo-
litions come at the request of Mayors and are carried out by the national and municipal 
police. For Marché Pederson, this demolition was the first in a series across several years 
in which the Mayors of the City of Dakar and the Commune of Plateau were attempting 
to pressure vendors into following through on their participatory relocation program. Alt-
hough the building was complete and constructed, few vendors had moved into the 
building and the majority elected to continue selling on the streets and sidewalks.  
 
A Quiet Escape 
 
Most street vendors in Dakar refused to relocate to the newly constructed commercial 
centers. Yet there were always a handful of vendors who had voluntarily chosen to take 
up a spot in the building. Of the 4,000 places in the building there were never more than 
a couple doze occupied at any one time. Some vendors clustered towards the front of 
the building where their merchandise would be more visible, but many others purchased 
the less expensive places higher up and further back in the building, almost entirely out 
of sight. Although a minority, there was this handful of vendors who moved themselves 
into the building, both before and after the demolitions in the markets. Far from refusing 
fiscal participation or relocation, these vendors actively included themselves in the pro-
cess: they registered for a stall, they paid the down payment, and went on to pay the 
monthly user fees. But rather than improving their performance in the market, these ven-
dors used the buildings to escape it. They were hedge against impending demolitions or 
simply taking a break from the fierce competition and hot sun of Dakar’s urban markets.   
 
Maliq, a marchand ambulant and friend of Oumar, had purchased a place right on 
the front balcony overlooking the entrance. Maliq was often asleep in the shade of his 
market stall. The building was always empty and quiet, far from the bustle and noise of 
Marché Pederson, and Malik took advantage of the relative tranquility that the market 
provided.  Maliq, a middle-aged man, had been a marchand ambulant for 14 years and 
the building offered a way to improve his life, to have a boutique that was all his own, to 
have amenities not available in the street market, a secure place to keep his things, and 
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regular shade to escape the mid-day sun. In this respect, Maliq was an ideal tenant for 
the building, and he took great pride what he envisioned as the future of urban markets 
in the city. With Maliq, I toured every floor, now nearly empty, and he showed me the 
different sizes and types of market stalls, the free and well-kept bathrooms, and even 
the view from the roof from which I could see into downtown Dakar, a nearby mosque 
jutting out into the city skyline and, of course, Marché Pederson just a few short blocks 
away. It was clearly an impressive sight, but especially for vendors who had spent dec-
ades down on the streets and rarely had the chance to take a birds-eye view of Dakar. 
Maliq’s tour was markedly different from Oumar’s: rather than a critical rebuke of the 
building, Maliq offered an easy pride and optimism in its future.  
 
Maliq showed me some photos of this view that he took on his iPhone, along with 
a wealth of photos of his children, wife, and extended family who seemed happy and 
healthy and well-dressed. He tried to send me the photos, but the internet had long 
stopped working on his phone which his brother-in law had purchased for him some 
time ago. Maliq couldn’t afford to replace the iPhone, but his brother continued to send 
money back from Italy to help support the extended family, to keep the school fees paid 
and to put food on the family table. Maliq’s life differed greatly from the other vendors 
around him, and other vendors made note of this. He was not making any money in the 
commercial center, and he was not at all stressed about making new sales. He was, in 
many respects, comfortable: he had a financially supportive extended family that pro-
vided the means for his slow life in the building. While others were struggling to make 
enough money for rent and food, Maliq was living a relatively comfortable respite from 
market life. Yet few vendors could feasibly embrace the relocation like Maliq, and were 
instead met with the widespread and everyday challenges of eking out a living as a 
marchand ambulant.  
 
Although the most vendors in Sandaga and Pederson markets privately refused 
to relocate to the Félix Éboué commercial center, other vendors sustained a different 
kind of refusal. In the case of a similar commercial center in the downtown market of 
Kermel, vendors publicly criticized their own new market building and engaged in an 
extended negotiation with municipal authorities over the terms of their relocation. Similar 
to the critiques of Félix Éboué, these vendors criticize the size and price of the market 
stalls. Although they participated in the design of the building, they also claim that the 
plans they approved were significantly different from what was built. The table vendors 
in Kermel, for example, have similarly stalled their negotiations with the government and 
the private operators and similarly refused to relocate to new market building.  
 
Unlike the marchands ambulants, however, these vendors are marchands tabliers 
and they have a prior legal claim to their location: in response to a fire in the historic 
building of Marché Kermel, these vendors were relocated by the municipal government 
into small plots of land directly adjacent to the building. Although the inside of the build-
ing was renovated as a large fruit and vegetable market, the vendors who sell artisanal—
and mass produced—art objects still sell in the auto-constructed stalls on the adjacent 
plots of land. But their relocation is not private and passive. Instead, they have organized 
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a public refusal—more akin to a strike or a boycott—as part of formal negotiations with 
the government. They stage protests, they negotiate in monthly meetings via their asso-
ciation, and they are organized and outspoken critics of the building. This small group of 
vendors began with political inclusion and have sustained it over time as a technique to 
retain control over their vending space. As such, their refusal to relocate takes a public 
and procedural form, as a part of—and not a rejection of—their political inclusion.  
 
Vendors’ various positions in relation to political authority are diverse, and this 
public refusal of the marchands tabliers at Kermel underscores the specificity of the pri-
vate refusal of the marchands ambulants to relocate to Félix Éboué. The vendors at Ker-
mel are not subject to the demolitions elsewhere in the city and they have an important 
point of legal leverage in their negotiations with the municipal government. They work in 
a highly trafficked and well-known market for tourists and do not need to circulate in the 
streets to find clients. Their fees and taxes have long been fixed in negotiations with the 
municipal government and they have a small an organized association that has long 
advocated for their interests. These vendors are a different kind of community than ven-
dors elsewhere in the city: they are small, geographically defined, and have legal author-
ization for their self-built structures. Marchands ambulants, by definition, lack such struc-
tures, have no authorization to vend, and are and are a large, geographically dispersed 
group often in competition for clients in the market. As such, they are often subject to 
demolitions and few have the means to secure the material structures and formal au-
thorizations vendors have in Kermel. Instead, marchands ambulants able to remove 
themselves from vending on the street must participate in other kinds of income gener-
ating activities. Malik, for example, was able to secure a place in Félix Éboué only be-
cause of the financial support from his extended family. Many marchands ambulants lack 
such support and are unable to escape the vagaries of revanchist demolitions in the 
market.  
 
Refusing a Fiscal Contract  
 
In the years after the tent’s demolitions, the vendors in Oumar’s tent were unable to 
rebuild. And the lot which formerly housed their temporary tent remained vacant and 
enclosed. Hastily constructed concrete walls blocked vendors from setting up shop 
again, although several vendors used the walls themselves to display art for sale to tour-
ists. Oumar and many of the other vendors in the tent simply moved back across the 
street to a small corner where they worked in the years before the temporary tent, and 
they continued their daily practice of evading the police. They did not join the union, they 
did not join in protests, and they especially did not relocate into the commercial center. 
One vendor took a construction job in Louga. Another started his own cafeteria in Yoff. 
Several vendors who remained negotiated an agreement with the owner of a nearby 
currency exchange. He allowed them space to store and sell their goods in exchange for 
guarding his parking space and taking care of his stylish black Peugeot. 
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Figure 4.8 Concrete Wall Blocking the Former Site of the Temporary Tent 
Photo by Author 
 
Oumar remained an unwavering and incisive critic of the relocation plan. He en-
joyed shouting, “you can’t eat roads!” a common critique among vendors. He even went 
beyond these popular critiques to craft his own telling limerick about the whole situation 
“les rues sont propres, mais ils sont vides nos ventres” (the streets are clean, but our 
bellies are empty). There is a saying in Dakar that every street vendor has in his heart a 
tiny cafeteria. In other words, vendors have a desire for permanent structures, formal 
registration, and professional advancement. But this kind of business overhead is not 
only a luxury, it poses a challenge to the market-making strategies of an itinerant street 
vendor. Oumar wanted his own boutique, but he simply did not have the means to pay 
for it. He is exemplary of the many street vendors who aspire to have the security of their 
own boutique, but often lack the money to make regularized payments for commercial 
space. The tent offered a potential solution—an affordable alternative not far from po-
tential clients—but its demolition pushed the vendors back onto the free and publicly 
accessible street.  
 
Street vending remains illegal in Dakar. And for Oumar, this was insulting. Unlike 
the masses of Senegalese who fled the country, he argued, Oumar had never taken the 
long trip by pirogue across the Mediterranean. Instead, he stayed and he worked and he 
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contributed to his country and is a positive example of civic comportment (civisme) in 
Senegal. Oumar views this labor as a prayer, as a demonstration of his commitment to 
Islam and to his religious brotherhood. And he similarly views this labor as a civic con-
tribution, the means through which he takes part in and makes claims to Senegalese 
citizenship. But the relocation, demolition, and policing of street vendors makes evident 
that his vision of citizenship is not shared by the governing elite. Oumar, in other words, 
offers up a vision of the public value of the urban street in terms of entrepreneurial and 
civic comportment (civisme), but not the calculated costs of congestion. Decades of so-
cial movement activism in Dakar have established cleanliness as a public—and reli-
gious—value of the urban environment (Diouf, 1992; Fredericks, 2013). And Oumar re-
sents that the municipal government continues to treat him like garbage in a city to which 
he has dedicated his life and work.  
 
One day after the demolition, Oumar and I drank spiced coffee from a wheeled 
Nescafé cart in front of the currency exchange. After finishing his drink, he took the small, 
tan, plastic coffee cup, held it triumphantly up in the air and shouted, “Watch! I don’t pay 
taxes and I throw my trash in the street. There is no civisme here!” Oumar had refused 
his city’s citizenship.  
 
*** 
 
What is political about this refusal of fiscal participation? Vendors fought back during 
demolitions, many took to the streets in protest, and the swarm of vendors’ associations, 
advocates, and activists in Dakar have made meaningful advances in the legitimacy of 
working life on the city’s streets. There is no doubt that this style of politics is effective 
and profoundly necessary. But most vendors did not form a conscious and collective 
opposition to the relocation, they did not resist in solidarity with their representative as-
sociations, and most did not engage in a sustained dialogue with municipal officials. 
Instead, they voiced their disagreement by quiet non-compliance, by ignoring the whole 
absurd situation altogether. Vendors did not only resist relocation. They refused it. 
 
Resistance is the conscious act of opposition to a social dominance and hierarchy 
(Seymour, 2006). Refusal, by contrast, flat out rejects this whole situation and challenges 
the assumption that there is a hierarchy in the first place (McGranahan, 2016). By ab-
staining from public debate, refusal challenges the necessity of the bourgeois public 
sphere and “rejects the idea that one must speak through one’s citizenship” (Weiss, 
2016: 357). Most vendors privately refused participation in state planning. And the mu-
nicipal state, for its part, could not oblige or violently coerce vendors into fiscal partici-
pation. Indeed, the premise of the program was voluntary, and there were simply not 
enough resources or political will to enforce laws, demolish markets, and force consent. 
As one municipal official pointed out, it was just not possible to arrest all the illegal ven-
dors in Dakar, even if he wanted to. And vendors simply had no need for this whole 
program of relocation in the first place. After the demolitions, they waited for the police 
to leave, returned to their places on the sidewalks and streets, and took up market life 
again much as it was before. Their refusal is not abstention from the political. Instead, 
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this refusal is political: it is a disagreement over the whole situation itself, a dispute over 
who and what is included in the common interest, and a rejection of the consensus-
based negotiations among the various representatives of that common collective 
(Rancière, 2004). 
 
Street vendors’ refusal reveals a profound consequence of consensus-based 
planning. The program did not produce a sustained agreement among the parties in-
volved in the planning process, and it certainly did not realize the plan that this collective 
put forth. Indeed, the program was a failure of participatory planning in most respects. 
The vendors’ associations and most individual vendors themselves felt excluded from 
this participatory process whose “pro-poor” focus was mostly a bureaucratic require-
ment of the Gates Foundation. This confirms the critique that such institutional forms of 
participation act as a patina of legitimization for highly unequal development projects 
(Cooke and Kothari, 2001). But in a surprising way, the failure of the relocation program 
reveals a distinct success of fiscal participation: it transformed vendors’ political capac-
ities in relation to the state (Williams, 2004). Fiscal participation provided the conditions 
of possibility for refusal to become a possible and effective act in Dakar’s street market 
relocation program. In this context, vendors gained the power of disruption—the with-
drawal of a contribution on which others depend—and successfully used this position 
to voice their disagreement with the basic premise of the whole plan.  
 
There was, of course, no uniform political response shared by all vendors in Da-
kar—some participated in the census and the plan, debated the price of the stalls, pub-
licly denounced the demolitions, and some made direct appeals to elected officials to 
improve their lot. In this sense, vendors participated in various forms of politics at once, 
many of which are contradictory in their practices and aims. For example, vendors’ as-
sociations make an active contribution to Dakar’s bourgeois public sphere. But vendors 
also broker very different arrangements with the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, 
negotiating directly with the—often private—institutions and individuals responsible for 
the provision of public and infrastructural services (Anand, 2017; Von Schnitzler, 2016). 
Urban street markets are not a uniform political bloc in any sense, nor do they engage 
in any singular political terrain. Indeed, markets themselves are structured by diverse 
forms of legitimate, hierarchical, and non-state political authorities (Roitman, 1990). And 
the modern African state is only a recent creation, whereas markets have been the cen-
ters of continental exchange for centuries. In this sense, disputes between markets and 
the state may only be marginal sites in the making of West African markets. Indeed, 
vendors’ refusal in Dakar is exemplary of the sustained difficulty with which modern 
states exercise legitimate authority in an age-old market society.   
 
Street vendors and their markets are not only subjected to and subjects of state 
power. The market is not a vulnerable or marginalized institution, but an historically cen-
tral form of public culture and power across West Africa. In this sense, market society is 
durable and not up for grabs. What is at stake in vendors’ refusal, however, is the legiti-
macy and authority of the modern municipal state. Rather than acting as marginalized 
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participants in the renewal and re-assertion of state authority, vendors have had a foun-
dational say in how and where such authority may legitimately be exercised. Vendors’ 
refusal asserts the autonomy of market society from state regulation, and it reveals a 
limit to municipal fiscal authority in Senegal. But, importantly, it also delimits this same 
authority. Vendors’ refusal shapes the conditions of possibility in which municipal states 
in Senegal can legitimately expand and exercise their capacities to secure a changing 
fiscal contract. 
 
This form of fiscal contract is distinct from a tax: it replaces obligatory payment 
with consensual participation. In place of an abstract social contract, there is an actual 
fiscal contract which binds vendors to payment once they agree to its terms. This de-
pendence on voluntary inclusion—and payment—opens the possibility to refuse such a 
contract and to derail governmental intervention altogether. Such a refusal is one way to 
voice disagreement with a governmental definition of public value, and to advance a 
contrasting definition in its place. Vendors’ ongoing refusal of fiscal participation is an 
effective political act that successfully delimits the fiscal authority of one municipal state 
in Dakar. Such refusals have posed—and will continue to pose—significant challenges 
to similar experiments in municipal fiscal authority across the world.  But in Dakar, ven-
dors’ refusal revealed a profound disagreement over the public value of the urban street, 
as well as a novel—and neoliberal—way of voicing such a disagreement. Although the 
building failed to relocate vendors, it succeeded in transforming the problem of commu-
nal government into a question of consumption and contractual payments.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Local Tax, Local Territory 
Communal Authority and a Reputation for Violence 
 
In April of 2015, Dakar’s urban landscape was littered with the remains of a contentious 
battle over revenues. The mayor Mermoz Sacré Cœur, Barthélémy Dias, ordered the 
destruction of dozens of large billboards within his municipal boundaries, arguing that 
the advertising agencies who owned the panels had not paid their taxes. The destruction 
left the commune’s public spaces filled with the mangled metal remains of the billboards, 
some uprooted from their concrete fixtures and toppled over on their side, and others 
simply left in place and torn to pieces. What wasn’t left lying on the side of the road, Dias 
used as payment for the scrap dealers he hired to tear down the billboards. In what 
became known as the “Billboard Affair” (L’Affaire des Panneaux Publicitaires), Dias and 
his staff would sit before the Supreme Court for the civil charges of theft, destruction of 
property, and criminal conspiracy (association des malfaiteurs).  
 
But beyond a judicial debate over civil law on how the commune enforced the 
payment of taxes, the affair also became a referendum on the decentralization reforms 
that recently assigned fiscal authority over advertising taxes to communal governments. 
Local taxes like the advertising tax were at the center of this shift in fiscal decentraliza-
tion. Dias’ violence became the centerpiece of his image as an emerging voice in Sene-
gal’s Socialist Party, and this broader reputation for violence was tightly linked to the 
fiscal authority of the commune itself.   
 
In an open letter defending Dias, one of his supporters argued that the destruction 
was legal, citing the Law 64-51 of 10 July 1964 that authorized all mayors to remove 
billboards that are not up to code (Affaire des Panneaux, 2016). Further, the law outlines 
that any infractions of the law will be punished by a fine of 20,000 to 1 million fCFA ($35-  
113 
	
 
Figure 5.1 Billboard Remains 
Photo by Author 
 
$1,500 USD), up to 6 months in prison for recurring violations, and that local govern-
ments are entitled to order the destruction or removal of advertising posters and equip-
ment. Dias destroyed 123 billboards for the “failure to conform to the applicable rules 
for material,” and used the billboards themselves as payment for those he hired to de-
stroy the panels. Of these billboards, the letter argues that 61 were not authorized, 92 
were declared, and only 4 advertising agencies had respected these codes, receive an 
authorization from the municipality, and were legally permitted to construct their bill-
boards. The rest had done so informally and illegally. And according to the letter, Dias 
was within his legal right to exercise his “power of administrative police” to ensure public 
order, public security, and public cleanliness.  
 
But three advertising agencies took Dias and the commune of Mermoz Sacré-
Cœur to court, suing for 700 million fCFA in damages. The agencies argued that not only 
had the Commune destroyed and stolen their property, but there had also been signifi-
cant damages to their reputation. And in a case of “crossed lawsuits”, Dias himself filed 
a similar suit against the advertising agencies accusing them of slanderous remarks 
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against the mayor (Mansaly, 2015). At first, the lawyers for the advertising agencies de-
manded the annulation of the deliberation of the Municipal Council of Mermoz Sacré-
Cœur 5 February 2015 015/AA/SPA fixing the rate and arrangements of the advertising 
tax. At issue in this municipal code was an entry fee that the commune assigned to the 
tax. The law had long required any public advertisements in the city to be taxed, with 
large billboards paying the normal fee of 20,000 fCFA ($35 USD) per meter squared. The 
law also outlined smaller and fixed taxes for specific kinds of advertisements, such as 
company logos on scooters or vans, tall podiums, and the small directional signs that 
were increasingly taking over the urban landscape. But Dias’ council instituted an entry 
fee that required every new advertising agency pay a flat and one-time fee—in addition 
to the regular tax—for the right to register their advertisements with the commune. This 
was the tax that many of the advertising agencies refused to pay.  
 
It is a common occurrence for agencies to not pay their taxes in full or on time, 
but municipalities had previously taken a different approach to enforcement. Yet instead 
of making a violent display of tearing down and destroying the entire billboard structure, 
the communes simply painted over billboards in arrears with white paint. Communes 
across Senegal use white paint as an enforcement strategy, but Barthélémy Dias was 
different: he made a public display of the violence that undergirded his fiscal authority. 
The destruction of the billboards sparked a legal battle between the commune and the 
advertising agencies that went back and forth for years. And by the end of 2015, the 
supreme court upheld the agencies’ lawsuit, annulling the decision of the Municipal 
Council and invalidating the proposed changes to the advertising tax (Affaire Régie Pub, 
2016). But Dias continued to argue for his innocence, insisting that he had only “de-
stroyed the supports of the embezzlement of public funds illegally implanted within my 
communal borders” (Barthélémy Dias Confirme, 2016) and in doing so, was simply exe-
cuting a municipal code that had been validated by the Prefect of Dakar, the central state 
representative responsible for approving all such municipal ordinances. Dias and his 
supporters accused the advertising agencies of tax evasion, arguing that evasion of the 
advertising tax amounted to an estimated—and outlandish—sum of 80 billion fCFA 
($135 million USD) in the past ten years (Affaire des Panneaux, 2016).  
 
Although the affair became known publicly for its spectacular destruction of the 
urban landscape, also at stake in the affair was the problem of communal authority. What 
revenues did local governments have the legal right to collect? And what are the legiti-
mate means through which a local government could enforce this collection? 
 
Dias turned the legal case on violence into a debate over newly assigned com-
munal rights. The year marked a departure from years past in which advertising agencies 
paid directly with the City of Dakar an annual tax that corresponds to the size of the 
billboard itself. But 2015 was the first year that the decentralization reforms had devolved 
fiscal authority to the communes. Although the law established hundreds of new com-
munes across the country, in Dakar, it had simply added new rights and obligations to 
already existing communes. The Billboard Affair, then, became a referendum on the legal 
rights of communes to create and enforce laws within their communal territories. This 
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debate over communal authority was also a debate about communal revenues. And in 
April of 2016, the court changed its mind, retracting its previous ruling and instead ruling 
in favor of Dias and his commune (le Redacteur, 2016). The judge reviewing the case, 
Mouhamed Fall, argued that “the management of advertising spaces belongs exclusively 
to the local government. Today, the law defined the communes as the exclusive manag-
ers” (Dieme, n.d.). In other words, the commune not only had the legal right to set and 
collect taxes as the Municipal Council saw fit, but Dias also had the right to use violence 
to extract it.  
 
The Billboard Affair is an exemplary contestation over the newly assigned fiscal 
authority of the communes. In the wake of the decentralization reforms, new controver-
sies over communal territories and communal authority erupted across the nation, high-
lighting divergent understandings of the law and prompting a host of new legal battles 
along the lines of the Billboard affair. For many, revenues were at the heart of the prob-
lem. As the reforms had reduced communal reliance on the central state transfer and 
freed the communes to collect their newly assigned revenues, Mayor’s and administra-
tive staff across the country scrambled to make up for their loss in transfers with gains 
in local tax collection. In this novel search for revenues, each commune took its own 
approach: while some hired and trained a fleet of new staff to collect, others filed re-
quests to the central government to increase collection on their behalf, and others, like 
Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, simply created new municipal ordinances that allowed them ac-
cess to a new set of revenues.  
 
What the case of the Billboard Affair demonstrates, however, is that the legal right 
to revenues does not clarify any of the practical aspects of their collection. How, then, 
would a relatively small and under-resourced commune collect a new tax? If the state’s 
authority to collect a tax is upheld by violence, how would a small government with no 
police force ensure enforcement?  
 
Making Territory “Sur le Terrain” 
 
In the wake of the decentralization reforms, communal staff began collecting local taxes 
for which they had no previous right to collect. Although these small taxes were previ-
ously collected by agents from the City of Dakar itself, the decentralization reforms in-
troduced a new set of tax collectors into the urban landscape. This change is significant. 
For many taxpayers, field audits were often the first point of contact with local govern-
ment tax collection. Rather than collecting taxes on behalf of the public, taxpayers often 
perceived tax collectors as working on behalf of the mayor himself. And at the point of 
collection, taxpayers often associated tax payment with the Billboard Affair and the 
Mayor’s reputation for violence. And tax collectors themselves leveraged this fear of vi-
olence to enforce compliance. Tax payers rightly perceived a shift in revenue assignment 
at the point of collection, linking local taxes directly to the broader reputation of the 
Mayor. In the case of Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, the technical administration of local tax col-
lection became tightly linked to the reputation for violence of the Mayor, his supporters, 
and his communal administrators.  
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Figure 5.2 Billboard Image from a Field Audit 
Photo: Tax Administrator at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur 
 
In this chapter I draw on ten months of participant observation with a communal 
tax collection team at the commune of Mermoz Sacré-Cœur. I accompanied tax collec-
tors in their daily work activities, conducting field audits for various local taxes, register-
ing declarations from tax payers in the communal office, and reconciling communal rec-
ords with the central state treasury office. Like in many other communes across Dakar, 
I requested written and formal permission from the Mayor to conduct an interview with 
the municipal secretary, and had to request a similar permission to begin work with the 
tax collection team. Indeed, my participation in communal administration was directly 
dependent on Mayor approval. It was, for example, not possible to work on the local tax 
collection teams at the National Treasury, unless I had specific permission from the doz-
ens of individual Mayors for which the central office collected taxes. So, my participation 
in tax collection was itself an exercise of communal authority: it was up to the Mayor to 
decide who may and who may not work in his administration. And over the course of my 
fieldwork, it became clear that the Mayor was willing to exercise his authority to appoint 
and demote his administrative staff at his discretion, often without explanation30. In this 
sense, affiliation with the Mayor was both a prerequisite for and an everyday experience 
of administrative work in Mermoz Sacré-Cœur. And this was as true for me as it was for 
my colleagues on the tax collection team.  
 
																																																						
30 For this reason, I use pseudonyms for all the administrative staff with which I conducted participant 
observation, and I do not include the time or date of my communication.  
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Although the decentralization reforms legally authorized the communes to collect 
local taxes, it was up to these tax collection teams to transform a legal authorization into 
a real revenue. In participating in this practical administration of revenues, I discovered 
that taxpayers and tax collectors alike perceived the mayor’s reputation for violence as 
an exercise of the communal government’s authority to tax. And the criteria with which 
administrators determined tax obligation often cut along the lines of party affiliation: 
party members would be exempted from paying taxes, and were allocated priority for 
various discretionary expenditures. But the Mayor of Mermoz Sacré-Cœur was more 
than just a prominent member of the Socialist Party, he was a controversial public figure 
in his own right due to his overt and highly visible displays of violence.  
 
This reputation influenced how communal administrators collected taxes, and 
how taxpayers understood their obligation to pay. At times, they outright refused pay-
ment, arguing that the Mayor was a thief and a murderer. But other taxpayers—and the 
tax collectors themselves—did not frame the Mayor’s violence as a ground for refusal. 
Instead, his violent reputation cultivated a fear of retribution that tax collectors leveraged 
to encourage tax compliance. In place of a substantive threat of impersonal state vio-
lence, tax collection was instead upheld by the rumors and reputation of highly person-
alized acts of violence.  
 
Communal authority to collect taxes is limited to the legally recognized bounda-
ries of the commune. Yet within these borders this authority is not exercised evenly 
across space, time or status. Instead, the authority to extract wealth from the urban 
landscape is contingent and uneven. From this perspective, state territory is not only 
defined by its administrative boundaries, but by the circulation of public administrators 
in the urban landscape. This is particularly relevant for a suite of local taxes that are 
brought into local tax nets by field audits: for all taxpayers that do not self-report, it is up 
to tax collectors to locate, bill, and enforce collection. In a city where self-reporting is 
not the norm, most taxpayers are listed on the tax rolls because of these field audits. 
And in conducting these field audits, tax collectors are put into contact—and often con-
testation—with tax payers.  
 
In this chapter, I examine territorial reform in Senegal from the perspective of local 
government experiments in fiscal authority. Instead of assuming the link between legal 
authority and wealth extraction, I focus on how street-level bureaucrats problematized 
communal authority sur le terrain (on the ground). I use the French term sur le terrain to 
denote a specific set of fiscal techniques that required tax collectors to leave the office 
and conduct field audits of the communal terrain. Indeed, tax collectors themselves used 
the phrase sur le terrain to describe this work.  Such audits are a novel fiscal technique 
through which street-level administrators attempted to extend the exercise of communal 
authority sur le terrain. I extend the concept of territory to show how municipalities are 
territorial in a double sense: they are an administrative accounting of a physical land-
scape, but they are also an occasion to exercise a different form of political authority. I 
argue that this reputation for violence shaped how street-level bureaucrats collected 
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taxes. It is in this sense that tax collectors transform a terrain into a territory controlled 
by a violent form of political authority.  
 
As a concept, territory has taken many forms since its emergence in medieval 
Europe, but has today come to denote “a bounded space under the control of a group 
of people, usually the state” (322). Yet as Stuart Elden (2013) argues, such an under-
standing of territory is “a particular and historically limited set of practices and ideas 
about the relation between place and power” (7). The point for Elden is to not take this 
universal concept for granted, but to examine the specific configurations of place and 
power. It is in this sense that Elden draws on Foucault’s comments that territory may be 
understood rather simply as “the area controlled by a certain kind of power” (Foucault 
qtd in Elden, 2013: 9). And it is in this sense that Elden turns to an understanding of 
territory as a “bundle of political technologies” which “comprises techniques for meas-
uring land and controlling terrain” (323). Territory is the political counterpart to the notion 
of “calculating space” that emerged during the scientific revolution, and as Elden con-
tinues, “can therefore be thought of as the extension of the state’s power” (322).  
 
Scholars of the modern state have long characterized techniques like the census 
and the cadastre as totalizing forms of power, technical practices that routinize, make 
visible, and render populations governable (Scott, 1998). And Elden similarly turns to 
these techniques—particularly mapping cartographic representation—as exemplary 
forms of territorial control. And Elden examines these techniques alongside the rise and 
circulation of the national form, whose borders have over time transformed into strict 
cartographic and legal boundaries. Similarly, other scholars have argued that carto-
graphic representations of the state cultivated the emergence of a national identities 
across the world (Anderson, 2006; Winichakul, 2000). These approaches are instructive 
in examining contemporary relations of power and place. And in Dakar, there is no doubt 
a set of calculative political techniques through which communal governments exercise 
authority across an urban terrain. Yet Elden’s approach does not quite capture the form 
of political authority on offer in the commune of Mermoz Sacré-Cœur.  
 
Take, for example, the striking absence of cartography in the commune.  In com-
munal tax collection at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, there are no maps of the fiscal cadastre, 
and no one keeps an exhaustive accounting of the tax base. There is not, in other words, 
an extensive calculative rationality through which street-level bureaucrats govern the 
communal area. There is no total knowledge of the communal population or its territory. 
In its place, there is what one administrator referred to as an “information gap” (décalage 
d’information) between the state and the public: the state has little knowledge of its tax 
base, and the public has little understanding of its tax obligation to the commune. And 
what is more, administrators do not necessarily attempt to close this information gap: 
instead, they leverage it. Although the commune has almost no capacity for physical 
violence, tax payers do not know this. Nor do they know what taxes they owe, when they 
are due, or how to pay them.  
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In this context, tax collectors rely on their experiential understanding of the com-
munal terrain and the commune’s broader reputation for violence to enforce tax compli-
ance. Rather than exercising a calculative authority, tax collectors use the occasion of 
calculation—tax enrollment, billing, collection, and enforcement—to exercise a very dif-
ferent form of authority grounded in a reputation for violence. This reputation for violence 
is cultivated through the apparatus (dispositif) with which administrators produce 
knowledge of the communal fisc. In other words, the technical practice of tax collection 
is part and parcel of the broader cultivation of control over the communal terrain. And 
this control is not exclusively calculable, but grounded in the Mayor’s reputation for vio-
lence.  
 
Knowing the Fisc  
 
According to the Senegalese tax code, citizens are expected to voluntarily report and 
pay their tax obligations. For the advertising tax, this entails receiving an authorization 
for the use of public space, a registration and assessment of the tax obligation based on 
the size of the advertisement, payment of the tax at the local branch of the treasury and, 
finally, reporting the receipt of payment to the commune which levied the tax in the first 
place. This is what Senegalese administrative law refers to as the “fiscal chain”: the set 
of steps—enrollment, billing, collection, and enforcement—that bring citizens into the 
tax net and collectively constitute the tax base. Although there are rigid legal norms for 
this bureaucratic practice of tax collection, every aspect of the fiscal chain is neverthe-
less inflected by the discretion of street-level bureaucrats. Communal tax collection is a 
particularly local and spatial practice: agents are required to constantly circulate in the 
communal terrain, identify taxable objects, and build a fiscal cadaster for the suite of 
local taxes owed to the commune. 
 
Yet unlike the ideal-typical form of a fiscal cadastre, none of the communes I in-
terviewed used maps. As one tax administrator argued, it would simply take too long to 
map everything, and they already knew where most taxable objects were located. Many 
of these administrators had lived in the commune their entire lives and, apart from the 
requirements of the job, spent most of their time walking the neighborhood. But Sene-
galese tax administration is also highly centralized and most revenues and expenditures 
are controlled by the National Treasury. Communes do not have their own accounts and 
there is instead a single account managed by the National Treasury. For most payments, 
citizens must take their tax declarations to the local office of the treasury and make a 
deposit; communes cannot accept most tax payments. As a result, knowing the local 
fisc is an intimate and informal task: it requires constant circulation, negotiation and con-
tact with citizens and the urban landscape. 
 
One communal official described the fiscal situation of the communes as an “in-
formation gap” (décalage d’information) between the state and the population. On the 
one hand, he argued that local populations simply did not know what the state was and 
what it did: what were the projects that it completed? What are the various services for  
 
120 
	
 
Figure 5.3 Images of small directional billboards taken during a field audit 
Photo by Author 
 
which a local state is responsible? And how did such states go about making decisions 
and setting budgetary priorities throughout the year? This, he argued, was not at all 
transparent to local populations. On the other hand, the state also did not have enough 
knowledge about the population. Take, for example, the tax base (l’assiette fiscale). To 
improve collection, he argued, a commune would need to do a “real” census: employ 
youth who know the area, map it, regularizing the labor, and create a formal administra-
tive procedure for establishing a fiscal cadastre. In his view, such labor was done only 
informally. And to formalize the process—to map and to regularize—would improve the 
state’s knowledge of the population and increase the quantity and regularity of revenues.  
 
In many ways, this administrator’s recommendations reflect a standard approach 
to administrative reform in which informal and discretionary practices are brought under 
the purview of administrative standards. From this official’s perspective, the problem 
was that the current tax base is constructed almost entirely from such informal 
knowledge practices, which limits knowledge of the population and, in turn, limits reve-
nues. Yet his comments also note the importance of local and informal knowledge: em-  
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Figure 5.4 Sur le terrain 
Photo by Author 
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ploying youth in the commune who “know the area” remains part of a standardized ad-
ministrative practice; it is not excluded from it. This official’s comments underline the 
importance of the knowledge and labor of street-level tax administrators. But how ex-
actly do these administrators go about knowing the fisc? And how are these 
knowledge practices related to the political image of local mayors? 
 
In the tax collection office at Sacre-Cœur Mermoz, work began with waiting. And, 
at times, walking. As a declarative system, tax administrators spent days in the office 
waiting for taxpayers to come in to the office and declare their tax obligations. At Mermoz 
Sacré-Cœur, collectors focused most of their efforts on the tax on advertising and the 
tax on the occupation of public space. While the advertising tax was often paid by large 
advertising agencies and restaurants in the area, the tax on the occupation of public 
space was paid by street vendors who had constructed a shop in the interstitial thor-
oughfares throughout the commune. At times, there were long lines of businesspeople 
and vendors coming in to the office to declare their payments. But for most the time, the 
tax team waited in the courtyard and smoked cigarettes, chatted about the elections and 
the Socialist Party, and gossiped about friends and neighbors. But throughout the year, 
this steady stream of declarations created a large pile of paperwork: the carbon copy 
sides of the declarations that stated how much taxpayers were obligated to go pay at 
the local office of the Treasury. Although taxpayers made deposits throughout the year—
almost universally after the legal deadline of January 1st of the year in which the tax was 
imposed—communal staff had no knowledge of current rates of collection or of who had 
paid and who had not. And closing these gaps in fiscal knowledge requires physical and 
affective labor.  
 
Declarations of the advertising tax are two-sided documents. On the first side, 
basic information about the name, location, and contact information for the taxpayer sits 
just above a more detailed box in which tax administrators record the size of and calcu-
lated tax obligation for the advertising tax. On the other side, there is a detailed descrip-
tion of the tax obligations and regulations as outlined by Senegalese law, as well as a 
box that shows the total amount owed signed by the taxpayer himself. The common 
practice was to make duplicates of every single declaration by using a small piece of 
carbon copy paper on each side of the original. The communal staff held on to the cop-
ies, but the taxpayers themselves kept the originals to present these documents at the 
local office of the National Treasury to make a payment. The Treasury would not accept 
duplicates as a legitimate proof of declaration which meant that the commune’s records 
of declaration were exclusively created with carbon copies. And these carbon copies 
were notoriously difficult to read and almost always left information slightly askance on 
the copied documents. Yet identifying the correspondence between the original and the 
copy was the central technique through which the commune could know who had paid. 
And this gap in fiscal knowledge was a shared problem across communes in Dakar. As 
one administrator complained, it is almost impossible to know who has paid and who 
has not paid for any of the local taxes in any of the communes.  
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To close this knowledge gap, tax administrators at the communes spent weeks 
going through the paperwork copies one sheet at a time and comparing to the Treasuries 
records of who had come in to pay their tax. One afternoon, the lead administrator of the 
advertising tax team, Ibou, asked me for a ride to the Treasury. He said that we needed 
to stop by and pick up the original copies of the declarations that the Treasury collected 
at the point of payment. Although the Treasury works on behalf of the communes, they 
were not willing to cede control of this information. He was not allowed to take the doc-
uments with him, but he was allowed to look at them on site. Ibou asked the staff at the 
treasury if he could borrow two pens and a stack of blank papers: we were going to 
spend the afternoon copying down the information by hand, one entry at a time for the 
nearly 600 declarations that had been submitted this year for the advertising tax. The 
work took hours and we simply copied down enough information from each declara-
tion—name, location, amount—that would let us to identify our corresponding copy at 
the communal office.  
 
For the next two weeks, the rest of the staff sifted through this stack of copies 
looking for the names that appeared on our list from the commune. They divided up the 
stack of copies into three equal piles and searched one by one for each name that ap-
peared on our list from the Treasury. Each copy that also appeared on the Treasury’s 
list, we placed in a folder marked “paid”. And all the copies that did not appear on the 
treasury list, we put in a folder marked “unpaid”. By late March, the head of the adver-
tising tax collection team was pushing his employees to get out on the ground and to 
notify (interpoler) taxpayers who had not paid. While conducting this field audit we were 
also asked to conduct a survey of the large billboards within the communal borders. So, 
at the same time that we were notifying tax payers based on the information we collected 
from the treasury, we were also collecting new information from the field—we were doing 
billing and enforcement at the same time.  
 
Both these practices relied heavily on the knowledge of tax administrators em-
ployed by the commune. The declarations only included a single line that indicates where 
advertisements were located in the commune. And although this information was labeled 
“address”, there is no operational system of address within the City of Dakar. At times, 
the forms would include a villa number, but these numbers did not correspond to a lo-
cation on a street. Most written addresses in Dakar only included the villa number and 
the commune in which the villa was located, but neither of these points of information 
helped communal administrators located taxpayers. Instead, they used the same system 
of wayfinding that everyone in the city used: landmarks.  
 
The communal tax collection team had filled out the declaration forms them-
selves. And at the point of intake, had also themselves noted the location of the adver-
tisements and the location of the business responsible for posting such advertisements. 
Almost no one in Dakar uses Cartesian maps. Although private companies and the state 
alike have been increasing the use of mapping technologies for online purchases and 
property tax collection, most Dakarois would not even use a paper map to wayfind in the  
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Figure 5.5 Images of large billboards taken for the field audit 
Photo by Author 
 
city. Instead, there are a general set of landmarks with which most people in Dakar nav-
igated the city—gas stations, the personal residences of Marabouts, schools, etc.—and 
many of the locations on the declarations reflected this common practice. For example, 
some locations simply listed the name of the largest gas station in the commune with no 
indication where the business might be located in relation to this gas station.  
 
But communal staff had written these declarations themselves, lived in the com-
mune for most of their lives, and discussed with each taxpayer where and how to find 
their business. And, as such, were often able to recall these conversations and estimate 
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where we might be able to find the taxpayer. If not, we simply called the phone number 
on the declaration and asked again how to find them. Of course, on these calls the staff 
never identified they were tax collectors, for fear that taxpayers would simply refuse to 
share directions to their offices.  
 
Communes in Dakar almost universally relied on the personal and local 
knowledge of their tax collectors for billing, collection, and enforcement. One relatively 
wealthy commune, however, had developed a program to formalize this bureaucratic 
practice. After the decentralization reforms, the Commune of Parcelles-Assainies hired 
over 44 new administrative staff, stream-lined their organigram, and developed training 
materials for the new tax collection teams. For the advertising tax, the training manual 
included small photos with examples of taxable advertisements, the measurements for 
them, and the appropriate amounts to tax various advertising objects. This commune’s 
standardization of tax administration was an exception in Dakar. And the municipal sec-
retary noted that they were able to make such a large investment in their administrators 
because they already had a significant amount of own resource revenues. In the Dakar 
Peninsula, he pointed out, their commune was second only to Plateau, the central busi-
ness district of Dakar, in terms of the size of its annual revenues. And he claimed that 
most these revenues come from the taxation of public markets and small storefronts in 
the commune. However, most communes in Dakar are not in a similar financial position 
and do not have an extensive training program or even staff to train. The more common 
experience of tax administration in Dakar’s communes entails a small team of 3-4 staff 
members from the commune hired through the personal or political connections of the 
Mayor. 
 
But relying on this kind of tax collector was not only a result of lack of funds or 
Mayoral authority; many officials perceived local knowledge as a valuable asset for tax 
collection practices more generally. Many municipal secretaries began their career at the 
City of Dakar, and had since moved into careers in many of Dakar’s smaller communes. 
And these administrators continued to employ a tax collection practice they learned from 
the City of Dakar: communal governments supplied the local staff to central state tax 
agencies in order to improve collection. Officials justified this practice in two ways. First, 
they argued that agencies like The Treasury simply did not have enough staff to do field 
audits and enforcement themselves. The local arm of the Treasury near Mermoz Sacré-
Cœur, for example, claimed to work on a “first come, first served basis” in which the 
communes who asked for field audits were the ones to receive them. However, many of 
these communal audits would only last for two or three weeks, until the Treasury office 
had to move on to the next commune. Second, officials argued that help from the local 
agents supported central state agents who did not know the neighborhood. To locate 
tax payers and update the cadastre, local agents were understood to have the intimate 
knowledge of Dakar’s neighborhoods needed to do so. Officials and administrators in 
governmental agencies at all scales recognized on paper and in practice the importance 
of this local knowledge.  
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Figure 5.6 Billboards in Arrears 
Photo by Author 
 
At the same time, officials also noted an obvious problem that comes with discre-
tion in census and collection practices: corruption. Many Senegalese tax administrators  
carefully observe tax laws in order to reduce corruption; in particular, the heavily central-
ized administration of expenditures and revenues means that very little cash actually 
touches the hands of local tax administrators. Instead, it is deposited directly at the local 
Treasury office. Nevertheless, mayors and street-level bureaucrats have found myriad 
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techniques to hide and embezzle money from the public purse, from simply taking bribes 
to overlook tax obligations to creating elaborate shell corporations to which they award 
large public contracts. But the opposite is also evident: administrators and public offi-
cials make use of discretion to reduce corruption practices.  
 
In one case, a local business owner came to pay his tax for the occupation of 
public space at the local office of the Treasury. The man was a resident from a nearby 
neighborhood and he owed a significant amount of money to his commune. He owns a 
gas station and had taken up some of the public space to plant flowers and beautify the 
area surrounding it. And he claimed that 10 years ago he had signed an agreement with 
the mayor that he would only have to pay 50% of the cost of the area. Although the full 
monthly cost for his use of public space would have been around 600,000 fCFA a month, 
with his informal tax break he had only been paying 300,000 a month. And, in this case, 
the mayor had simply declared the tax at a lower rate and filed this declaration with the 
Treasury, which meant that this man still paid his taxes directly to the communal ac-
count, only at half the legal rate.  
 
But a new Mayor was voted into office during the last election, and he decided 
that the tax break was no longer valid. Instead of paying the full amount at the perception 
however, the Mayor suggested that he continue paying half the amount to the perception 
and pay the other half to the mayor directly. This taxpayer, however, was not interested 
in this. He exclaimed that he was an honest man and preferred to run his business 
straightforward. Such informal agreements would not benefit him, he thought, especially 
if this mayor would soon be replaced by another—would their agreement fall apart, as 
this one had? So, he circumvented the mayor altogether and declared his full rate directly 
at the perception.  
 
In situations like this, taxpayers and administrators alike willfully attempt to de-
personalize the tax collection process, to take control out of the hands of corrupt public 
officials and administrators. However, this is not the norm. Although there are many pub-
lic administrators who claim to respect—and regularly recite—the letter of the tax law, 
the dominant mode of local state tax collection is conducted by personal and political 
appointees of the Mayors with little to no administrative training. And those with formal 
administrative training identify this as an endless source of frustration. Municipal Secre-
taries are the lead administrators of any commune, and many have been trained at the 
National School of Administration. These administrators often frame themselves as apo-
litical technocrats—they do not engage in the world of electoral politics and they serve 
the Mayor and the public regardless of political affiliation. Yet their encounters with su-
periors and subordinates in the administrative hierarchy is nevertheless shot through 
with political and electoral motivations. One municipal secretary proudly claimed, “I re-
fuse to be behind my mayor” to indicate her independence from political concerns. But 
shook her head and admitted that, nevertheless, “it is often politics that speak instead 
of technicians.” 
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From this perspective, communal administrators often use the term “politics” to 
refer to the disputes among elites and elected officials. Another Municipal Secretary 
pointed to blockages—like the case of Dakar’s municipal bond—as a political problem 
that prevents technicians from doing their jobs. Yet this same administrator and his staff 
also dedicated most our conversation to similar disputes within the Socialist Party, as 
his commune was the home of the imprisoned Mayor of Dakar an electoral proving 
ground for any candidate looking to win this position in the future. In his words, one must 
win elections in his commune to become the Mayor of Dakar. He only took a break from 
this discussion to argue on the phone with an official from the Ministry of Finance and 
accuse him of being “too political”. “We are technicians!” he shouted, “we don’t take a 
political position!” This was evident across most of the communes with which I inter-
viewed and worked: a stated belief in the ethical principle of apolitical administration, 
coupled with constant discussion of political parties. At times, I pointed out this apparent 
paradox to public administrators. Many would simply laugh, shrug, point their palms to 
the sky, and say, “this is Senegal. Everything is political.”  
 
On the ground with communal tax collection teams, political concerns took a dif-
ferent form. They were not the disputes among elected officials, but instead the disputes 
that administrative staff encountered as they registered and collected taxes. In this con-
text, tax collectors are also political appointees widely known to be associated with the 
political personage of the mayor. At Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, for example, much of the ad-
ministrative staff spent their afternoons working for the Mayor’s re-election campaign. 
And in the months leading up to the elections, the entire staff dedicated nearly all its time 
to outreach for the electoral campaign, going door-to-door speaking with the constitu-
ency, holding public rallies and protests, and organizing media appearances for the 
Mayor. And there was an obvious overlap between this political work and the technical 
work of tax collection: both relied on the local and intimate knowledge of the people and 
the landscape of the commune. Despite many administrators’ belief in the apolitical 
practice of communal administration, tax collection in practice often overlaps with the 
political practice of communal elections.  
 
Tax administration and elections in Dakar require this kind of local labor, and un-
der-resourced communes rightly employ the existing staff they have on hand to conduct 
both forms of work. But blending this labor furthered the perception among the public 
that tax collectors are the on the ground agents of an elected official; they were not 
understood to be collecting taxes for the public good, but were instead understood to 
be collecting taxes for the Mayor himself. In this sense, local tax collection is always 
inflected by taxpayers opinion of the Mayor and his public image. Which, in the case of 
Mermoz Sacré-Cœur revolved around his reputation for violence.  
 
Affiliation and Political Work  
 
During the elections, the entire staff at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur was exhausted. One day 
the head of a tax collection team came into the office around noon, complaining that he 
had gotten up before sunrise to attend a political strategizing session with the Mayor.  
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Figure 5.7 Painted over Political Ads in Mermoz Sacré-Cœur 
Photo by Author 
 
He covered his eyes from the hot sun, made a gesture to hide himself from the oppres-
sive heat, and went home for lunch. Another tax agent finally arrived later in the after-
noon, but similarly complained about fatigue, as his sheep had given birth the night be-
fore and kept him awake with her screaming. He made a loud imitation of a sheep 
scream, shook his head, and went to go sit in the cold and quiet of our air-conditioned 
office. Both administrators were militants of the socialist party, and both were doubly 
exhausted by the heat and intensity of public rallies, protests, and press interviews that 
constituted most of their political work for the Mayor. At this time of the year, tax admin-
istration was only a secondary concern.  
 
Like many social and professional environments in Senegal, the tax collection 
teams at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur were divided by gender. There was a group of around 
four or five women in in their twenties and thirties that, in theory, worked for the agent 
responsible for the collection of the tax for the occupation of public space. But there was 
a second and much larger group of similarly aged young men that worked for the agent 
responsible for the advertising tax. However, in practice, both agents almost exclusively 
worked with the young men because, as one agent believed, the women were not strong 
enough to do the work of field surveying in the hot sun and regularly miss work for a 
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“monthly sickness”. This strictly gendered division of labor, then, put young men out in 
the field and reserved the young women for work in the office. Although there were some 
exceptions, there was a similar division in the political party in which young men consti-
tute most the Mayor’s political outreach team. And this electoral field team served a 
double roll as tax collectors. Work on the ground (sur le terrain) was not reserved for men 
exclusively. But when women did perform this labor, it was often those that were under-
stood to be “strong like the men”. As a young man with a car, it made sense for me to 
work on the field team.  
 
For the several young men on the Mermoz Sacré-Cœur tax collection team, they 
had found their jobs through personal connections. One administrator was a carpenter 
prior to starting on the tax collection team and another had previously been working as 
a server in a restaurant. Neither of them had any experience with municipal administra-
tion, but both had found the work through political connections. Where one had an Aunt 
who had been a higher up in the Socialist Party in the 1980s and was a personal friend 
of the Mayor, the other had worked for the Mayor’s electoral campaign and was offered 
this post as a result. With only one or two exceptions, communal staff had found their 
jobs at the commune through similar means and nearly all were strong and vocal sup-
porters of the Socialist Party more generally and the Mayor more specifically. Although 
it was technically the Municipal Secretary who leads communal administration, it was 
clear that these employees were at the service of the Mayor himself. One tax adminis-
trator, for example, was offered his job because the previous agent had disagreed pub-
licly with the Mayor’s decision to form a coalition with a politician outside the Socialist 
Party. And, within the year, this new administrator had been sideline and ultimately de-
moted in favor of a more hardline political supporter of the Mayor. In other words, ap-
pointments to administrative positions were tightly linked to personal relationships to the 
Mayor and contingent on ongoing political support.  
 
Thus, for much of the staff, their administrative labor was tightly linked to their 
political labor. Take, for example, the advertising tax collectors. In the months preceding 
the 2017 legislative elections, nearly all administrative work ground to a halt in the com-
mune and everyone on staff began dedicating their time to political work. During the day, 
this meant organizing and participating in public protests and rallies, appearing with the 
Mayor at various publicity events, and, for some, attending political strategizing meetings 
with the core political supporters. During this time, Dakar’s urban landscape turns into a 
massive canvas for political advertising: this includes large, printed banners hung across 
streets; massive caravans of cars decorated in the Socialist Party colors and, often, an 
image of political candidates themselves; and the more informal political graffiti for which 
Dakar is famous. These forms of advertising are not taxed. Yet they are subject to an-
other form of political authority: the public advertising of opposition candidates within 
communal boundaries was regularly destroyed. If a candidate placed an ad in the wrong 
area, it would almost certainly be taken down or defaced. Rather than make a public 
stand against this practice, however, political supporters often did this illegal activity 
under the cover of night. And it often led to violent confrontations. 
 
131 
	
Souleymane, for example, was the Mayor’s bodyguard and often worked on the 
tax collection team as “the muscle”. But one day, instead of going out on the ground to 
conduct the census, the tax collection team had to pick up Souleymane from the nearby 
jail. The night before the Mayor had pulled together a small group of his supporters to 
go out and confront another group who had been posting political ads around the com-
mune and who, Souleymane argued, had been tearing down the signs for the Mayor. In 
Souleymane’s telling, the Mayor warned the other group to leave and, once they refused, 
the Mayor took out his gun and fired three warning shots into the air. But after having 
successfully dispersed the group, the National Police arrived at the commune the next 
day accusing the Mayor of having fired a gun in public.  
 
Instead of admitting to the crime himself, the Mayor allowed Souleymane to sur-
render in the Mayor’s place, claiming that it was in fact Souleymane himself who had 
fired the gun. This was not, however, Souleymane’s first encounter with the police. Like 
many of the other staff members at the commune, Souleymane was involved in the on-
going court case regarding the Billboard Affair, as he had helped orchestrate the de-
struction of the panels and, as in this case, was taking the fall for the Mayor. Souleymane, 
however, was unphased. “It was just a political strategy” he argued, “and the other side 
does not have any proof that I committed any crimes.” From Souleymane’s perspective, 
the other group were the aggressors and he encouraged me to come along and film the 
next confrontation as proof.  
 
Yet many of the administrative staff at the commune had themselves committed 
similar crimes. The month before the election, a large political ad for a candidate of the 
opposition party appeared in the middle of a prominent roundabout in Mermoz Sacré-
Cœur. The ad was three stories high and triangular in shape so that it could be seen 
clearly from every position in the roundabout as well as from the adjacent highway over-
pass. On each side of the triangular ad there was a large portrait of the candidate, draped 
in the tan and brown colors of the Alliance for the Republic. Unlike many of the other 
political ads around the city, this ad was monumental. The metal posts for the structure 
had occupied the middle of the roundabout for weeks before its construction, but only 
days after it was installed the nylon ads had been ripped to shreds from top to bottom. 
It appeared as if someone had climbed the scaffolding with a machete, and sliced the 
nylon ad in long tears on the way down.  
 
It was normal for ads to be painted over or torn down in Dakar, but it was surpris-
ing to see this ad destroyed so quickly and not in time with the rest of the enforcement 
measures that the tax collection team had planned for the advertising tax. I asked one 
of the other tax administrators if he had noticed the ads and if we planned to permit, 
measure, and tax them even though they had been destroyed. He laughed and said no, 
probably not, as it was him and the rest of the tax collection team who had taken ma-
chetes to the ads. They went out at night, he claimed, wore ski masks to hide their faces 
and destroyed all the political ads within the commune that were not for the Socialist 
Party.  
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Figure 5.8 Barthélémy Dias at a Political Rally 
Photo by Author 
 
Many of the administrators at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur identified as militants of the 
Socialist Party, a term that usually designated the most politically and aggressively out-
spoken members of the party. Militant does not denote a shared values or support of 
candidates, but instead it was a style of political engagement and affiliation. And most 
militants of the socialist party in Mermoz Sacré-Cœur were young men who also worked 
on the administrative staff of the commune. And beyond the label “militant” these young 
administrators often used war metaphors to describe the contexts in which they worked. 
Souleymane, for example, described his confrontation over the opposition’s advertising 
as an example of the war-like conditions in which communal staff worked. And the young 
militant and tax collector who took a machete to the opposition advertising described 
this work as part of the broader battle for the Socialist Party in Senegal. War metaphors 
abound in Dakar’s sphere of electoral politics, and the militants at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur 
brought this attitude to their administrative work.  
 
One tax administrator in Dakar identified this tight relationship between electoral 
politics and administration as a central problem of tax collection in local governments. 
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The common practice of hiring political supporters meant that many of the administrators 
had no training for the jobs in which they were placed. And once a new Mayor is elected, 
the entire administration would likely be replaced. In the case of Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, 
there was only one administrator who had not been hired from the ranks of the militants 
from the Mayor’s electoral campaign. This administrator further argued that the com-
mune’s expenditures were similarly politicized, that cash distributions from the Mayor 
were made along political lines. Mayors across Dakar are known for making small cash 
distributions to constituents in times of emergency or holiday. And many officials insisted 
that the key challenge for Mayoral governance in Dakar is to shift focus away from these 
small, discretionary, and short-term expenditures and towards long-term financial plan-
ning for large-scale public services.  
 
In Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, such distributions were made along political lines. For 
example, each year for Tabaski—an Islamic holiday about one month after the end of 
Ramadan commemorating Abraham’s sacrifice of his eldest son—Mayors across Dakar 
give out rice to their constituents. Months prior to the celebration, friends and family of 
the tax collection teams were asking for priority in the rice distribution, knowing that the 
administrative staff could likely move their names up on the list or circumvent the list 
altogether. In the weeks prior to the holiday, the tax collection offices were filled from 
floor to ceiling with large bags of rice and much of the staff spent their days loading 
these bags into the cars of constituents who had been allocated a gift. In nearly a year 
working at the commune, this was one of the few occasions when the Mayor was present 
at City Hall—he arrived in a black range rover to shake hands with a few constituents 
before promptly disappearing again with his group of bodyguards.  
 
According to one administrator at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, anyone requesting help 
from the commune had to submit a formal written request. Alioune, the head of corre-
spondence for the commune, said that he regularly received such requests and pre-
sented to me a short letter in French addressed to the Mayor requesting an unspecified 
amount of cash to help with a family’s financial hardship. The man submitting the request 
did not speak French, however, and Alioune suggested that he likely pay someone to 
prepare the letter on his behalf. Alioune filed away the paper with the rest of the corre-
spondence for the day and said the Municipal Council would review the requests at the 
end of the month.  
 
Although this practice is commonplace in Dakar’s communes, another adminis-
trator critiqued the practice, arguing that such distributions were not only help, but were 
instead political patronage for electoral support. In his view, cash distributions were 
made exclusively along political lines: “The first criteria we use to make payments” he 
argued, “is to see if they are part of the Socialist Party or not”. And much to this admin-
istrators’ chagrin, the commune had just submitted a request to for a change to the 
annual budget, increasing on “social assistance” to one of the largest expenditures for 
the commune. He handed me the budget request and asked me to look for the new 
amount requested, and next to the line on “assistance for the poor” (“secours d’inid-
gents”) there was an amount of 35,000,000 fCFA ($60,000 USD). For comparison, the 
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annual expenditure on education for the commune amounted to 1,500,000 fCFA ($2,500 
USD) for the year and then 150,000,000 fCFA ($250,000 USD) for annual salaries. In 
other words, social assistance was second only to staff salaries in terms of the relative 
importance in the annual budget. And many believed these social assistances were di-
rectly linked to political party affiliation.  
 
A tax administrator for another commune made a similar critique of political ad-
ministration in Dakar. He came in from a nearby commune to file a request and a decla-
ration on behalf of a friend. He had with him the paperwork for the installation of a bill-
board in Mermoz Sacré-Cœur and the receipts from the printing company that included 
the measurements. The staff at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur approved the request and signed 
the declaration in the office without an on the ground inspection of the site, and the entire 
process was complete in less than 5 minutes. But this administrator was also curious 
about my research and wanted to discuss communal tax administration. He had studied 
geography and administration at the University in Dakar and wanted to know if my re-
search made any concrete recommendations to improve tax collection. I suggested that 
an up-to-date and complete fiscal cadastre would allow the commune to better know, 
access, and anticipate its revenues. He agreed, but quickly countered with an observa-
tion about public interest: that the problem with public finance was that expenses did 
not go towards projects that benefit everyone, but were instead reserved for the sup-
porters of a mayor's party.  
 
The rest of the staff at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur nodded in agreement, although they 
themselves were some of the key levers of political patronage in the commune. And even 
this colleague from a nearby commune was in our office to help a close friend could 
install his billboard in Mermoz Sacré-Cœur territory and was, in part, building a collegial 
rapport with us to ensure the billboard would not be destroyed. None of this, however, 
is a paradox of fiscal administration: in a social milieu where affiliation and belonging are 
the central criteria for access to resources, even critics of patronage and corruption are 
obliged to take part. For many in Dakar, affiliation and administration are inseparable.  
 
Violence in Circulation 
 
Tax payers in Mermoz Sacré-Cœur often viewed tax collectors as representatives of the 
Mayor himself. They perceived their payments as going to an account controlled by the 
Mayor and distributed to his political supporters. And in many respects this view is cor-
rect: administrative employment, social aid, and other expenditures were openly 
acknowledged to be distributed along the lines of political affiliation. This link between 
expenditures and affiliations also shaped revenue collection. Tax administrators often 
overlooked the tax obligations of the Mayor’s political supporters, and were met with 
resistance and critique from taxpayers from opposition parties or, more commonly, who 
disapproved of the Mayor’s reputation for violence. However, this talk of violence during 
tax collection was not only expressed in terms of opposition; taxpayers and tax collec-
tors alike framed the Mayor’s reputation for violence as an implicit threat for non-com-
pliance. Administrators and citizens often joked about this violence, insinuating that the 
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Mayor and his agents would shoot those who refused to pay. But although this talk was 
often humorous, there was nevertheless a persistent association between tax payment 
and the Mayor’s reputation for violence.  
 
Among administrators, Mayor Dias was most widely recognized for the Billboard 
Affair and the protracted legal battle that surrounded it. Two administrators in two sep-
arate Ministries, for example, had the same perspective on the affair: the commune was 
within its legal right to create and enforce and entry fee, but it was simply the Dias’ “flare 
for the aggressive” that made the confrontation so controversial. As one of these admin-
istrators noted, “maybe it was a bit brusque or brutal, but legally he was right.” These 
comments are exemplary of what communal administrators perceived as the central 
problem of the recent decentralization reforms: although they allocated resources and 
responsibilities on paper, they did not quite outline how they would be carried out in 
practice. For the new “competencies” that were allocated to the communes, there were 
no guidelines, benchmarks, or requirements for how they would know or meet the needs 
of communal populations. Indeed, as part of the stated value of “free administration” in 
the reforms, it was up to the Municipal Councils and the communal staff to define and 
provide urban public services.  
 
The same situation applied to revenue collection: for many of the local taxes com-
munes were left to create new administrative practices for the enrollment, billing, collec-
tion, and enforcement of taxes they had never encountered. And although violence is 
usually linked to the practice of enforcement, in the case of the Mermoz Sacré-Cœur 
taxpayers and tax collectors alike spoke of violence at every moment in the fiscal chain 
and it underpinned compliance and noncompliance. However, this violence took a dif-
ferent from than the more familiar forms of state fiscal authority like asset seizure or 
imprisonment. These practices existed at the communal level, but were only carried out 
on an infrequent schedule and on a shoestring budget. Communes do not have their 
own police force to enforce collection, and instead relied on an under-staffed and over-
worked national police force or an un-trained fleet of municipal volunteers. And in 
Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, the public image and rumors of Dias’ propensity for violence func-
tioned as an implicit—although likely empty—threat that shaped the conduct of tax col-
lection and compliance.  
 
Beyond the Billboard Affair, Dias also had a reputation for his role in the 2011 
murder of a young member of the Senegalese Democratic Party (PDS), Ndiaga Diouf. 
Staff members at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur recounted the murder as one of self-defense, 
Diouf and a small group of PDS supporters descended on the City Hall of Mermoz Sacré-
Cœur to confront the Mayor and his political supporters. Although they were not armed, 
the group as throwing large pieces of concrete at City Hall. The Mermoz Sacré-Cœur 
group, including Dias himself, then retaliated by firing a handgun at the group of young 
men. A video online shows one of the staff standing by and encouraging another to load 
and fire his weapon into the crowd, but there was no similar evidence that this was doc-
umentation of the actual shooting or that Dias himself had been involved in the confron-
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tation. Later, Dias admitted that he was involved in the confrontation, but denied respon-
sibility for the murder: in his words, “j’ai tiré, mais je n’ai pas tué” (Mine, 2016)31. This 
argument opened the door for Dias’ bodyguard to step in and admit that he, not Dias, 
had fired the bullet that ultimately killed Diouf. There was no available ballistic evidence 
that tied the bullet to this body guard’s gun, but the courts were nevertheless willing to 
let him take the fall. 
 
6 years after the shooting, however, Dias’ court battle was still ongoing and it was 
only in February of 2017 that he was finally convicted for murder, assault and battery, 
and the illegal possession of a weapon without administrative authorization. The court 
ordered him to serve two years in prison—of which six are mandatory—and also to pay 
25 million fCFA ($43,000 USD) to the family of Ndiaga Douf in damages and interest. 
Nevertheless, Dias and his supporters accused the courts of political interference, argu-
ing that there was no proof that Dias had killed Diouf himself and that a “political cabal” 
was organizing against him because of his intent to run in the legislative elections later 
in 2017.  
 
However, this argument did not have traction with the court and Dias eventually 
served his 6 months in prison being released in September of 2018. In the 7 years be-
tween Dias’ role in the murder and serving his sentence for this conviction, Dias devel-
oped a reputation for violence among the Senegalese public. The protracted court battle 
received regular attention in the local news media, and even received international at-
tention as an exemplary case of a change in Senegalese democracy today. As one BBC 
article noted, Dias violence was a seeming outlier in a country “known as one of West 
Africa’s most stable and democratic countries” (Senegal’s Barthelemy, 2011). And one 
staff member at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur similarly pointed to Dias the primary political elite 
contributing to the increasing role of violence in Senegal’s electoral stage.  
 
Within and beyond Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, Dias became known as the face of a 
violent turn in Senegalese politics. For staff at the commune, their affiliation with the 
Mayor often affiliated them with this violence, which applied to me as a participant and 
administrator in the local tax collection team. When one acquaintance in a nearby neigh-
borhood discovered that I worked on Dias’ tax collection team, he laughed, held his hand 
up in the shape of a gun, and exclaimed “Dias, the pistolero?” Throughout my time work-
ing at and living in the commune neighbors, colleagues, friends, and public officials often 
responded similarly when they learned about my work. At times, they dismissed Dias as 
a moody and tempestuous child of a political elite who posed no meaningful threat or 
contribution to Senegalese politics. Dias father was the Mayor of the commune before 
him, and many perceive him as having inherited his position due to his family’s political 
standing.  
 
																																																						
31 In English, “I shot, but I did not kill”. I foreground the French phrase above to preserve the poetry of a 
Dakarois politician which is almost always alliterative.  
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Although Dias garnered enough electoral support to regularly win elections in his 
commune, he also had critics. One acquaintance and a long-term restaurant owner in 
Dakar disliked Dias precisely because of his nepotism and violence. I suggested that 
perhaps Dias was a new kind of “strong man” politics in Dakar in which political oppo-
sition was met with non-state sanctioned violence. Again, he laughed at the idea and 
argued that, no, Dias was more of a “weak-man” that lacked any vision for benefiting the 
broader public. Like many others, he underlined the comic absurdity of Dias’ political 
image—that his shows of strength were nothing more than a show.   
 
Affiliation and Exception 
 
Dias’ reputation had political effects. For example, in driving around Dakar, I was con-
stantly pulled over by the police. But my affiliation with Dias often exempted me from 
punishment. I drove a modest two-door Peugeot that most people viewed as a feminine 
car, something for men to purchase on behalf of their wives or daughters. Although the 
car was relatively low status, my foreigner status immediately—and, in many ways, cor-
rectly—marked me as a wealthy elite. Police regularly pulled me over. In one stop, the 
officer pulled me over in the middle of a roundabout next to my apartment for, appar-
ently, not wearing a seatbelt. The fines for traffic violation were relatively affordable for 
me—between 5,000 and 12,000 fCFA ($10 or $20 USD)—but the greater inconvenience 
is that police officers seize the license and registration for traffic violations. To retrieve 
your paperwork, you are required to go to the central police station and pay the fine.  
 
In one such encounter with the police, I was exempted from the law. In this case, 
I was pulled over for driving the wrong way down a one-way street with an expired reg-
istration. I asked if I could pay my ticket on the spot he countered that, no, I was required 
to pay at the nearby station to retrieve my license and registration. Usually, it takes a day 
for your paperwork to reach the station, but I had been pulled over just as a man on a 
scooter had come by to collect at the seized licenses for the day and deposit them at 
the station. The officer suggested that I just follow the scooter there and then I could 
retrieve my license immediately. Once I arrived at the station, I met an officer in a small 
room piled high with thousands of drivers’ licenses, presumably, ones that had not been 
recovered by their owners. The man on a scooter arrived and placed a large plastic bag 
on the desk full of new licensees they had seized during the day.  
 
The officer at the desk gave me all the documents back first, and I immediately 
pocketed the ID and held the others in my hand. On my ticket, the first officer wrote AF 
6,000 in larger red letters next to the AF 12,000 which this officer in the bureau inter-
preted as a fine of 18,000 fCFA. He rummaged through his desk for a moment, looking 
for the right paperwork, but then gave up and informed me that I wasn’t going to be able 
to pay today. The fine was for 18,000 and they only had receipts for a fine of 6,000—the 
receipts are printed with the fine amount included and they didn’t have any more receipts 
printed for 18,000. It wasn’t clear when they would be back in stock. But, he said, I could 
go down to the central station, pay there, and then bring the receipt back to him to 
recover my documents. I said I didn’t know where it was and he countered that it was 
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easy to find downtown next to the Place de l’Indépendance. I complained that this was 
very far away, would take the entire day in this traffic, and I didn’t have the time to go 
there as I had to get to work. He asked where I was going and I told him that I worked 
at the commune of Mermoz Sacré-Cœur. “The City Hall of Mermoz Sacré-Cœur?” he 
asked. “Yes,” I said. “With Barthélémy Dias?” he asked. “Yes,” I said. “The politician?” 
“Yes”. “What do you do there?” he asked. “I am working the collection of taxes with the 
commune.” “So, you are there to help them?” “Yes,” I said. And then he gave me back 
all my documents and shook his head, crumpled up my ticket and said, “it’s not a big 
deal”. I stood still in disbelief and asked if everything was in order, and if I still had to go 
downtown. And he said, “no, we don’t want to bother you too much.”  
 
When, I told everyone at the commune about this, they were jubilant. One of the 
tax collectors said that the officer was probably afraid of me and thought I was going to 
shoot him, that I was some crazy American who worked for Barthélémy Dias. He held up 
his hand like a gun and laughed. He said even the other mayors are afraid of him, be-
cause Dias is crazy and shoots people. He argued that it would make sense that a low-
level police officer would be afraid of an elite member of Dias’ group. However, it is not 
possible to know the motivations of this officer. Although my connection to Dias certainly 
informed his decision to exempt me from punishment, it is not clear what aspect of my 
relationship was important to him. And there are a number of other plausible explana-
tions: he could have been a militant of the Socialist Party, he could have taken interest 
in a foreigner here to help with a development effort, or he could have simply been ex-
hausted from work with little energy left to argue or look for a new receipt. But the com-
mune staff were happy to explain my exemption in terms of the officer’s fear of Dias. 
 
This explanation reveals something about how tax collectors view their own com-
portment and reputation in Dakar more generally. Tax collectors in other communes 
frame their work in very different terms from those in Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, approaching 
their work with tax payers as helpful accompaniment and public education. However, 
tax collectors often reference themselves as the representatives of Mayor Dias and his 
broader reputation for violence. And as the tax collection team circulated around the 
commune for enrollment, billing, and collection of local taxes, it became clear that much 
of the tax paying public viewed them in the same way.  
 
The Limits of Reputation 
 
“Thieves!” an elderly woman shouted at the tax collection team. Like many other taxpay-
ers in Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, this woman was reluctant to pay her taxes. Not only was 
she opposed to payment in general, but she was also opposed to Barthélémy Dias in 
particular. And subversive graffiti throughout the neighborhood similarly painted Dias as 
a thief, rapist, and murderer. Apparently, the previous year, the team had painted over 
her advertising sign for non-payment, and for this reason she held a personal grudge 
against the Mayor to this day. Again, rather than a principled opposition to the tax itself, 
this neighborhood elder took a principled opposition to Dias. It is likely that she was not 
a member of the Socialist Party, given her public rebuke of one of its leading politicians, 
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but it was Dias’ name she cursed, not the party.  
 
The tax collection team had no official identification cards and wore no official 
uniform, although all these young men dressed well and professionally: they never wore 
shorts, always wore a button-up shirt or a polo, and would even arrive in a tailor-made, 
traditional boubous on Fridays. Nevertheless, taxpayers—particularly business owners 
who did not live in the neighborhood—were often skeptical of the team. Team members 
often introduced themselves as “with the commune of Mermoz-Sacré Cœur” and were 
there to collect a tax owed to the commune itself. But this presentation was often met 
with a different kind of recognition: tax payers would nod their heads and say, “ah, 
Barthélémy Dias”. One taxpayer even referred to the team as part of “kër Barthélémy” 
which translates both as the house and family of Barthélémy. Although kër is a common 
familiar metaphor used to describe all kinds of close-knit groups, taxpayers attached the 
“kër” to the name of the Mayor himself, not to the name of the commune.  
 
During the team’s effort at enrolling and billing new taxpayers in the commune, taxpayers 
often made associations with Dias’ name, both positive and negative. For many residents 
in the commune, the tax collection team were well-known, not for their position in the 
commune but because they were from the neighborhood and affiliated with Dias. At 
times, this meant that we were met with applause and cheers as we walked the com-
mune. This was a way to humorously, but respectfully, mimic the tours that politicians 
make during local elections. And, in one case, the purpose of this public display of sup-
port was meant to communicate affiliation and belonging: this man then proceeded to 
argue that he should be exempt from paying his taxes because of his political support. 
In many cases, this kind of argumentation was effective. Tax payers would suggest that 
they had a special arrangement with the Mayor or one of his adjoints and should be 
exempted from their tax obligation. A tax administrator could either honor the agreement 
on the spot, or would ask who at the commune had made the agreement and then make 
a phone call to confirm. But tax administrators were not always in a position of authority 
in relation to taxpayers, various elite institutions either refused payment or would simply 
be overlooked by tax administrators in the first place.  
 
On the ground with the tax administrators in Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, we passed by 
most advertisements that, legally, could be taxed by the commune. There were two cat-
egories of advertisement that were de facto exempt from tax obligations: small signs for 
neighborhood shops and large signs for international or governmental agencies. For the 
small signs, tax administrators justified non-collection in terms of poverty and efficiency: 
none of the tax administrators wanted to put in the effort to collect even a small amount 
of money from an already poor public. Although these tax administrators could have 
certainly collected these taxes if they wanted to, they simply did not. But for many of the 
international and governmental agencies, enforcing collection was not a choice; it was 
an obligation. In one instance, one administrator overlooked a large banner advertising 
the offices of United States Agency for International Development, because it was an in- 
140 
	
 
Figure 5.9 Political Graffiti in Sacré-Cœur Naming Bathélémy as a “rapist” and “assassin” 
Photo by Author 
 
ternational organization, and that he “didn’t have the power” to ask them for money. And 
he made similar arguments about Senegalese state agencies located in Mermoz Sacré-
Cœur. He recounted that one Senegalese agency has simply refused to pay when he 
asked; they laughed at him and argued that local governments did not have the authority 
to tax the central state. But according to the letter of the law, they did.  
 
If members of the Socialist Party would request and sometimes receive exemp-
tions from tax obligations at Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, Socialist elites were automatically 
exempt. In one instance, during a field audit, a higher up in the Socialist Party refused to 
pay. I suggested that we go up and deliver a convocation to an office building with a 
large banner draped over the third-floor balcony. Alioune was a bit hesitant, as the ban-
ner was for a well-known socialist publication. We waited in the hallway for around 20 
minutes and by the time we met the organization’s boss, he was already irritated: he 
crossed his arms and remarked that he was very busy and only had time for a short 
meeting. He was obviously a senior militant of the Socialist Party and behind his desk 
had a large, framed portrait of Thomas Sankara, a Burkinabé socialist revolutionary, Pan-
Africanist, and postcolonial political leader. When we told him we had come to deliver a 
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tax bill for his banner, he quickly changed comportment and laughed heartily at our re-
quest. From his perspective, it was a hilariously absurd request. He told us to report 
back to the Mayor and ask if he was required to pay. I argued that everyone was obli-
gated to pay, to which he laughed again, shook our hands as he escorted us out of the 
office, and assured us that his payment would be in the mail. Which, of course, it 
wouldn’t be.  
 
Tax administrators were often not willing to tax these elite organizations, and 
when they attempted to were met with similar kinds of refusals or avoidances. Street-
level tax administrators held very little authority on the ground. Not only were they lower 
political and social status than elites, but they also did not have the immediate physical 
authority to enforce payment. At best, tax administrators could note down who refused 
to pay, keep a record of refusals, and then return during the two weeks out of the year 
when the national police force was available to aid in making enforcement rounds. How-
ever, no one did this. Instead, lawful exercises of violence were limited to enforcing other 
kinds of taxes and only for this short annual window of time.  
 
Negotiating Enforcement 
 
For example, the police helped to enforce a business tax in Mermoz Sacré-Cœur The 
tax is levied on any business within communal borders, is paid annually, and corre-
sponds to a percentage of assets and infrastructures held by the business. Although 
these taxes are levied on all businesses, Mermoz Sacré-Cœur’s enforcement rounds 
were made almost exclusively on small retail businesses and corner stores located on 
the ground floor of residential buildings. The enforcement team consisted of one repre-
sentative from the local Treasury office, several of the tax collection team from the com-
mune, and three unarmed police officers. And for only two weeks at the end of the year, 
this team drove around in a small white pickup truck provided by the treasury and en-
forced collection of the business tax.  
 
During these tours, one of the communal tax collectors carried a small backpack 
with four or five large chains and several padlocks. The representative from the Treasury 
carried with him the list of businesses on the tax rolls, but did not have a print out of who 
had paid and who had not. So, once the team located a business on the list, the Treasury 
administrator would ask for their receipt of payment. If the business could not present 
this receipt, then he threatened to shudder the shop and lock it up until they paid. He 
offered that they could pay him on the spot, and many taxpayers suspected that this 
was an opportunity for a bribe. However, he would argue that, in fact, it was a generosity 
of the Treasury that they could pay immediately and that he was an honest man who 
would not embezzle money, especially in front of the police and the communal staff. 
Nevertheless, he kept the cash payments in his pocket and deposited it himself at the 
Treasury, which no one on the team had any way to confirm.  
 
It was rare that a business owner could not pull together enough money to pay, 
but there was always an extended negotiation over the amount owed. In Dakar, it would 
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be strange not to negotiate a price, as negotiation is seen as both an art and a form of 
jovial sociality—as one resident noted, to deny a negotiation is like denying a handshake. 
And tax negotiation took a familiar form. The Treasury agent would inform the business 
owner of their tax debt, listen to complaints and counter-offers for a few minutes, and 
would then promptly instruct the police to lock up the store and walk off in the opposite 
direction. This performance indicates clearly that he is not willing to budge on price, and 
it is used every day across all negotiating contexts in Dakar, from hailing a taxi to pur-
chasing cloth in the market. Once the police took out the chains and began pulling down 
the large metal shutters on the stores, the owners often leapt into action, chasing the 
Treasury agent down the street to organize payment. Often, he would ignore them until 
they handed over the receipt and cash in hand, sometimes out of breath and in tears 
after a panicked search for cash to re-open the business.  
 
Like a good negotiator, the Treasury agent knew that this threat of violence was 
a bluff. But the taxpayers did not. The group had threatened closure to dozens of busi-
ness over the course of the two weeks on the ground, but only had access to several 
sturdy locks and very little budget to purchase more. And the National Police were al-
ready stretched thin, as the surge in violence around the legislative elections had re-
quired additional police presence in the regular protests and rallies that took place during 
this time. So, although there is an immediate threat of violence, tax payers could easily 
outnumber or wait out the police. If more than four people refused to pay in any given 
day, the team would be unable to continue until someone bought more chains—which 
no one had the discretionary budget to do on the spot. And if these taxpayers simply 
ignored the police and left the chains on for a week, they would be de facto exempt from 
taxes after the police moved on to the dozen other communes that had made similar 
requests for enforcement, or any of the other security obligations that the police were 
expected to meet during the legislative elections.  
 
Violence in the enforcement of tax collection is rare and infrequent, is largely on a 
shoestring budget, and exists almost exclusively in the form of a threat. But in this ne-
gotiation over payment, there is a vast asymmetry of information: not all taxpayers know 
that the physical authority of the local state to collect taxes is largely a negotiating bluff. 
And the Mayor’s reputation for violence more generally creates an environment in which 
taxpayers have every reason to believe that this threat is real and present.  
 
Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, I have focused on how a form of authority is exercised through the fiscal 
knowledge apparatus. In the commune of Mermoz Sacré-Cœur, the technical practice 
of tax collection is part and parcel of the broader cultivation of communal authority in 
Dakar grounded in the Mayor’s reputation for violence. And, inversely, this form of au-
thority underpins the actual practice of tax collection in the commune. Mermoz Sacré-
Cœur is a unique case study in Dakar, as the Mayor’s reputation for violence stands out 
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as an exception in Senegalese politics, long celebrated for its peaceful political transi-
tions and urban democracy. However, as many in Dakar argued, such violence was be-
coming less the exception than the rule.  
 
Nevertheless, violence in Senegalese is taking a significantly different shape than 
elsewhere in the continent. It is neither a state orchestrated genocide nor the everyday 
violence of local “big men”. Instead, much of this violence this is limited to a change in 
the scale and affect of political rallies. And in terms of elite violence, critics point to 
Macky Sall’s increasing propensity to jail his political opponents as a leader in this shift 
towards expanding illegal forms of state violence. Yet Bathélémy Dias presents some-
thing different: largely limited to infrequent but widely known encounters, Dias’ violence 
is more about reputation, rumor, and image than physical force. It is not unusual for a 
local state to enforce tax collection through legal forms of violence. And in many contexts 
across the world it is also not unusual for a local “big man” to wield authority through 
illegal forms of violence (Hansen, 2005). Like such big men, Dias’ violence defied con-
ventional distinctions between legal and illegal (Hansen, 2005: 185). But unlike such big 
men, Dias was an elected official, and it was often up for debate which actions were 
legitimate and which should be prosecuted by law. Put another way, the line between 
Dias’—and his administrators’—public and private action was never clearly defined. And 
rather than clarifying this distinction between public and private authority, many tax ad-
ministrators leveraged the confusion and fear that such violence evoked.  
 
This style of political violence has had effects on tax collection and fiscal authority 
in the communes. The decentralization reforms devolved fiscal authority to the country’s 
newly established communes, but the laws left individual communes to establish this 
authority on the ground themselves. In this respect, the decentralization reforms were a 
success: each took on an administrative style distinct to their elected officials; they were 
free to administer communal affairs as they saw fit, with a decreasing role of the central 
government in overseeing this administration. But the communes were free in a double 
sense: they were free from central state oversight, but also free to pay for communal 
expenses themselves. And finding the resources for cash distributions to public educa-
tion or patronage distributions to the Mayor’s political supporters was a new administra-
tive labor that each commune was left to work out on its own. It is in this sense that this 
reputation for violence was a discrete problematization of communal authority. Again, 
the solution that emerged in the practice of tax collection was not to legally clarify the 
public actions of communal representatives, but to leverage the fear incited by Dias’ 
questionable techniques of exercising violent authority.  
 
From this perspective, establishing a functional fiscal chain—enrollment, billing, 
collection, and enforcement—remained an elusive practical reality. The physical labor 
required to create the fiscal chain is scarce: administrative staff are not trained and work 
for low pay, and enforcing local tax collection is not a priority of the local police. As part 
of an explicit mandate to expand the “free administration” of the communes, Act III in-
tended to leave communes to administer themselves. But in the absence of training and 
resources for communal administration, the kinds of fiscal techniques that emerged after 
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the reforms were highly dependent on the individual character of the commune. Those 
with robust public markets, for example, continued to thrive in their regular collection of 
market taxes and fees, while residential and religious communes struggled to expand 
collection and lost resources because of the reforms. The problem of how to know a tax 
base and how to effectively extract wealth from it was left to be worked out by street-
level tax collectors in communes across Dakar. And the political and social hierarchies 
in Senegalese administration meant that the individual comportment of Mayors were 
clearly reflected downward into the practice of collection itself.   
 
For this reason, tax collection in Mermoz Sacré-Cœur was a kind of shoestring 
authority: there were very little resources to physically enforce collection, but the repu-
tation and rumors of violence worked as a different form of enforcement. In the common 
practice of tax negotiation, this reputation—and the threat it implies—were largely a bluff, 
there was little physical capacity to orchestrate this violence. But taxpayers had no 
knowledge of local state capacity. There was, as one administrator pointed out, a “gap 
of information” between the public and the state. However, this gap was not necessarily 
a problem to be solved, but a useful context in which to negotiate and enforce tax col-
lection. In this context, reputation was everything because reputation was information. 
As one tax collector pointed out, “in the U.S. they said the clothes don’t make the man. 
But in Senegal, the clothes do make the man.” Although he made this comment to en-
courage me to buy a new outfit to celebrate the end of Ramadan, he also thought that it 
applied to the world of politicians in which reputation and public opinion were central to 
electoral success. In this chapter, however, I have argued that this reputation had polit-
ical effects outside the realm of electoral politics, it influenced tax collection and, there-
fore, was tightly linked to the fiscal authority of the commune itself.  
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CONCLUSION 
Circulating Municipal Forms 
	
“Act	3	of	decentralization	just	erased	200	years	of	history	of	the	City	of	Dakar”	
Khalifa	Sall,	Mayor	of	the	City	of	Dakar		
Twitter,	January	31,	2014	(qtd	in	Tanvé,	2018:	1)	
 
In the years following 2013, there were historic transformations afoot in Dakar. Not only 
was Dakar an exemplar of Africa’s rise in the global economy, but its domestic political 
scene had changed dramatically since the turn of the new millennium. Known globally 
for its peaceful and democratic transitions of Presidential power, electoral rivalries in 
Senegal had after 2013 taken new and more violent forms. In this dissertation, I have 
analyzed how municipal officials, development experts, and various publics in—and be-
yond—Dakar have attempted to make sense of municipal authority in the context of 
widespread economic and political change. Many of my informants were deeply con-
cerned with the legal assignment of functions among different levels of government and 
the local exercise of governmental authority. And as I have demonstrated here, electoral 
rivalries often emerged as a ready-made explanation for the various kinds of political 
disputes taking place across Dakar’s urban landscape.  
 
For Mayor Sall and many of his supporters, the 2013 reforms were an attack on 
their electoral futures. If the reforms took away the City’s capacity to govern, they as-
sured me, it would also take away their notoriety and relevancy in Dakar’s municipal and 
presidential elections. But Mayor Sall’s tweet in 2014 points to a different explanation of 
events: not only did Act III pose a problem for the City’s future, but Sall understood it as 
a betrayal of the City’s illustrious legacy. For over a century, Dakar was an urban center 
of West African democracy, and its communes were a central site through which colonial 
subjects could make claims to a more global form of citizenship and sovereignty beyond 
Africa’s continental borders. There was, in other words, a much broader set of transfor-
mations taking place in Dakar than could be readily understood in terms of the electoral 
rivalries post 2013. And these transformations had to do with a longstanding set of de-
bates over the distribution of Senegalese sovereignty and citizenship.  
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It is in this sense that I depart from how most of my informants have explained 
the fiscal experiments—and the disputes they entailed—that I have examined here. I do 
not foreground electoral rivalries as the ultimate source or ground of political contesta-
tion, and I do not understand the law as an “instrumentalization of justice”. There is no 
doubt that elected officials in Dakar have sought new battlegrounds in which to challenge 
electoral opponents both within and beyond their political parties. Yet Mayor Sall’s tweet 
reveals there was another kind of historical transformation going on in Dakar: it was a 
new chapter of an old history of the redistribution of sovereignty through Senegal’s com-
munal form, a process that I have termed municipal state formation. And such a re-
distribution was not only taking place in the grand historical narratives of electoral poli-
tics or legal reform, but also in the more mundane scenes of politics that often took place 
away from local public view.  
 
Most of my informants did not frame these transformations in terms of sovereignty 
and its distribution. For many, Senegalese sovereignty has been resolved, asserted, and 
strengthened in its national form since decolonization. Indeed, Senegal’s positive narra-
tive is an important antidote to the common diagnosis of the weakness or failures of the 
African state. It is a necessary counter to how theorists have long viewed the African 
experience as a negative example of historical developments in the state and reason 
(see Hegel, 1956). During my fieldwork, the question of sovereignty emerged in a differ-
ent and perhaps more familiar set of conversations: for many of my interlocutors, the 
frontiers of the sovereign form lay at the nation’s borders, in renewed claims to monetary 
sovereignty, or in the critiques of French control over local telecommunication industry. 
But, in this dissertation, I do not map these frontiers of Senegalese sovereignty. Instead 
I have turned inward to the “city” to examine one of the earliest problematizations of 
sovereignty on the continent—one which never desired or anticipated a national form, 
but nevertheless continues to transform alongside it.  
 
However, most scholars have not turned towards the commune as an especially 
revelatory site from which to understand sovereignty. Many scholars of Senegal have, in 
contrast, focused on Atlantic exchange networks and, later, international recognition. 
David Robinson (2000) argues that Senegal’s political and economic relation to coloni-
alism should be understood as “accommodation”—neither association or assimilation, 
but a strategic and partial contract with the colonial state and its European merchants. 
And this ersatz political and economic position—both an economic ally and a political 
opponent to the French—was established from the start of the region’s contact with 
Europe. As Michael Ralph (2015) argues, the Muslim brotherhoods of the Senegambian 
region have long been understood as models of peaceful comportment through eco-
nomic exchange. And that this understanding of the Senegalese people has also become 
associated with “the overriding historical disposition of the Senegalese state” (pg. 4) as 
“one of Africa’s most stable democracies” (pg. 14). But how did the Senegalese nation-
state arrive at such a privileged diplomatic standing?   
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For Ralph, this recognition and profile of Senegalese sovereignty does not derive 
from its adherence to an abstract concept of “sovereignty” that took shape in Europe. 
Rather, Senegal’s international recognition derives from a “series of specific rituals that 
people use to authorize trade and solidify binding diplomatic agreements” (pg. 14). 
These were much more pragmatic practices—such as inter-racial marriage among mer-
chant families or surveilling the ethnic Kingdoms that controlled the region’s interior—
that arose to evaluate which merchants and rulers in the Senegambia region could be 
expected to adhere to binding agreements. In the absence of an internationally codified 
and enforced law, such practices stood in as makeshift contracts. Ralph argues it is 
through these techniques that Senegal came to be understood as a sovereign nation 
with a reputable diplomatic profile. And this positive diplomatic profile has since but-
tressed the nation’s credit-worthiness and its access to various forms of investment and 
aid.  
 
Ralph highlights here an important feature of sovereignty: it is exercised through 
much more mundane and practical techniques than can be understood in terms of in-
ternational law. This reveals what is perhaps an obvious paradox of sovereignty:  that 
the supposedly absolute power of the sovereign remains dependent on international and 
internal recognition from other sovereigns, citizens, and subjects alike (Rutherford, 2012, 
pg. 3). But it is not at all obvious where, when, or by whom such assertions or challenges 
to sovereignty will be advanced. In thinking with Senegal’s unique approach to anticolo-
nial statecraft, I take the commune as an alternative entry-point to this paradox of sov-
ereignty. The commune, as I have argued here, has long been a site through which sov-
ereignty and citizenship have been re-distributed in Senegal. And I have further demon-
strated how the commune’s fiscal techniques offer up an important vantage point from 
which to understand how such sovereignty and citizenship continue to be problematized 
today. The local state in Senegal—and elsewhere across the world—is neither a failure 
or a success, neither complete nor incomplete. But municipal state formation is a distinct 
kind of problem out of which arises a constellation of disagreements over how and where 
municipal authority may legitimately be exercised.  
 
Such an analysis provides insight into one localized form of the problematization 
of local government, which I have situated in the broader field of Black reason: how the 
commune emerged as a site of critical reflection and practical intervention for West Af-
rica’s relation to the world. It is in this specific sense that the commune was the site 
through which a limited number of “evolved” (évolué) West Africans could legitimately 
be included as citizens in the sovereign Republic of France. As Mbembe points out, 
“Western metaphysics has traditionally defined the human in terms of language and rea-
son” (2017: 85) and the general problem that persisted through 19th century colonialism 
was whether or not people of African descent were similar enough in their humanity—in 
language and in reason—to warrant the same rights as Europeans. Such racialized dis-
courses prompted a number of responses which arrived at the general presumption of 
absolute difference: that people of African descent were not similar enough to warrant 
inclusion. In Senegal, however, a different response arose in which native subjects could 
be “converted” to this “essential similarity among all human beings” (87). For Mbembe 
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this politics of assimilation “consisted in desubstantializing and aestheticizing difference, 
at least for the subset of natives co-opted into the space of modernity by being ‘con-
verted’ or ‘cultivated’, made apt for citizenship and the enjoyment of civil rights” (87). 
 
 It is important to underline the particularity of this form of Black reason: there are 
few other locales in the colonial and postcolonial world where assimilation opened such 
a terrain for making claims to civic inclusion in a sovereign democracy. And it is worth 
remembering that even in the case of the Four Communes, colonial authorities tried at 
every step to foreclose access to rights for Africans, ultimately ending in an epochal 
denial of such claims to civic recognition in the form of decolonization. Outside Senegal, 
assimilation did not result in a communal democracy, but instead took the form of strict 
and often violent forms of cultivating proper comportment and de-tribalizing indigenous 
people. And, as such, Mbembe understands the assimilative space of modernity as a 
co-optation, or a foreclosure of the African subject. But there is another Senegalese tra-
dition of postcolonial politics that took assimilation as a potential field of political en-
gagement, one which may not have led to an inevitable co-optation or foreclosure of 
claims to inclusion and self-government.  
 
Decolonization certainly foreclosed formal civic inclusion for its former colonial 
subjects in metropolitan France. As a result, there is now an extended set of debates 
over the civic status of migrants and refugees, and a steady influx of dangerous and 
unsanctioned migration across the Mediterranean32. But the communal form persists in 
Senegal and across West Africa today, and has not ceased to be an important site of 
civic inclusion and the redistribution of Senegalese sovereignty. Although such practices 
are no longer tied to a metropolitan citizenship, they are tied to Senegal’s inclusion into 
an increasingly cosmopolitan understanding of Africa’s relation to the world. Indeed, I 
understand the “complete communalization of the national territory” as a historical prob-
lem-space that takes the commune as its central object of governmental reflection and 
intervention. And the commune has long been a cosmopolitan form. It is for this reason 
that I turn to the “city”—and not the international community or the borders of the nation-
state—to learn something about contemporary transformations in Senegalese sover-
eignty. But what might this mean for theorizations of the “city” and sovereignty elsewhere 
and outside Senegal?  
 
*** 
 
In these final pages, I offer some concluding reflections on the generalizability of munic-
ipal state formation in Dakar. I take two approaches to outlining the general significance 
of the case, and I will take each in turn. First, I recount briefly the empirical generalizability 
of the commune, and then I go on to further elaborate a conceptual and comparative 
generalizability with which to understand the relationship between city and sovereignty 
																																																						
32 For a detailed study of how the concerns of humanitarianism in France’s bureaucracy of immigration 
see Ticktin (2011) and Fassin (2005).  
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in places far beyond West Africa. I conclude with a brief juxtaposition of the case of my 
hometown of St. Louis, Missouri.    
 
Senegal’s Four Communes have served as a model for Francophone localities 
across the region, and Dakar remains a model of municipal government among interna-
tional development experts. There is therefore a regional limitation to the empirical gen-
eralizability of the communal form. In Dakar, there emerged protracted legal disputes 
over the status of local governments, and scholars have noted that there were similar 
debates over when and where communal status made sense in West Africa (Goerg, 
2006). But what kinds of political—and perhaps fiscal—techniques emerged as the prob-
lem of communal form arose in different locales across Francophone West Africa? To 
which publics did these communes turn in order to exercise and expand their authority? 
And with what norms did the commune itself emerge as a problem of governmental re-
flection? Just as the communal form emerged as a different kind of problem in its relo-
cation from France to Senegal, there are a similar set of transformations that arose in the 
empirical generalization of the commune across West Africa. It is in this sense that the 
historical case of the Four Communes is a consequential reference point for further in-
quiry into the commune as a form-in-circulation across the region.  
 
But there is another, more contemporary case to be made for why municipal state 
formation in Dakar may matter beyond the region. As I have demonstrated here, devel-
opment experts are holding out municipal bonds and credit-risk rating as a potential 
solution to the crisis of fiscal capacity for municipalities across the world. Although Dakar 
never issued its bonds, the failure has nevertheless transformed into a lesson-learned 
for policy experts elsewhere on the continent seeking to experiment with a similar form: 
Abidjan (Côte D’Ivoire) and Kampala (Uganda) have both taken steps towards their own 
bond issuances, for example. Beyond this, however, Dakar remains a city where institu-
tions like the World Bank continue to introduce novel forms of governmental intervention 
at the municipal level. These interventions are not only new to Dakar, but they are also 
often new to developmental expertise more generally.  
 
For example, during my fieldwork in Dakar, the World Bank was beginning a new 
program for the evaluation of communal governments and the distribution of central 
state transfers, part of a Program-for-Results Financing (PforR) scheme. PforR programs 
were new to the Bank in 2012, and Dakar was the first site in which such an evaluative 
framework would be applied to evaluating the performance of a local government. As 
one of my interlocutors at the Bank described it, the program would set in place perfor-
mance indicators which were rewarded with an increase in fiscal transfers. It would, in 
his view, put in place the right incentives for local governments to respond to the needs 
of their citizens in a democratic and transparent fashion. I left the field before the imple-
mentation of the program and it remains to be seen the results of the Bank’s experiment 
with creating a new fiscal incentive structure for local governments. How might such an 
incentive change the exercise of municipal authority in Dakar? And how might this re-
sponse transform the Bank’s interventions in this sector more generally? Such questions 
offer an expanded field of inquiry into how new municipal financing schemes at the World 
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Bank may change the terms of municipal state formation in the Global South, with Dakar 
once again as an experimental and exemplary case.  
 
 Beyond this empirical generalization of the case of Dakar, I also want to make a 
conceptual case for how municipal state formation may be taken up methodologically 
elsewhere in the world. Again, the scholarly literature on municipalities and state for-
mation could not quite account for many of the transformations I encountered during my 
fieldwork in Dakar. Much of the thinking on the formation of cities engaged with a radi-
cally different place and time: medieval Europe stood in as the exemplar of the earliest 
city form and the historical narrative of its centralization in the modern nation-state. The 
fear of war is understood as the impetus of such centralization, but this had little explan-
atory power when analyzing decentralization and municipal authority. And African na-
tion-states appeared only later as a negative example of a more general, normative, and 
ideal-typical form. Then in turning to some of the more recent thinking on the “city”, I 
discovered that many of the most important elements of state formation—violence and 
taxation—had taken a conceptual backseat to constitutional law and the legal assign-
ment of functions. In this context, municipal authority often appeared in the form of wide-
spread legal reforms to delegate political and fiscal authority to the lowest possible level 
of government. But how, then, should one make sense of a contemporary municipality 
were law, violence, taxation, and the legitimate authority of a municipal government re-
main up for constant experimentation and dispute?   
 
 The contest over municipal authority and the redistribution of sovereignty did not 
end in the middle ages and it does not only take place in terms of legal reform today. 
Municipal state formation might at first appear as a kind of reflection on a medieval past, 
but I insist that a frame of analysis usually reserved for the medieval “city” remains an 
important way to make sense of municipalities in the present. However, the purpose of 
such an analysis is not to imply a temporal equivalence between an African present and 
a European past (see Fabian, 2014). Dakar is not a place from which to learn what Europe 
once was, as a relic of colonial bureaucracy or insight into a foregone time before au-
thority was consolidated in a centralized nation-state. Rather, the purpose of this analy-
sis is to assert the coeval and cosmopolitan nature of the municipal form and to provide 
a mode of inquiry that might be useful in other locales.  
 
*** 
 
Take, for example, the case of municipal government in St. Louis, Missouri. In 2013, a 
white police officer shot and killed an 18-year-old, Black, unarmed, young man named 
Michael Brown. Brown was killed in his hometown of Ferguson, a suburban municipality 
in St. Louis county, and his death set off widespread protest against police brutality 
which later coalesced into the Black Lives Matter, a global movement which aims to 
intervene in violence inflicted on Black communities by the state. But Brown’s murder 
also provoked a renewed set of reflections on the problem of municipal government, for 
which St. Louis had long been a local exemplar of broader trends in the United States.  
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In 2015, the year after Brown’s murder, the Civil Rights Division of the Department 
of Justice published the findings of its investigation into the Ferguson Police Department 
(FPD). This investigation revealed “a pattern or practice of unlawful conduct within the 
FPD that violates the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution, and federal statutory law” (pg. 1). Such violations revealed a facet of Amer-
ican life with which many Black residents were already intimately aware: police violence, 
harassment, and unlawful conduct disproportionately impact Black people, and this in-
stitutionalized racism has left many residents with profound distrust of their local police 
departments. The report found the FPD to “both reflect and exacerbate existing racial 
bias” and that such practices have “sown deep mistrust” and undermined “law enforce-
ment legitimacy among American-Americans in particular” (2).  
 
But perhaps even more surprising was what the report considered the impetus 
for such aggressive policing: revenue generation. Department of Justice (DOJ) investi-
gators conclusively determined that Ferguson City officials “exhort police and staff to 
deliver…sizeable increases in in municipal fines and fees each year…and closely monitor 
whether those increases are achieved” (2). Rather than enforcing municipal codes to 
promote public safety, the police department had instead focused on the narrower in-
terest of generating measurable revenue increases for the municipal government. This 
approach to policing introduced a new measure of “productivity”, in which officer eval-
uations and promotions were evaluated in terms of “number of citations issued”. As a 
result, the report concludes, “many officers appear to see some residents…less as con-
stituents to be defended than as potential offenders and sources of revenue” (2). And 
further, the report determined that the municipal court, too, was using its “judicial au-
thority as the means to compel the payment of fines and fees that advance the City’s 
financial interests” (6). There was, in other words, a fiscal pressure which intensified 
FPD’s already biased policing of its Black residents.  
 
In the years since the DOJ’s report, it has become increasingly clear that the “fines 
and fees” approach to municipal policing was not limited to St. Louis. There has been, 
for example, decades of recourse to techniques like Philadelphia’s civil forfeiture, which 
allowed the city’s police department to seize the assets of individuals involved in a crime. 
As Jackson Smith (2018) argues, “forfeiture became a salve for law enforcement as aus-
terity measures hit a city already reeling from widespread disinvestment and hemorrhag-
ing population.” And forfeiture only increased in the decades since its introduction in the 
1980s, peaking in the 2000’s at an average of “10 percent or more of the DA’s annual 
budget” (Smith, 2018). Similarly, Alexes Harris (2016) argues that monetary sanctions 
are widespread in United States, and that the imposition by the criminal justice system 
of fines and fees ensures that the “poor experience a permanent punishment” that they 
can never repay (pg xix). Like in the case of Ferguson, it appears that municipalities 
across the United States are blurring the line between punishment and fiscal manage-
ment (Harris, 2016: 11).  
 
St. Louis, however, remains a key reference point for this “fines and fees” ap-
proach to municipal fiscal management. As Ava Kofman (2019) reveals, St. Louis courts 
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have long forced defendants to pay for the means of their own punishment. These courts 
hired a private contractor, Eastern Missouri Alternative Sentencing Services, to manage 
the assignment of ankle-monitors to defendants on bail, all of whom were required to 
pay a down payment ($300), an installation fee ($50), and a daily use fee ($10) for the 
duration of their sentence or time awaiting trial. Kofman (2019) reports that such elec-
tronic monitoring services offered municipal governments a cheaper alternative to the 
“moral outrage and fiscal sinkhole” of mass incarceration, and represent “one of the 
fastest growing revenue sectors of their industry.” Unlike other forms of “fines and fees” 
policing, electronic monitoring does not generate revenue for the court. Rather, the im-
petus for the expansion of such fiscal devices is to reduce the cost of punishment. It is, 
in other words, a cost-saving measure that puts the burden of payment on individual 
offenders, and relieves the public from paying the full price of public safety itself.   
 
 From these cases, there emerges a portrait of urban fiscal administration that 
seems to confirm the critical conventional wisdom on municipal government: beginning 
in the 1980s governments across the country introduced fiscal austerity measures to 
compete for firms to locate within their municipal jurisdiction (Harvey, 1989). And in the 
decades since the 80s this austerity has introduced municipal fiscal crises that have 
been resolved through more budgetary cutbacks and a turn towards municipal debt-
financed development and new financial techniques like tax-increment financing (see 
Sbragia, 1996). From this perspective, the revenues of such entrepreneurial cities re-
bound alongside the urban economy: the entrepreneurial city has, in this sense, staked 
its future on the return and growth of urban capital. But I propose that the concept of 
municipal state formation—drawn from the case of Dakar—might call attention to some 
under-recognized transformations in the American “city” that remain obscured by these 
theories of the entrepreneurial, neoliberal city.  
 
 One could, for example, ask a slightly different question about the municipal form 
in the United States: How has the municipality been constituted as a kind of problem? 
And what are the novel set of experimental techniques that have emerged out of critical 
reflection on the problem of municipal form? To take these questions seriously requires 
a shift in analysis away from critical conventional wisdom on the neoliberal and entre-
preneurial city. In these analysis, fiscal austerity appears as symptomatic of broader 
shifts in a supposedly global and neoliberal capitalism. The problem at hand is centered 
on a broader crisis of capitalism for which the municipality and its city figure as a solu-
tion—or, in the critical vocabulary, as a fix. Yet there are more problem-spaces at play. 
As Ignacio Farías (2011) has argued, critical urban scholarship has long taken capital-
ism—not the city—as its central object of research. And Farías counters that urban 
scholars should return to an inquiry of the city. For Farías, such an inquiry conceptualizes 
the city as a socio-material assemblage and “a metabolic process of matter and energy” 
(pg. 368), and it allows “an understanding of the real”, the multiplicity of forms in the city, 
and the “actual urban situations” around which a democratic politics may emerge.  
 
 Following Farías, I begin with a city form—the commune—as my initial object of 
inquiry. But I depart from Farías in one important way: I do not make an ontological 
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argument about what cities are, nor do I seek to reveal the “real” or the “actual” of a 
socio-material and urban assemblage. In short, I do not counter critical and theoretical 
reflections with an empirical inquiry into ontological form. Rather, I take critical reflections 
on the problem of the “city” as my central objects of research. Such a reflection is not a 
task reserved for urban scholars. Municipal officials, development experts, bureaucrats, 
and urban publics alike are constantly reflecting on—and intervening in—the problem of 
the municipal form. The purpose of this style of inquiry is not to find new objects of 
contemplation available in the field—say, the “city” in contrast to capital—but to reflect 
on the work of problematization more generally as an engine of knowledge formation in 
the world (see Miyazaki, 2003: 262). Once again, I ask, what are the set of critical reflec-
tions and governmental interventions that arise from the problem of the municipal form? 
At which historical junctures have such problem-spaces consolidated and transformed? 
And to what effect? 
 
 To illustrate this point, let me return to this juxtaposition of St. Louis, Missouri and 
Dakar, Senegal. Both cities today have around 3 million inhabitants. Both are former 
French colonies, but from very different eras of French imperial expansion. While the 
French legacy of law and administration is much more recent and more apparent in Da-
kar, St. Louis has by contrast been outside French colonial rule since the Louisiana pur-
chase in the early 19th century. The municipal form in St. Louis today is not a result of 
the French revolutions, the end of slavery in the French empire, the rise of the colonial 
policy of assimilation, or the democratic and liberal values associated with the communal 
government. Instead, municipalities in St. Louis are more closely linked to American 
home rule laws and the history of suburbanization and racial segregation in the mid-
twentieth century United States. But the comparison I want to draw here centers more 
specifically on the problem of municipal government, and how it has been conceptual-
ized differently in St. Louis at two important points in its recent history.   
 
 In 1988, the inaugural report on metropolitan organization by the U.S. govern-
ment’s Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) focused on the 
case of St. Louis. The purpose of the report was to “learn more about how complex 
metropolitan areas are organized and governed in our federal system” (iii) and St. Louis 
was selected because it was “an area oft cited as a prime example of perverse organi-
zational patterns” (pg 9). St. Louis’ governmental organization was indeed complex: at 
the time of publication St. Louis County contained 91 municipalities, 23 school districts, 
and 25 fire protection districts, totaling over 151 governmental units (iii, 9). Like Dakar, 
St. Louis’s urban landscape remains to this day covered by a vast patchwork of munic-
ipal governments which often overlap in jurisdiction with higher levels of government. 
Leading up to the publication of this report, this kind of jurisdictional pattern was under-
stood to be a problem and, as such, was long characterized as “fragmented” in a pejo-
rative sense. The report was self-consciously “controversial” and sought to re-frame 
such fragmentation as a positive attribute of metropolitan regions with “the potential for 
and realization of more accessible representation of local citizens, more economical pat-
terns of accountability, and greater local responsibility for local problems” (iii).   
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 The authors of the report intended to change the way experts understood St. 
Louis’ jurisdictional pattern: although fragmentation was widely accepted a pejorative 
term for an undesirable form of metropolitan organization, the authors argued that such 
a complex pattern promoted the “creative capacities” of communities to collectively ad-
dress their common needs; and in the tradition of Alexander Hamilton, to join “reflection 
and choice” in a tradition of self-governance that “predates the U.S. constitution” (pg. 
iii). Indeed, the authors of the report were introducing what was at the time a new under-
standing of metropolitan governance put forth by Vincent Ostrom, Charles Tiebout, and 
Robert Warren (1961). According to the report, this theory of metropolitan organization 
reveals how “jurisdictional fragmentation and overlap can provide an institutional foun-
dation for a productive system of functional relationships among jurisdictions” (4). City-
county consolidations were the most popular reform at the time, but since the 1940s a 
declining percentage of such reforms were approved by popular vote. In contrast, the 
number of municipal incorporations across the country was on the rise. In other words, 
the report argues that the tools available to metropolitan governments did not reflect the 
needs or preferences of urban citizens and, as such, should be re-thought.  
 
 It is in this sense that the report outlines the beginning of a shift in critical reflection 
on the problem of municipal form in the United States. City-county consolidations were 
no longer the right solution to the problem of “fragmentation”, which was itself increas-
ingly making less sense to the experts tasked with its reform. And instead, a new theory 
of local public choice argued that fragmentation could be re-conceptualized as a positive 
value: functional relationships among jurisdictions in a fragmented region were already 
successfully addressing problems of local service provisioning and civic need. The the-
ory was against wholesale reform and instead expected ongoing disputes over jurisdic-
tional inequalities and spillover effects from one jurisdiction to another. Indeed, the re-
port’s authors were aware that “jurisdictional boundaries and the distribution of public 
authority have to be adapted to changing conditions” (6). And they introduced a more 
flexible set of functional arrangements through which municipal governments could pro-
vide public services, many of which involved the contracting out to private companies 
for the production of local public goods (like in the case of electronic monitors today).  
 
 There are striking parallels to be drawn here between St. Louis and Dakar, in part, 
because the justifications that undergird municipal organization in each city are drawn 
from similar sets of critical reflections on democratic government and intergovernmental 
reform. Since the publication of the U.S. government’s inaugural case study on St. Louis, 
the local public goods theory of Ostrom, Tiebout, and Warren (1961) has transformed 
from controversial thought to widespread conventional wisdom. As I have demonstrated 
in the case of Dakar, development interventions today are justified in the very terms with 
which the ACIR report promoted the functional organization of a metropolitan region. 
And local public choice theory continues to circulate and transform public management 
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practices across the world.33 But critical reflections on the proper distribution of munici-
pal authority have been far from resolved by this increasingly dominant approach. In fact, 
the purpose of such a theory was to turn attention to how disputes over such a distribu-
tion of public authority are resolved in situ.  
 
 After the police killing of Michael Brown in 2013, it became clear that extant set 
of reflections on the distribution of St. Louis’ public authority was again taking a new 
form. Inter-jurisdictional competition had driven down municipal revenues, leaving some 
municipalities in St. Louis county to draw 40 percent or more of their revenue from fines 
and fees collected by municipal courts (Balko, 2014). The “fines and fees” mode of po-
licing reflected a highly unequal metropolitan landscape which left many local govern-
ments with little resources, poor populations, and a perverse incentive to extract reve-
nues from diverse forms of fiscal punishment—from an avalanche of small traffic viola-
tions to more complex devices like ankle bracelets. Indeed, this style of policing was 
itself a discrete problematization of the broader fiscal inequalities surrounding St. Louis’ 
jurisdictional form. And many argued that Brown’s death revealed this long-standing 
problem of St. Louis’ “unique political geography” in which nearly 115 separate local 
governments were targeting poor, Black residents as novel sources of revenue (Balko, 
2014). And in response, the re-unification and the consolidation of St. Louis City and 
County was once again on the table. In a striking reversal of the 1988 report, the project 
“Better Together” formed to respond to what was once again the problem of “St. Louis’ 
outdated and obsolete fragmented structure” (qtd in Balko, 2014, emphasis added).   
  
 I have briefly examined the case of St. Louis to demonstrate the comparative pos-
sibility of municipal state formation. In Dakar, as much as in St. Louis, the extant set of 
critical reflections on the proper distribution of public authority has brought to the fore 
new sets of techniques for addressing the problem of municipal form. In both cases, 
municipal governments turned to experimental fiscal techniques which, in turn, provoked 
a new set of disputes over the legitimacy of these novel exercises of municipal authority. 
And at stake for each city is more than a question of neoliberal entrepreneurialism, but 
a historical question of democracy, citizenship, belonging, and recognition. In Senegal, 
unification of the metropolitan area is not on the agenda for reform. In fact, just the op-
posite: my fieldwork began in the wake of a legal commitment from the central govern-
ment to carry out the complete communalization of the national territory, to actively cre-
ate what St. louis was once again pejoratively referring to as “fragmented” governance. 
 
In the years after 2013, there emerged a yawning gap in the problematization of 
municipal form on either side of the Atlantic: What one African city understood as a so-
lution—the proliferation of local governments—one American city had come to under-
stand as its most pressing political problem. In this dissertation, I have examined the 
specific form that the problem of municipal government has taken in Dakar in the years 
following its most recent decentralization reforms. It is not a universal concept to be 
																																																						
33 For a specific discussion of how New Public Management has transformed political possibilities in In-
dia and South Africa, see Bear & Mathur (2015) and Von Schnitzler (2016), respectively. 
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taken up and applied to other cities elsewhere in the world. But it is the early outline of 
a concept—drawn from the empirical case of Dakar—that might offer up a useful tool for 
comparison in other areas and other times of the world. It is in this sense that municipal 
state formation may function as a concept-metaphor with which to approach similar 
styles of concept-work elsewhere in the urban world.34  
 
	  
																																																						
34 For Henrietta Moore (2004) the purpose of a concept-metaphor is not to resolve ambiguity between 
and object and its referent, but to maintain “a tension between pretentious universal claims and particu-
lar contexts and specifics” (74). And as Paul Rabinow (2007) suggests, working with such concepts is as 
much a “search of a referent or space of reference as it is an act of naming such a domain that was al-
ready there” (190). Although municipal state formation can’t describe such a universal domain, the point 
is to open a set of inquiries into the particular formulations of the general problem.  
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